Hi Struan, Roger, JC and all,
I took the liberty of changing the subject header to my own. Struan
probably considers this pure sophistry.
> JONATHAN wrote:
> "The
> free-will argument is a red herring because humans clearly DO make
> decisions and can be held responsible for the outcomes."
STRUAN:
> Computers clearly DO make decisions and CAN be held responsible for
the outcomes, but does this mean
> that they are responsible in a moral sense? ...
Struan, I reject your equating human decisions and computer decisions.
Computers do *NOT* make decisions in the same sense. They simply process
information in a rigid and predictable manner - the same computer,
program and data will give the same result every time (we hope). There's
no question of a computer doing it's job carefully vs. carelessly,
responsibly vs. irresponsibly. The computer just runs though the same
procedures in the same way time and time again. (Of course, some of us
suffer from computers that don't or won't ;-).
I suppose the Pirsigian phraseology would be that the computer
represents STATIC values only. Obvious really - the computer is
*programmed*.
STRUAN
> Jonathan, the vital point in the Q v X argument is brought out here,
as the 'agreement argument' is
> easily explicable using traditional science and the old razor
precludes a new metaphysics based on
> that:
>
> JONATHAN:
> ", X is meaningless until
> AFTER it has been defined, while Pirsig presented Q as a metaphysical
> entity that precedes definition."
>
STRUAN
> Yes, this is how he presented it, but there is a fatal contradiction.
Q has already been defined
> simply by the use of the word, 'quality,' as the word (being a proper
word) at least partly defines
> what it is applied to.
I disagree. Using the word "quality" is hardly definitive. It may be a
small contribution towards a definition, but it only scratches the
surface. Struan may find this shocking, but the majority of "objective"
scientists I know deliberately use emotive phraseology to drive home
points. We carefully choose value-laden words even when according to the
"hard data" we should only be talking about X, Y and Z.
STRUAN:
> The 'metaphysical entity' does not precede definition because it is
called
> quality. If you want something that precedes definition then, on a
priori grounds, the name one
> ascribes to it has to be a meaningless one. Only after it has
succumbed to (at least partial)
> definition can one give it a name like quality because definition is
built into the term.
>
Nonsense! You are confusing description with definition.
Let me thank Roger for prompting me to look over the old THEO/JONATHAN
debates from June 1998.
THEO (Struan)
>I invite Jonathan to comment upon it as I think it
>helps clarify why I disagree that Quality always requires an observer
>and an observed for its occurence.
JONATHAN
>Thanks for the invitation. I'm going to change the last word of your
>previous sentence so that it now reads:-
>"Q always requires an observer and an observed for its *definition*".
>Pirsig himself saw this - which is why he was so reluctant to define or
>properly describe Q.
A year and a half later we are still having essentially the same
argument.
I still maintain that Q "occurs" (exists), and can be observed and
described.
To call the metaphysical entity by "X" or any other meaningless name is
to say that
it totally lacks any characteristic "qualities" (Ha!), whereas Pirsig's
Q has some very obvious characteristics. as illustrated in the ZAMM
classroom scenario.
STRUAN
>...if the corollary is that morality=X, then Q=X. This
> is my point. Under Pirsig's system he might as well have used X
instead of Q because if Q does not
> equate to morality then what is the point of using a value laden word
to describe something for
> which he cannot substantiate values without undermining his own
position that quality precedes
> definition?
If Q is obvious even before formal definition, then there is no problem.
Most moral choices are also pretty clear - no course in ethics necessary
to dismiss murder and rape as immoral. However, there are moral choices
which are as unclear as the question whether or not a good wine tastes
better than chocolate.
Struan, had Pirsig written ZAMM as a book about "X" and not "quality",
then
I believe that he would have written a book that totally lacked quality
(again Ha!). I'm trying very hard not to just play word games, but it's
just like in my subject line - the words themselves present the case!
"Pure sophism." says STRUAN, using the word sophism to mean trickery by
word games.
"Absolutely" replies Jonathan, remembering that sophos means wisdom.
STRUAN
> Meaning eh? Well, it is a lot better than quality, but it doesn't help
>much in the search for a
> rational ethic. Does killing a germ instead of a man have meaning?
>Well yes, but is it good? No
> answer!
This confuses primal meaning (significance) with the evaluation of that
meaning as good or bad. This was the basis of my objection to the hot
stove example e.g. (JONATHAN, 5th Jan 2000):
<<<the initial quality sensation (DQ if you like) isn't really good vs.
bad, but the
registering of a sensation. The classification of the experience as good
or
bad comes a fraction of a second later.>>>
A very good contemporary example of the confusion is Time Magazine's
vote for Man of the Century (or Millennium, whatever). Hitler polled
lots of votes due to his unquestionable significance to modern human
history. On the other hand, many people were unhappy about Hitler
winning the vote by infamy and preferred candidates who were both
significant and morally good.
In this respect what JC wrote looks increasingly inviting:
>Morality is the continuum or a line and Good is the direction ON the
line.
Well, it's way too late so I'll sign off now.
Regards to all, Jonathan
MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:00:36 BST