From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Tue Jan 06 2004 - 01:00:15 GMT
Anthony said:
The first problem with the above paragraph is the term “Rortyan” which, in the above context, is an absurdity. This is because anyone who seriously believes Rorty’s call for artistic self-creation won’t simply regurgitate Rortyan philosophy but invent an original philosophy (as per Nietzsche or Pirsig). As Rorty notes:
“The generic task of the ironist is… to sum up his life in his own terms…. That the last of his final vocabularies, at least, really was wholly his.” (CON, p.97)
I’d rather visit Rorty’s website or read his books rather than look at Matt’s second hand rehash. It seems that Matt has gone from being a priest of one philosopher (i.e. Pirsig) to just being a priest of another (i.e. Rorty) thus ignoring the emphasis both these philosophers have on creative originality.
Matt:
This is where Anthony gets nasty, so you'll excuse my staccatoness.
1) In the "above context," the notion of following in Rorty's footsteps, of being a "Rortyan," is not absurd. The context at issue was that "Rortyans simply think that, for the most part, real life issues can be split into public issues and private issues." This is a typical liberal platitude. It is political, it reflects my public side, not my private side. As part of my public side, it is something I hope to reach commensuration with others on. As such, I do not wish to invent an "original philosophy" because I agree with Rorty that in Western social and political thought, Mill probably summarizes "the last _conceptual_ revolution it needs." (CIS, 63)
2) It is true that Rorty, Pirsig, and Nietzsche call for creativity. The intellectual historian's job is tell each of them where they've failed. Unlike Pirsig, Rorty's public rhetoric is that he isn't even attempting for originality, that he's simply regurgitating Sellars and Quine or commenting on various other original philosophers. He says, "I don't think I have any original ideas. I think that all I do is pick up bits of Derrida and bits of Dewey and put them next to each other and bits of Davidson and bits of Wittgenstein and stuff like that. It's just a talent for bricolage, rather than any originality. If you don't have an original mind, you comment on people who do." (Interview) For whatever personal idiosyncracies, I'm much more attracted to Rorty's humility than anybody else's hubris. As it happens, I also agree with David Hall who says that despite Rorty's claim to only be a "weak thinker," there is a strong case to be made for him being a strong poet.
All this being said, I never claimed to be original. I never claimed to be trying. Rorty says, "I think that of the various potentialities that human beings might hope to fulfill, such a person fulfills only some and leaves others unfulfilled. I think it comes to saying: Ideally, people ought to be both imaginative and nice. Some people are nice without being imaginative. Some people are imaginative without being nice. One out of two isn't bad, but it would be nice to have both." (Interview)
Is it ironic that I let Rorty do all the talking about how unoriginal I am? No, simply self-fulfilling. The only thing I've claimed is that Rorty's the best philosophy I've read so far.
3) "That the last of his final vocabularies, at least, really was wholly his." The _last_ of his final vocabularies. For an ironist, this means the vocabulary she's using when she dies because that is the only point at which an ironist stops recontextualizing, reweaving her web of beliefs.
I'm 23 Anthony. I think pointing out how unoriginal I am is one of the silliest ad hominems one could possibly offer. Of course I'm unoriginal, I'm still being socialized, I'm still learning. Individuation, a real strong effort for originality won't happen for me (because I ain't no genius) until later. And I think it equally silly for me to take the easy way out and turn your attack back on you.
(With that, I hope to at least fulfill the "nice" part.)
Anthony said:
For instance, despite strongly promoting ironic philosophy (i.e. philosophy that an individual creates for themselves i.e. a true philosopher in Pirsigian terms), Rorty thinks that “a society whose culture socialised its youth in such a way as to make them continually dubious about their own process of socialization” is a bad thing; that in “the ideal liberal society (only) the intellectuals would still be ironists.” (CON, page 87) This section strikes me of elitism.
Matt:
This is a cogent claim, but I don't think its quite true despite appearances. This passage of Rorty's is difficult to understand, but I think you've run together two separate claims. The first is that "the intellectuals would still be ironists, although the nonintellectuals not." The second is that "there could or ought to be a culture whose public rhetoric is _ironist_." (CIS, 87) I think Rorty's wrong in the first case and not the second and I think he would agree with me given what he's said elsewhere.
The first claim as it is expanded is tricky, but it hinges on him being able to make a difference between being an ironist and simply being a nominalist and historicist. I think he can, but I don't think he gets the mileage out of it that he thinks. I think the only difference between an ironist and a nominalist/historicist that Rorty makes is that the ironist is a nominalist and an historicist _plus_ she has "radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses." (CIS, 73) Rorty's claim, then, is that nonintellectuals cannot have radical and continuing doubts. I think this wrong. Rorty is here running together two things: being an ironist ("radical and continuing doubts") and being an intellectual, the only distinguishing mark I can find being that intellectuals are "bookish." (CIS, 87) I don't see why you can only have radical doubts if you are bookish. Rorty is not, however, priveleging bookish people over nonbookish. Its simply a sociologic
al distinction. As I quoted Rorty earlier, a liberal democracy "would not insist that anybody be self-creative if they don't feel like it."
The second claim is even trickier, but I think Rorty's right though I still don't think it implies elitism. When Rorty says that he cannot imagine our public rhetoric being ironist, he is, first, saying that he cannot imagine us having radical and continuing doubts about the desire to alleviate the misery of others. If we did, we would no longer be liberals. Rorty is suggesting that, though we teach people that their beliefs are contingent, we shouldn't teach them to be _continually_ and _radically_ doubtful of the wrongness of being cruel to others. Second, he is saying that if we were to have doubts, they would occur in solitude, not in public when we are attempting to affect action. In public, we would stand shoulder to shoulder and unflinchingly demand that people be treated equally. In private, we would think by ourselves that maybe this isn't what we should be doing. I don't see why this implies elitism for the same reasons as I noted above with the first claim:
A) you don't have to be an intellectual to be an ironist and more importantly B) you don't have to be an intellectual. There's no moral imperative that you be either, though I don't see why we couldn't have a society filled with liberal ironists, even liberal intellectual ironists. I don't see the problem, though I doubt it ever coming to exist, nor do I think it necessarily better that it should exist. On a continuum, I agree with Anthony and Andy that having people be more intellectual than not would be better, but in a liberal society, people can live their lives as they wish (though you can be sure that I'll make everyone read a lot in primary and secondary school).
Anthony said:
This relates to Rorty’s assertion in CON (p. 94) that journalism will do much more for freedom and equality than ironist philosophy. This is surely wrong. To realise this, you only have to examine the xenophobia and sexism generated in the gutter press of the UK (i.e. The Sun, Sport, Express, Daily Mail etc) or the scare-mongering TV news that is largely to blame for the relatively high number of gun deaths in the United States (as noted in Michael Moore’s “Bowling for Columbine”). As such, I really think it’s a dangerous idea to rely on the present _mass_ media of the West to defend freedom and equality. Mandatory classes in philosophy (ironist and otherwise) and sociology for school children would be more effective.
Matt:
First, Rorty's assertion is refering to mudraking journalists like Michael Moore. Just because Rorty emphasizes the greater importance of journalism for political goals than philosophy does not mean he can't make a distinction between good journalism and bad.
Second, I think it is imperative that we have a mass media in the West to defend freedom and equality, though I agree that the _present_ mass media leaves much to be desired. I agree with many political analysts who say that in America there are really four interlocking checks and balances: the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and a free press.
Third, I disagree that philosophy would be more effective than better journalists, though I think sociology would be better than philosophy. When asked if its important to continue to read Plato and Aristotle, Rorty said, "Important for somebody. I mean, it would be a great pity if people ever stopped reading them, but I don't think it's necessary that everybody read them. ...[I] think it would probably be a good idea if everybody had to read Plato in their senior year of High School or their first year of college; they'd be better informed about where their ideas were coming from." (Interview) It would be a great pity, but when it comes to political efficacy, my money's on Michael Moore.
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