From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Nov 04 2003 - 15:23:29 GMT
Dear Wim,
> You wrote 30 Oct 2003 10:52:38 -0500:
> 'when a revolution occurs that overthrows the dictatorial form of
> government and substitutes a republican form, then the social patterns
> are likely to change rather dramatically. The best example I can give
> you is immigrants to this country from Europe who in a single generation
> changed from old country patterns of social behavior to new, freer
> patterns'
>
> American social patterns of value differ from European ones, sure, but
> they didn't become different by a revolution and not even in a single
> generation. Europeans moving to America and participating first in
> European social patterns of value and then in American ones is not an
> example of changing patterns of value.
Sure it is. For the most part, the first generation of Europeans kept
their own language. But their children spoke English. Language is a
social pattern of value.
> You wrote also:
> 'Rorty's theory of truth is that there is no fundamental theory of
> truth. Truth is whatever some group says it is, i.e. what you can get
> away with. Call it Dynamic if you wish. I call it disastrous.'
>
> Dynamic or degenerate? MoQish argumentation would be to quote examples
> of Rorty's theory of truth leading to higher quality (intellectual or
> social) patterns of value respectively lower quality ones. I don't know
> examples of higher quality results (because I don't know enough about
> Rorty and his followers). Maybe Matt K. does? I don't remember you
> quoting examples of lower quality results. You just seemed to express
> your fear that it might lead to such. Can you give such examples?
Sure. Just read Andy's diatribe comparing Bush and Gringrich to Stalin
and Hitler. (Andy along with Matt are this group's champions of Rorty's
belief in fluctuating truths.)
> You continue:
> 'A culture, MOQ-based or otherwise, will fall apart if truth standards
> are up for grabs.'
>
> Following Pirsig's definition of 'a culture' as a sum of social and
> intellectual patterns of value (in 'Lila's Child') I agree that the
> intellectual patterns of value of most cultures, i.e. the SOM-based
> ones, (and thus those cultures) would fall apart without truth
> standards. I don't know enough about Rorty's theories and their effect
> to know whether they would annihilate truth standards or merely
> substitute them with other (more dynamic) ones. In practice groups DO
> determine what is truth for their members, so they apparently do have a
> truth standard... The question is whether ON TOP OF 'social-determined
> truth' there is a more fundamental truth (and whether we need it). What
> basis do we have for telling the group that it is false, for denouncing
> its truth standards? Merely the truth standards of another group? So
> what?
So am I to presume you see no difference between the truth standards of
Soviet Communism and those of the Netherlands? And so, if Soviet style
Communism were to take over the Netherlands, your response would be "So
what?" I don't believe it.
> Societies and cultures only fall apart because of the competition
> between different groups and their intellectual standards. Without a
> group making his theory into a standard, Rorty cannot be of any social
> danger. His theory in itself is not 'socially dangerous'. Groups
> competing for membership can choose almost any intellectual pattern of
> value to rationalize why people should choose to 'belong' to them. It is
> not much of an achievement (or proof of high intellectual quality) for
> an intellectual pattern of value if it is 'chosen' by a stable social
> pattern of value to be part of the same 'culture'. Compare: the sales of
> wordprocessing software can be boosted both by writers of bad prose and
> by writers of good prose (e.g. if the bad prose happens to underpin a
> dictatorial regime).
I don't follow your argument here. It seems to be based on the arguable
presumption that truth must always be determined by some group or
other, neglecting completely the role of the individual in discovering
truth. Is it necessary to list all the individuals who changed
"groupthink" truths of their time? I'll take the truth of Galileo over
the truth of the then current religious group any day. And today, I'll
take the truth of Denmark's Bjorn Lomborg over the truth of radical
environmentalists.
> Finally you ask me:
> 'Should society punish you if you are caught lying in testimony to a
> court?'
>
> No, intellect should. Social patterns of value (in my definition:
> involuntary, habitual and/or socially copied patterns of behavior), e.g.
> paying respect to an impressively clad judge, are not threatened at all
> by lies.
Well, I'm glad somebody should punish you. But keep in mind that
without the 'social' policeman to back it up, an 'intellectual' judge
couldn't punish a rabbit.
Finally, could you sum up your new economics in 100 words or less?
I'd appreciate it. Thanks.
Best regards,
Platt
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