Greetings,
This interested me.
Horse posited the question:
"None of the problems I've seen discussed recently are going anywhere. They vary between
Emotivism (I believe X, do so too) and pasting the MoQ onto already held beliefs. Neither
approach will get anyone anywhere in arguing moral action. In fact, the most basic
question of moral action has been continually ignored:
Is it possible to behave morally?
Are we determined or do we have free will. Only if we have free will can we CHOOSE to act
morally (and I'm going to get really pissed off if someone gives me the standard Pirsig fudge
that our actions are free when we follow DQ, 'cause if we don't CHOOSE our course then we
are not FREE. Are we being continually being blown about by the wind of DQ or can we
make a choice of the most Dynamic action. Choice still comes into the equation and the
question of whether we have it or not still needs to be answered) "
In the absence of any other attempts I will try to point a possible way forward, but initially the
full force of the argument needs to be appreciated as other replies have happily ignored it.
Moving beyond Pirsig's simplistic appraisal of the problem, the first thing to point out here is
that there is no, 'Free will v Determinism,' debate as Horse correctly implies elsewhere. It makes
not one jot of difference to free will if our actions are the result of a mechanistic, strict cause
and effect series or if they are the result of random changes at a quantum level. I cannot 'choose'
a random fluctuation (by definition of the word 'random') any more than I can 'choose' a Newtonian
deterministic series of events. Neither determinism nor indeterminism have any decisive effect on
the concept of free will and it is 'strawman' to lump them together. One can have free will with
determinism and equally one can have free will with indeterminism. It would help if Pirsig had not
conflated the two and I suggest that we avoid the same mistake.
Upon application to morality, the idea is regularly put forward that if, in principle, our future
actions are physically determined then we cannot be held responsible for them as they would be
inevitable. Thus the murderer will kill and can claim that it literally wasn't his fault. However
plausible this conclusion may seem it is false, as I shall demonstrate.
An analogy: A computer is set up to solve an equation. An electronics engineer would consider this
to be a physical system set up according to determinate laws, therefore its behaviour is determined
purely by physical causes. The user, on the other hand, would consider that what matters is that the
computer's behaviour is completely determined by the problem it is solving. There is no conflict
here as the equation is not something outside the computer but embodied within it in such a way that
the computer's behaviour is determined both by the physical forces and by the equation. The solving
of the equation is the significance of the physical activity and so the two answers to the question,
'What determines behaviour?' are not rivals but complementary. (A and not A!)
Transport this analogy to humans and the significance is clear. A deterministic explanation showing
how physical forces determine behaviour would rule out 'free will' only if choices and thought were
external to the physical system. If our thinking and decision making processes are embodied in the
workings of the brain then there is no contradiction in claiming that our behaviour is determined by
our thinking and choosing, even if our brain mechanism is wholly physically determinate.
The mythical subject object metaphysician need not abandon either free will or determinism as Pirsig
claims (Chpt 12 Lila) (although he may want to abandon either or both for other reasons) and once
more the moq has failed to illuminate anything, which, as it unfailingly misunderstands the problems
it confronts, is hardly surprising.
The answer to Horse's question of whether we can behave morally is therefore yes.
------------------------------------
I have watched with interest the debate (started by Walter and Jon) that has emerged from some of my
old postings. In particular, Roger quotes my, 'alter ego,' one Theo Schramm, who was invented by
myself to remove the cultural blinkers from certain people who read, 'Struan,' and immediately let
rip regardless of how stupid their refutations were. It was astonishing how many people agreed with
me when they didn't realise it was me and I have to say that I almost convinced myself when I wrote:
THEO QUOTE:
<<" A subject object metaphysics is any one of a family of explanations of
reality which rest upon the tacit assumption that there are two separate
and irreducible fundamentals in the way we perceive the universe, namely the
experiencing subject and the experienced object. Although not
necessarily recognized by its proponents this 'A or not A' position leads to
an irreconcilable tension between subjective reality and objective
reality with each vying for dominance within the subject object metaphysical
system.">>
I say, 'almost convinced myself,' but the formulation was constructed only to make sure that I
understood where others were coming from. Having confirmed that I did (understand), I then knew that
it was a 'strawman.' The idea of 'irreconcilable tension,' stood out (along with the 'perception'
bit and the 'vying for dominance') as the main point of nonsense in that statement. Nobody sees an
'irreconcilable tension' here - well apart from those who are totally off their rockers like Bo who
thinks, for example, that every scientist who studies the problem believes that every behavioural
pattern is due to nature or, alternatively, that every behavioural pattern is due to nurture with no
in between. This is so far removed from the reality of the situation that one can only laugh.
Scientists, and sensible philosophers, are much more pragmatic than that, (Whitehead for example
Roger), and would never fit into such a simplistic and crass definition. I do like the ironic
situation that someone who sees SOM as a literary device with no basis in reality, synthesises a
definition accepted by many who think it is not just accurate but a fair description of the
overwhelming majority of Western philosophy and science since Greek times.
DLT qoutes:
"The rift between ourselves and the cosmos- between SUBJECT and OBJECT- is, then, one troubling
legacy that the seventeenth century bequeathed to us. Contemporary philosophers, OF ALL SCHOOLS, and
in their differing ways, have protested against this subject-object split. They would like, if
possible, to get rid of these troubling notions altogether. And so the philosophers at the the
beginning of our epoch, particularly Descartes, are taxed with having introduced an unnecessary
dichotomy into our thinking."
Few people - and certainly not I - would claim that Descartes did not introduce an unnecessary
dichotomy into philosophy (of course Pirsig's SOM is claimed to go back to the Greeks so this can
only be one aspect of it) and I have repeatedly pointed out that contemporary philosophers of most
schools (all schools is far too strong) reject it. These philosophers do not see it as a problem.
They reject it. Hence they call it an unnecessary dichotomy. Big deal. In the 14th century many
people thought the world to be flat, but if I, in this century, wrote a book claiming the earth to
be square and, further, set about proving it was square by showing how unflat the earth is, while at
the same time insisting that everyone else thinks it is flat, those people who believe it to be
round might be forgiven for thinking that I am touch mad and that I might be better off pitting my
square theory against their spherical evidence if I want them to listen. They might be forgiven for
being even more annoyed if I described flat evidence using spherical terminology. Effectively
calling spherical evidence a load of balls (grin) by reinventing it as flat evidence needs to be
squashed. . . flat. Wittgenstein in his, 'Philosophical Investigations,' ended the Cartesian era
and, ( I don't judge Bennett here as I have never heard of him and don't know the context of the
above quotation), very few have resurrected it since, so we can now all stop pretending that this is
how everyone else thinks and bring ourselves up to date. Let us get this clear. I am not denying
that there are subjects and objects and I am not denying that, for most practical purposes, we all
see ourselves as distinct from everything else. After all, if I wasn't distinct from the milk I feed
my cat it might lap me up too!! What I am denying is that this constitutes a metaphysics. Modern
science and philosophy is ultimately concerned with relations, not with substance and certainly not
with the chimera that constitutes a rift between ourselves and the cosmos.
DMB
"I really don't see room for honest disagreement
here. I think there is great level of certainty on some matters. The sky is
blue, the Earth is round and Scientific materialism is the West's
world-view."
Of course scientific materialism is the predominant world view in the West. I never claimed it
wasn't, as any cursory glance at the archives will show. The problem is, DMB, that you don't
understand coherent materialism so you invent your own simplistic, 'neo-Democritic,' version and
call it SOM. Then you obliquely question my honesty by falsely equating the two and suggesting that
I do the same. I do not. I never have. I never will and still I don't. So, I will restate the above
sentence again just for you. Modern scientific materialism is ultimately concerned with relations,
not with substance and certainly not with the chimera that constitutes a rift between ourselves and
the cosmos. But enough, one could spend all day correcting your inventions and distortions so I will
leave it there.
------------------------------------------
Everything is quality v everything is X:
JON:
And finally there's Struan's assessment that saying Quality is the primary
empirical reality of the world can easily be replaced with "X" is the primary
empirical reality of the world. How many would agree with this? Is the logic
sound? Can we easily replaced Quality with X...?
ROGER:
Of course you can, if it is a better definition..... if it is more true to
experience .... if it is simpler and more concise .... if it is less
confusing and inconclusive ... if it is more elegant and connected to other
beliefs and experiences....IN OTHER WORDS, "X" IS BETTER THAN "QUALITY" ONLY
IF IT IS OF BETTER QUALITY.
I think I will stick with "Quality."
Pure sophism.
X is of 'better' quality because it doesn't bring with it the unwanted baggage of 'quality.' If I
call a certain fish of the genus hippoglossus hippoglosus a halibut, Roger might come along and
call it 'quality' saying that I should only call it a halibut if the term, 'halibut,' is of better
quality. At first sight I might give in and concede that quality is a better name because it has
more quality, (ha ha, QED and detum de dum), but, being slightly more canny than that, I realise
that this is purely a linguistic trick as I hope this analogy will make clear to the reader. X is
perfectly sufficient, more concise, less confusing and very elegant. It totally accords with my
experience and, more importantly, if 'dq' is indefinable (as Pirsig claims it is) then why try to
define it in the first place with terms like quality and dynamic which have all sorts of definite
connotations. If it is indefinable then leave it undefined for goodness sake. X. Pirsig answers this
by claiming that a word with value subtracted is unrecognisable, but his reasoning rests upon the
same conflation of a utilitarian use of quality and a moral use of quality that Roger presents
above. Along the same lines, and partly for these reasons, there is no doubt that Horse is right to
point out that a distinction needs to be made between good and morality, but can the moq really
survive that or is it so far removed from Pirsig's moq that it then becomes something else? Most
importantly of all, I have never ever seen a convincing attempt to show that the moq has anything
whatsoever to say about morals, which, bizarrely, Pirsig sees as synonymous with quality. Pirsig's
examples are, hopeless as is plain from the complete disarray evident in recent discussions, and (to
my knowledge) nobody here or anywhere else has got anywhere whatsoever in establishing a rational
moq morality. The only attempts I have seen ignore metaethics and rest upon the age old 'higher
stage of evolution is better' approach which has been in vogue amongst lesser thinkers for the last
few decades, but is profoundly unoriginal and deeply suspect for many reasons which I will not go
into here unless asked. So we have the amusing situation of a metaphysics with value at its core
which is unable to make any pronouncements upon ethics. Which brings us back to Horse's question and
the initial reason for this posting. The increasing realisation by others that it is at this
metaphysical, meta-ethical root that the major problem with the moq resides is good to see, but it
is still depressing that many are happy to waffle on about normative ethics (atom bombs and the
like) without the slightest idea of where their sense of morality, vis-à-vis the moq, comes from.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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