Diana McPartlin (diana@asiantravel.com)
Tue, 7 Oct 1997 07:04:05 +0100
Magnus Berg wrote:
>
> Diana wrote:
> >I realize that descriptions and examples are a form of definition, but it's
> >too easy for someone to come along (as Magnus did) and point out that these
> >are not precisely definitions in the sense of a formal statement of the
> >meaning or significance of a word. It is this type of formal statement that
> >I believe is impossible.
>
> But what harm could come from trying?
None. Go ahead and try. But I've tried for years without success. That may not
prove anything, but Pirsig hasn't managed to do it either, neither has anybody
else. Eventually it occurred to me that perhaps the reason Pirsig hadn't
defined the levels was because he couldn't. From there it took me about two
seconds to realize that biological value is biological experience and
consequently beyond intellectual definition.
However if you think that defining the taste of chocolate is a worthwhile
intellectual pursuit then go ahead, and good luck.
> >Pirsig compares establishing metaphysics to planning a chess strategy. If
> >you start off by saying "here are the definitions of the four levels" sooner
> >or later your opponent is going to point out that they are not precise
> >definitions. And then you are going to have to say "yeah well descriptions
> >and examples are kinda like definitions." You would be in a far stronger
> >position if you called them "descriptions and examples" right from the
> >start.
>
> I still don't like imprecise descriptions in the long run. What you
> describe
> sounds a little cowardly. An imprecise description opens up for
> ambiguities
> and are hard to develop, and that's a bad thing IMO. The right way to do
> it
> is to specify the definitions as precise as you can and make it possible
> for others to find faults and inconsistencies. The 'opponents' as you
> call
> them, are then invited to join the development of the definitions and
> make
> them better.
Okay, the point is not to outsmart other people. The idea of a chess strategy
is to test the rationality of your own ideas. If you can find a flaw in them
then that's because there *is* a flaw in them and you need to go back to the
drawing board and rethink the whole thing.
> >> If you really mean this, we're really starting to understand each other.
> >> A human with a warm coat and a good pair of shoes is a society (a
> >> composition of organic patterns) that can better withstand cold
> >> weather than a human without them. Therefore, the coat and the
> >> shoes (and the human) are organic patterns to that society.
> >
> >Sorry, no, a warm coat in a cold climate would be biological because it
> >keeps the person alive - thus propagating biological value. No social value
> >here. (Unless it was a designer coat)
>
> A good example of the limits of general idea descriptions. We just
> can't resolve this disagreement using them, and it's very hard to see
> the origin of it because of the vague definitions used.
On the contrary it is easy to see that a human is biological value and
designer fashion is social value. Any reasonable person can see the rationale
behind this, even if they don't accept it. (A computer might not find it so
easy though.)
A couple of days ago I was explaing the four levels to someone who had never
heard of the MoQ before. She picked up the jist of the levels in about ten
minutes. As Pirsig says, there's nothing very original about the four levels.
In any case the fact that you want/like/need definitions doesn't prove that
definitions are possible. This is not just some philisophical game. The four
levels are not abstract concepts and they are not created out of our
definitions. The four levels are real live powerful forces. They exist whether
we define them or not. As humans we can recognize them the same way we
recognize the sea or the sky - because they are there.
Diana
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