Re: MD When is a metaphysics not a metaphysics?

From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Sat Nov 29 2003 - 22:43:52 GMT

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    Dear Matt K.,

    Having finished reading the new Harry Potter, which appeared in Dutch last
    weekend, I can now reply to your 24 Nov 2003 12:45:44 -0600 post:

    I didn't misunderstand (your) calling the questions that organize my beliefs
    & experience trivial with calling my beliefs trivial (which you didn't do).
    Your description demonstrated quite convincingly that at least your
    (personal) beliefs are organized in quite a trivial way. In other words:
    they are quite unorganized and appear to depend on coincidences.

    You may be right with:
    'I doubt we organize our beliefs all that differently, but in a specific
    sense, we almost certainly do because of the personal experiences we've had.
    In a broad sense, most of the differences are pretty trivial, but in a
    specific sense, they make the difference between marrying at 18 or 45, being
    a Quaker or being a Buddhist, loving comedy or thinking Chris Rock poor
    taste. The only things that really make a difference are the belief in
    democracy and the desire to minimize cruelty in the world.'

    So yes, the questions as I formulated them may be unimportant as a way of
    organizing personal beliefs and experience. I'm not so sure however if they
    are also unimportant as a way of organizing collective beliefs and
    experience, the intellectual patterns of value that we share with lots of
    other people despite the trivial differences between our beliefs and
    experiences.
    The body of beliefs and ways of experiencing life that connects people and
    constitutes (the intellectual aspect of) cultures, that has (been) developed
    over centuries, doesn't that depend on (some people at some points in time)
    asking those questions and reformulating the common-sensical answers to
    them?
    Personal beliefs and experiences are (despite trivial differences and
    haphazard changes) part of larger-scale patterns of value (e.g. Quakerism
    and Buddhism). We choose to (or happen to) participate in them. They exist
    because enough people do so for some or their time. Couldn't the continuity
    (stability and versatility) of such patterns depend on consistent answers to
    the questions as I formulated them?
    '1) How can we know? (epistemology)
    2) What can we know? (ontology)
    3) How can we know what we should do? (meta-ethics)'

    With friendly greetings,

    Wim

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