RE: MD X

From: Struan Hellier (struan@clara.co.uk)
Date: Thu Jan 13 2000 - 18:46:48 GMT


Greetings,

(I'm still working on yours Roger)

Jonathan. Your word games continue - but we may agree yet. It all boils down to this:

JONATHAN:
">Struan, had Pirsig written ZAMM as a book about "X" and not "quality", then I believe that he
would have written a book that totally lacked quality (again Ha!). I'm trying very hard not to just
play word games, but it's just like in my subject line - the words themselves present the case!"

You are right, I will say it is pure sophism but certainly not in the wisdom sense. The words
present the case only in an utterly superficial way. Just as Roger might want to rename my
hippoglossus hippoglossus, 'quality,' because it has more quality than the name 'halibut,' (Ha! -
the words present the case), so you want to do the same with X. 'Ah yes' you may say, 'but a halibut
is a subset of quality and so it is right to have a different name for classification purposes."
Essentially the argument that quality is the ultimate reference point. To which the retort is that
the 'primary metaphysical entity,' or 'X' must therefore HAVE qualities but it cannot BE quality.
Equally it must (in a sense) have meaning, but it cannot BE meaning. The question then is, 'What
sort of qualities does it have?' This is exactly the logic of your position and you put it very well
here:

JONATHAN:
"Nonsense! You are confusing description with definition."

I was not. But fine. Quality is a description OF SOMETHING ELSE. It describes a characteristic
(Oxford dictionary) of what, for convenience I shall call X. Or more accurately it purports to. So
quality is not the primary metaphysical entity but a description of it. Precisely my point. Your
claim that 'quality' is merely a description rather than a definition totally undermines the claim
that 'quality' is primary.

You make the point again.

"To call the metaphysical entity by "X" or any other meaningless name is to say that it totally
lacks any characteristic "qualities" (Ha!), whereas Pirsig's Q has some very obvious
characteristics."

Ha!, Ha!, and thrice Ha! Your own words present the case.

If the claim of the moq is simply that the 'primary metaphysical entity' has certain qualities
(whether we know them or not) then it is stating the stark staring bleedin' obvious.

JONATHAN then moves on to claim:

"STRUAN
> Meaning eh? Well, it is a lot better than quality, but it doesn't help
>much in the search for a
> rational ethic. Does killing a germ instead of a man have meaning?
>Well yes, but is it good? No
> answer!

JONATHAN:
"This confuses primal meaning (significance) with the evaluation of that
meaning as good or bad. <snip> The classification of the experience as good or bad comes a fraction
of a second later."

Absolutely right and the point I was trying to make. So, good, bad, morality and value all come
after experience and are evaluations of it. (again - the words present the case) Once again
morality, good and value are not equivalent to X (the primary metaphysical entity).

But hark, we agree:

JONATHAN:
"Next let's consider morality="X".
This is an inevitable outcome of Pirsig's treatment of the Q idea in his
second novel. He broke his own rule by putting Q subservient to
Aristotelian definition. The whole 4 layer MoQ presented in Lila is just
that. The only way one can accept any of Lila is by not taking it too
literally. A literal reading of Lila just opens up endless
contradictions - as Struan will surely agree."

I do, I do. Verily and forsooth. I simply go further and conclude that this process was already
completed when Pirsig called X, 'Quality.' One does not need to go as far as Lila to find the
contradictions. They were there in that first step.

So. Quality is not synonymous with morality, good, bad or value. Good is nothing more than (as you
put it) a 'classification of (an) experience.' and, furthermore ethics depend almost exclusively
upon intuition. So far you have established nothing whatsoever about X. Therefore to call it Quality
is entirely fanciful, and ethics, once more, is reduced to an emotivist or intuitionist position.

May I ask what is left of the moq?

Struan

------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)

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