Scott plays to the audience... as always....
Struan wrote:
I will stick with the realisation that free will lies in the fact that we
cannot predict what we are going to do... [snip]
Scott adds:
Rightly so. To reiterate, the so-called 'conflict' of free-will vs.
determinism depends on the assumption that rationality *can* predict sentient
behavior with complete accuracy - an assumption neither proven nor proveable.
The 'conflict' is considerably overstated, a conflict of stagnant
philosophical belief systems only.
As I remember it, Pirsig said in essence that behavior is predictable to the
extent that it is dependent on predictable physical processes, which reduces
logically to 'behavior is predictable to the extent that it is predictable,'
a tautology.
As for ethics, I would not agree with the statement made (by Roger?) that
"Pirsig 'rejects intellectual rationalisations' of ethical dilemmas": all of
the MoQ, hell, all of philosophy is intellectual rationalisation, at its root
simply 'attributing reasons to phenomena'. The point Pirsig makes in
ZATAOMM, that rationality must expand and change if it is to explain the
inexplicable, seems truistic to me. (As P. points out, it's integral to the
progress of science.)
I like your line: "[Pirsig] clarifies popular misconceptions with his own
misconceptions and thus clarifies nothing." That sounds like something
Pirsig would wryly agree with.
To sum up, Struan, let me borrow some of your own words in paraphrase:
"If the MoQ resolves a perceived problem to one's satisfaction,
_enabling_one_to_touch_'X'_, then that is great!"
Whatever the case, I'm glad to read your criticisms of the MoQ. It
absolutely beats comfortable agreement all to hell.
-Scott
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