From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Dec 02 2003 - 23:56:50 GMT
David,
Platt made a strange reach for help (from Susan Haack), but I'm not sure why. I questioned _his_ and Mark's understanding of pragmatism and philosophy, not Susan Haack's. I know who Haack is already, so the credentials were unneeded. I have no doubt that Haack understand's a philosophical argument much better than Platt and Mark. But that wasn't the issue. Those two are the one's with irrational impulses, not Haack, who can mount an argument.
David says, "Your quote is an interpretation of Haack's interpretation of Rorty, as far as I know Haack does not use the word dangerous in her work with respect to Rorty, a strange idea with respect to a philosopher."
I've read two pieces by Haack that talks about Rorty: Ch. 9 of her Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology entitled "Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect" and "Vulgar Rortyism," a review of Loius Menand's excellent (in my opinion, not Haack's) anthology of pragmatist philosophy (the review is available online). I'm pretty sure the word dangerous never pops up. However, Haack's tone is as reactionary as Platt's. I swear, Platt probably picked up on Haack completely on accident, but the two are a perfect fit. I suggest to Platt that he read the chapter from her book, where she mounts an argument (the review doesn't have an argument, its more or less just spite). Maybe he can pick up on it.
For all of Haack's spite and piss and vinegar, Rorty says that "I cannot see the difference Haack sees between prizing these [scientific] communities [as opposed to prescientific] for their greater like-mindedness and prizing them for their greater truth-indicativeness (any more than I see the difference between praising myself for having achieved a really tight fit between all my beliefs and experiences and praising myself for being a good truth-indicator). The two compliments seem to me not to differ in their pragmatic implications, except that the latter gives the epistemological skeptic (the person who asks, "How do you _know_ they are truth-indicative?") an opening that the former does not. That seems to me an excellent reason for restricting ourselves to the former compliment." (from Rorty and Pragmatism)
Rorty limits himself to agreeing with Haack that the difference between the two aforementioned cultures is "a matter of greater willingness to submit beliefs to criticism, a greater awareness of alternatives," (from Haack's article) but refuses to add "greater truth-indicativeness" to the list of differences. It just leads to philosophical problems that pragmatism (which Haack considers herself an adherent) should have cleared up. Rorty's response is a brilliant foil to Haack's vehement attacks as he is more or less bewildered as to how Haack has gotten herself so worked up. (Alas for Platt, I suppose, is that Rorty does question her understanding of the neopragmatist line.)
Matt
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