From: MATTHEW PAUL KUNDERT (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Fri Jan 16 2004 - 19:02:28 GMT
Anthony,
Anthony said:
Glad to see you got round to reading the interview with Rorty in “Philosophy Now”.
Matt:
Actually, I didn't because I'm not a subscriber to "Philosophy Now" and the interview is restricted.
Anthony said:
Firstly, my comment about defining “Rortyan” was a concern with Rorty’s strong emphasis in CON for artistic self-creation rather than an ad hominem attack, silly or otherwise. To ignore Rorty’s call for originality is to overlook an important point of his work; possibly the most important one.
Matt:
My reply to your comment was concerned with the fact that you somehow thought I had missed Rorty's strong emphasis on self-creation. I tried to make plausible this claim, that it was asanine to think that I ever claimed to be original in my expositions of Rorty and that the expectation of originality was misplaced given purpose and age, and that because of this, your comment ended up only being slanderous. To ignore Rorty's call for different means for different purposes is to overlook an important point of
his work; probably the most important one because it is directly out of his pragmatism. In fact, it is this point that I see you consistently ignoring throughout your reading of Rorty.
Anthony said:
The importance of philosophy and sociology is that they develop your critical faculties and put you in a better position to question and assess the output of the mass media and even the work of journalists such as Michael Moore.
Matt:
Neither I or Rorty see philosophy as being special in the ability to develop critical faculties. They can be learned just as easily in English class as philosophy class. Our money is still on media literacy classes.
Anthony said:
Well, as Rorty states in CON, the definition of liberal he uses is from Judith Shklar’s “Ordinary Vices” pp.43-44. Presumably, this definition is argued for in her text. Even still, as Rorty bases so much of his argument on this definition, I think it’s remiss of him not to state his reasons for using this definition rather than the usual (more positive) one of a liberal as “someone who advocates individual freedom”. This is important as the latter definition certainly ties in more with the MOQ.
Matt:
Yes, Rorty coopts Shklar's definition and maybe she does argue for it, but that is besides the point for Rorty. At the beginning of Ch 4, Rorty discusses "final vocabularies." He says that it is final "in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse." (CIS, 73) You can give reasons for your choice in definition, but you can't argue for it without being circular. Even Spinoza and Euclid realized that you couldn't give arguments for your
definitions, you could only point to the final product and say, "That's why I did it that way." Rorty, in fact, gives reasons throughout the book, even reasons for thinking we can't give anything but circular arguments. The book, in fact, is one big reason for defining liberal this way for certain purposes. Another way of defining liberal is they way you did, as "someone who advocates individual freedom." I like that definition too, and I use it alot. Pragmatists hav
e no problem with moving from one definition to another because they don't think there are any Real Definitions that define the word they way it wants to be defined. Words are defined by people and it all depends on what they are trying to do.
And I dispute that the individual freedom definition necessarily ties in closer to the MoQ. I'm thinking of ZMM where Pirsig says that the flip-side of Quality is care. I take the term "care" as being very closely related to Rorty's Shklarian definition of liberal.
Anthony said:
Well, having studied such a “single vision” in the form of the MOQ over the last decade, I just don’t accept this and, as such, this prevents me accepting most of Rorty’s further assertions. I’m not suggesting that the MOQ is perfect but I think it is a pragmatic system that achieves a single vision that is less problematic than the route that Rorty chooses. To some degree, this is an issue of foundationalism. As the MOQ is a “contradiction in terms” (Pirsig’s words) in being a metaphysics of the nameless
Tao, I think Pirsig has the balance (and it’s a delicate one) just about right between SOM objectivity and post-modernist relativism. Rorty is too extreme towards the latter.
Matt:
Well, that's fine that you don't accept Rorty's critique of metaphysics. However, us Rortyan pragmatists will always deny that you can have that particular "single vision" without being Platonic in that icky sense that Pirsig does not want, a single vision that will give us The Republic. I see Pirsig as hopelessly trying to balance SOM objectivity and post-modern relativism. I say "hopelessly" because I agree with Richard Bernstein that we should move beyond this see-saw, that we should move to a position
where there isn't a choice between objectivity and relativism. That's what I believe Rorty has given us.
Anthony said:
Ironically, a single vision (such as the MOQ) is argued for by Orwell (1944) who is quoted by Rorty (CON, p.176)...
Matt:
Not really ironic, Rorty never said that he was trying to unearth Orwell's vision of philosophy and politics. He's just as conscious of Orwell's intentions as every other Orwell commentator.
Anthony said:
Despite his usual enthusiasm for Rorty, even Matt has his doubts that private self-creation (& autonomy) can be separated coherently from social justice...
Matt:
Damned if I do and damned if I don't, eh?
Actually, saying that I have "doubts that private self-creation ... can be separated coherently from social justice" is to miss my point. I think they can be separated coherently, I just also happen to think that people need to keep a little bit more of their foot in the public sphere then they currently are.
Anthony said:
This movement of “the lowest common denominator of society” away from the private sphere sounds like backtracking to me.
Matt:
It only sounds like backtracking because you've created this "either/or" situation in which we can either have two visions or have one vision. Pragmatists blur either/or situations, they create continuums. We can have two visions, but we should also attend to both visions, particularly the public side where we shouldn't let it just fade away.
Anthony said:
I don’t think anyone round here is stating that the creation of a private sphere is invalid. The crucial point is that the public/private distinction must be reconciled, at least to some extent, to prevent Orwell’s “very dangerous” fallacy coming into being.
Matt:
How do you reconcile the public/private distinction without dissolving the private sphere? I don't think Orwell's "very dangerous" fallacy has anything to do with Rorty. I don't see how it engages his position. Rorty already agrees that "take away freedom of speech, and the creative faculties dry up." So how is Rorty running the risk, what's the fallacy?
Anthony said:
However, the MOQ uses a single vocabulary (of values) with the one aim of improving human life. As such, I read the MOQ as implying that both the arts and sciences are ways of making human lives into works of art rather than just the social sciences (as Rorty states in CONS, p. 87).
Matt:
Pragmatists believe that in the widest sense the only reason to do anything is to improve human life. I think you are sticking too close to the words Rorty uses and not seeing his vision. Because I still see that vision to be very much of the same spirit as Pirsig's. Just as you think I haven't been able to reconcile Pirsig's words with Rorty's words, I don't think you've been able to create a practical difference between the two. I just can't accept Anthony's contention that the two offer solutions that
cash out into different consequences.
For instance, Anthony says that an artist creates scientifically by using technology. I find it pretty silly most times to say that by using technology you are being scientific. Anthony also says that you can test for electrons artistically by using your intuition. But when did intuition become the sole provenance of artists? Pragmatists don't like to say such things. This punches up my two points: 1) pragmatists want to save science and art as two distinct disciplines. They do this by saying that the two
have different purposes and techniques. One way to characterize science's purpose is the attempt to predict and control the environment. One way to characterize art's purpose is the attempt to predict and control one's inner demons. The two, however, aren't necessarily exclusive of the other. This is why I think Anthony misses my point when he says that Jan Vermeer is creating art scientifically and that Anthony still hasn't created a difference between Pirsig and
Rorty (after all, where does Rorty prohibit the use of technology in art?). 2) pragmatists want to say that wide human capacities such as intuition (bracketing the question of whether there is such a capacity as "intuition") and reason aren't special to any discipline and that any discipline can use whatever human capacity it wants to get the job done. Pirsig wants to dispel the notion that science is the paradigm of human rationality and therefore all other human practices border on, if not are, irrational.
Rorty wants to transcend that limited notion of rationality as badly as Pirsig. That's why I can perfectly agree with your claim that Leonoardo da Vinci would make much of my two questions. I don't make much of them either. I think they are silly. My problem is that it would appear that you _do_ want to take them seriously. If you don't, then I still have no idea what you think the difference is between the consquences of Pirsig's and Rorty's philosophies.
Anthony said:
Other problems with Rorty, that Matt failed to address properly in his last e-mail, include the “vox populi” fallacy in Rorty’s definition of a liberal society, the elitist sentiment of his philosophy and his overlooking of Eastern philosophy.
Matt:
What is this, Jade Fox from Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon? Shoot a hundred poison needles and if one sneeks through your foe is defeated?
Anyways, I ignored your "vox populi" fallacy because I think Pirsig is just as susceptible as Rorty. And to be honest, I'm not quite sure what you are getting at. You said, "Rorty's definition lacks reference to the quality of individual opinions," but I fail to see how it has anymore than anybody else's definition of a liberal, pluralistic society. It seems to me to be a matter of good common sense that we should trust a specialist's opinion on his specialty, but doubt, along with Pirsig and Rorty, that
there are any "specialists of the good," which is what Plato thought.
The elitist sentiment of Rorty's philosophy I addressed towards the end of "Rorty II," right before the last part on mass media. If it wasn't done properly, you might want to say why.
On Rorty and Eastern philosophy, I addressed that at the very end of "Rorty III." I'll simply add that Rorty has attended several Philosophy East/West conferences and given papers there and has traveled to India for philosophy conferences. To say with Anthony that Rorty's rare mention of Eastern concepts, issues, or names "indicates that not only is Rorty’s work pretty much useless in explaining values or the everyday problems of the modern human ... Rorty’s philosophy is also pretty useless for achieving
enlightenment or understanding Dynamic Quality," is to fall into the trap that Pirsig rightly condemns: that you need to read the whole of philosophy before you can say anything about it. (Lila, Ch. 26) I think it asanine to think that a person has to say everything to all people all at once all the time, but that seems to be what Anthony wants. I think it much easier to think that we should pick and choose our favorite authors on particular subjects, without condemning
the scientist for failing to talk about Monet. Rorty isn't useful for bridging the vocabularies between East and West, but Pirsig is. But I don't take this as a knock against Rorty.
If that isn't proper enough for you, again, you might want to say why if you want to continue the conversation.
Anthony said:
Post-modernists (such as Rorty) might broadcast the limits of SOM or the falsehood of a static self but these understandings were realised by Buddhist philosophers (such as Nagarjuna) around two thousand years ago. No-one (of any sense) is going to get too excited about the wheel being invented twice.
Matt:
So, why are we excited about Pirsig again?
Of course, contrary to your claim, I think there has been intellectual progress. For instance, the West's ability to widen what it means to participate in the solidarity label "humanity" from "rich, white men" to "white men" to "men" to "homo sapiens" (not necessarily in that order).
Anthony said:
Moreover, (as seen in his comments about Plato in CON, p.96), such a lack in Rorty’s philosophical education has also instilled in him the attitude of the “western barbarian” towards the real concern of philosophy (metaphysical or otherwise) of achieving wisdom.
Matt:
So we are in the business of defining philosophy again. Well, I still back away from saying that philosophy has a "real concern." I think philosophy is concerned with whatever happens to be in front of it. To think that Rorty has no use for the term "wisdom" is to misread him completely. He says specifically in the passage you are referring to that he is talking about "wisdom" that Plato would have recognized as such, and it is doubtful that Plato would have recognized Eastern philosophy as having anything
to do with "wisdom." Why? Because Plato was from the West. I think Rorty is very self-conscious of the fact that what he is saying is only relevant to Western philosophy, the philosophy that is footnotes to Plato, that follows the dialectical path from Plato to Descartes to Kant to Frege and Nietzsche. Rorty won't circumscribe philosophy's "real" issues or concern. He'll only circumscribe what _his_ issues or concerns are, which is why he says, "[Ironist theorists
] all specialize in standing back from, and taking a large view of, what Heidegger called the 'tradition of Western metaphysics'--what I have been calling the 'Plato-Kant canon.'" (CIS, 96) That way he won't accidently be taken for neglecting things he's not talking about, like Eastern philosophy. He leaves that to people more qualified than he.
Anthony said:
Finally, Matt and I do agree on at least one point:
Matt said:
As it happens, I also agree with David Hall who says that despite Rorty's claim to only be a "weak thinker," there is a strong case to be made for him being a strong poet.
Anthony said:
I can’t argue with that. Though I’ve never read any of Rorty’s poetry, at least such an occupation would keep him out of philosophical mischief.
Matt:
I hope that was a joke. The only reason I have any doubts are because of the seeming inflexibilty in philosophical vocabulary that you've displayed everywhere else in your reading of Rorty.
In sum, I'm disappointed. Scott and David seem to understand Rorty. Unlike what seem to me as Anthony's ticky-tack criticisms, their criticisms come from a keen understanding in which they either want to reject a large part of Rorty's vocabulary (in the case of Scott) or reform a small part of it (in the case of David). But they do show a certain know-how with his vocabulary. They show the requisite ability to move from one vocabulary to another, translating from one to the other, without simply claiming
that the two mean completely different things without really trying. With certain readers of Pirsig, like Platt, it is obvious that they are Platonic and Kantian in the requisite senses. They embrace it wholeheartedly for fear of coming even close to the evil menace of "relativism." So I don't make much of them, other than as getting Pirsig wrong. But for people like Anthony, Mark, and DMB, I think for the most part they are reading Pirsig right, I just think they ar
e reading Rorty wrong or not facing up to the consequences Pirsig forces us to. Because on a lot of issues, I see Rorty and Pirsig lining up. I take the vehement backlash against Rorty to be a sign of inflexibility or uncharitableness, Pirsigian stuckness or Cartesian Anxiety.
Matt
p.s. The interview I quoted from originally was not the "Philosophy Now" interview. It was a different interview called "A Talent for Bricolage" that you can find on the internet. The link, along with the correct citation, is at the end of "Rorty III."
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