From: Paul Turner (paulj.turner@ntlworld.com)
Date: Tue Feb 17 2004 - 17:08:49 GMT
Bo
Bo said:
I tried to find out a little about the so-called Upanishadic period, but
it was very difficult, my Philosophy book seemed to say that Indian
culture went on to the Yoga branch of philosophy after the said Brahman
era, and then that the later more prominent philosophers (for instance
one Shankara around 800 AD) were to be compared to the Middle Age
religious philosophers ...for instance Johannes Eckhard.
Paul:
As I understand it, the Upanishads are a set of "scriptures" written in
Sanskrit that form a major part of the Vedantic philosophy and are
derived from the contemplation of the ancient Vedas. From what I have
read of them (translations are freely available on the web), they
exhibit a conscious effort, depicted in conversation, to understand
fundamental relationships between self, world and nothingness. They make
use of logic and analysis and as such the MOQ identifies them as
intellectual patterns, as per Pirsig's letter. By contrast, the Vedas
are what the MOQ would identify as social patterns - ancient hymns and
rites passed on through the ages by repetition and devotion - that
supposedly stretch back to the Aryan people.
I am open to correction here, but Shankara, Ramanuja and Madhva seem to
be the three most influential Vedantic philosophers, each forwarding a
different understanding of the nature of reality. Broadly speaking,
Shankara emphasised oneness and the identity between self and world
(Dynamic Quality). Ramanuja accepted this ultimate identity but
recognised the reality of "conditioned" difference (static quality).
Madhva emphasised ultimate difference between self, nothingness, and the
world. From what I have read, all three systems strike me as being as
equally intellectual as a lot of western philosophy.
Bo said:
So here is an important point that must be observed. Religious thinking
is an immense field - God knows - but this is Social patterned thinking
(Dynamic re. religious mysticism) according to the MOQ, not
Intellectual.
Paul:
Well, this is obviously what is required for your theory, but according
to Pirsig, it is not so. He clearly states in his letter to me that he
considers the Upanishads to be part of the intellectual level which is
consistent with the line in Lila, "Following the period of the Brahmanas
came the Upanishadic period and the flowering of Indian philosophy.
Dynamic Quality reemerged within the static patterns of Indian thought."
[Lila p.438]
So, to be clear on this, are you disagreeing and saying that the
Upanishads do not signal the emergence of an Oriental intellectual
level?
Bo said:
We will muddle the MOQ thoroughly if we regard "philosophy" or
"thinking" as Q-INTELLECTUAL activity in themselves.
Paul:
You're starting to fudge your theory in the face of contrary evidence.
You now have to qualify your previously held view, "philosophy is
intellectual," with, "western philosophy is intellectual." This was
precisely the narrow definition of intellect that I questioned in my
letter to Pirsig which led him to answer, "The argument that Oriental
cultures would not be classified as intellectual is avoided by pointing
out that the Oriental cultures developed an intellectual level
independently of the Greeks during the Upanishadic period of India at
about 1000 to 600 B.C." Your SOLAQI interpretation is taking you further
and further away from Pirsig's statements about the levels.
Bo said:
If there was a budding intellectual level it petered out and ended in
religious mysticism. Its dynamism was the very obstacle to a static
establishment. Consequently, there as no SOM from where the MOQ could
emerge.
Paul:
And now you are moving from flawed premises through to flawed
conclusion. Oriental culture has now been restricted to prehistoric
social patterns.
Paul previously said:
> "Rta" became "dharma," a term central to Indian philosophy that
> "includes both static and Dynamic Quality without contradiction."
> [Lila p.440] The Sophists seem to have been doing the same thing with
> aretê and rhetoric until Plato and co. usurped it with dialectic.
Bo said:
Yes, but still Social Dharma, the Oriental culture didn't allow it to
"degrade" into static intellectual Dharma ...at least this is the way it
looks from the MOQ. The fact that the Orientals paid so much attention
to the dynamic aspect of existence explains the lack of any further
STATIC development.
Paul:
I think you've argued your way into a corner. The way I see it, the
"profound achievement" of Vedantic and Buddhist philosophy that Pirsig
talks about in Lila was precisely to resolve the Dynamic-static
relationship within its static intellectual patterns. Regarding dharma
being social, you are correct in that dharma was taken from the social
patterns of Vedic "rta," but it doesn't end there. Pirsig has this to
say in Lila, "Within the Hindu tradition dharma is relative and
dependent on the conditions of society. It always has a social
implication. It is the bond which holds society together. This is
fitting to the ancient origins of the term. But within modern Buddhist
thought dharma becomes the phenomenal world-the object of perception,
thought or understanding." [Lila p.439]
Bo said:
As said, a religious "philosopher" is no Q-intellect representative.
Paul:
You now define intellect as "western, non-religious philosophy," which
rules out much of idealism and medieval philosophy, including
neo-platonism, as well as people like Barfield, Coleridge and countless
others.
Furthermore, in eastern culture, I believe one cannot draw such a sharp
line between philosophy and theology. However, this does not prevent
their systems from being rigorously logical and empirical - indeed some
would argue that they are more logical and empirical than much of
western philosophy. When your religion simply points to immediately
apprehended aesthetic experience as the presence of the divine and your
metaphysics points to immediately apprehended aesthetic experience as
the source of phenomena which we study then the two are not in
opposition.
------------------------------------------------------------
I think you have reached the end of a road here Bo. I think it has been
shown that your SOLAQI, in its current form, causes more problems than
it was intended to solve, and I do believe SOLAQI was invented to solve
problems. I also feel that *both* of our positions have become the
victim of ad hoc modification and it would probably be a good idea to
back up a little. Finally, I think there are three or four aspects of
SOLAQI that can be "salvaged":
1. Static intellectual quality, broadly speaking, is measured by truth.
2. The intellectual level began at around the time of the ancient Greeks
in the west (and the Upanishadic period in the east).
3. "Thinking" is an inadequate definition of the intellectual level.
and something you have alluded to
4. Language is a link or perhaps the link between the social and
intellectual levels.
I think each aspect needs its own clarification if we are going to move
past this point in our discussion. Of course, you may think SOLAQI does
not require "salvaging" in which case I'm afraid I'm running out of
energy.
Regards
Paul
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