Re: MD Self-consciousness

From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Fri Nov 07 2003 - 18:38:08 GMT

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    Platt,

    > > The MOQ does not account for the sense of self. Illusory it may be, but
    > > whence the illusion?
    >
    > Pirsig makes it clear that the "self" in the MOQ is an intellectual
    > pattern, not an illusion:

    Do you feel like you are an intellectual pattern? I don't. To me,
    intellectual patterns are things like "E=mc[squared]", or "the self is (or
    is not) an illusion". To call the self an intellectual pattern is in the
    same mold as materialists like Rorty and Dennett, who look on the self as a
    figure in a narrative. Such claims simply do not fit my experience. In my
    experience, the self is that which thinks intellectual patterns, which
    feels, etc., that it is different from all that is thought, or felt, or
    perceived. In short, it is not SQ alone. (I mention that it may be illusory,
    in that the word "that" in the second to last sentence does not act in the
    same way as, for example, its use in "that which lights up the sky". The
    latter use has a sensory referent (the sun), while its use in "that which
    thinks" does not, so the "may be illusory" refers to the fact that the self
    has no ostensive definition. That does not make it an intellectual pattern,
    however.)

    > . From Lila, chp 5:
    > "But that the quality is low is absolutely certain. It is the primary
    > empirical reality from which such things as stoves and heat and oaths
    > and SELF are later intellectually constructed."

    Do you recall ever intellectually constructing the self? I don't. Of course
    I don't recall intellectually constructing the meanings of most of the words
    I use, but I am just pointing out that because the self is not an object of
    sensory perception does not imply that it is not "primary empirical
    reality". This quote is a clear example showing that Pirsig presupposes a
    nominalist viewpoint.

    >
    > Whence the intellectual construction of self? Like the origin of all
    > constructions in the MOQ, from Dynamic Quality.

    Why not entertain the possibility that the self is DQ? It appears to create
    SQ (one thinks new thoughts), and is just as undefinable as DQ, and thus
    that possibility is more logically coherent and empirically adequate than
    the MOQ.

    - Scott

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