From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Sat Nov 15 2003 - 17:26:18 GMT
Scott, Matt
Scott
> I've had no problem understanding Matt (which isn't to say I agree >
> with
> him entirely), so another possibility is that you have locked yourself
> into a set of presuppositions that prevent understanding.
I'll admit to having presuppositions because everyone does. I'll also
admit to having a presupposition that philosophy and discussions about
philosophy should be based on reason and logic, following Pirsig's
definition of logic as "... a set of rules (i.e. an intellectual
pattern) that helps produce high quality in other intellectual
patterns." You on the other hand see logical rules, at least the
Principle of Identity, as something that gets in the way of
understanding, evidenced by your repeated appeal to the "logic of
contradictory identity." Likewise, Matt is predisposed to ignore logic
when it suits him because to argue on a strictly logical basis would
admit to foundationalism.
> A case in
> point is your accusations of self-contradiction when someone says things
> like "Truth will always be a muddle." A statement like this is not
> intended to be a straight true or false proposition. It can be
> interpreted in two ways. One is the way you interpreted it: "Every
> declarative statement has a muddled truth value".
No, I do not claim that every declarative statement has a muddled truth
value. Many declarative statements are merely expressions of feelings
and are never intended to be evaluated as true or false, such as "I had
a very nice time at your party." Many poems and prayers are in the form
of declarative sentences. To assess them as true or false would block
their purpose to elicit aesthetic responses. But, Matt's "Truth will
always be a muddle" is a proposition that can judged true or false,
especially considering it's universal claim, "always."
> But another way to interpret it, and it should be
> obvious in the context that this is what Matt intended, is "If one tries
> to establish criteria that will cover the determination of truth value
> for all declarative sentences, one gets into a muddle."
Since Matt said nothing about "declarative sentences" it would appear
you're taking considerable liberties with his "intentions." You may
have guessed right, but my point about expressing your views plainly
and simply is to eliminate as much guessing like this as possible. I
think that is just good manners on the part of an author to his
readers.
> Thus you miss
> the point when you give examples that are true by correspondence. Truth
> by correspondence only works when the example consists of
> sense-perceptible particulars, as is the case in your examples. But as
> soon as generalities are involved, truth by correspondence doesn't work.
Seems here you admit that Matt's statement is a general proposition
like I initially interpreted it. Further, I strongly disagree that when
general propositions are asserted, specific evidence of the truth of
the assertion based on correspondence to experience (empiricism)
doesn't work. Not only does it work but should be demanded. Recall that
Pirsig never shirks from putting such abstract generalities as quality
and morality and values to empirical, "correspondence" tests. If you
posit that reality is direct experience, then correspondence to that
reality should be insisted upon rather than ignored, especially as
thoughts tend to drift upward into airy generalities until they
disappear into misty ambiguities.
Matt
> > > No justification of truth by direct sensation--only change in
> > > belief.
Platt
> > Without explaining the difference as you see it between "truth" and
> > "true belief," this reader is left wondering what you mean in making
> > this distinction.
Scott
> Matt is here giving the pragmatist view. He is trying to change
> philosophical vocabulary, just as Pirsig does in Lila.
I didn't know there was a "philosophical vocabulary" other than a
number of terms common to that particular field of study as there are
in all particular fields of study. Examples of philosophical
vocabulary I suppose are: pragmatism, contextualism, epistemology,
metaphysics, existentialism, pantheism, teleology, and the like I
can't think of a single instance in Lila where Pirsig changed such
vocabulary other than to extend "morality" beyond just human social
behavior to include all creation. "Morality," of course, is not a term
confined just to philosophy as an religiously-inclined person will be
more than happy to explain.
Platt
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