Sorry for butting in on this one; I've been eavesdropping for a while.
Is not the problem here (concerning "Free will") one about the status of
"free will" - is it really necessary to assume some 'absolute' quality as a
property of the notion free will, without which the concept cannot be
proposed? why? - when it comes to certain encounters with the somewhat
nebulous (in physical terms) "gravity", I personally have found my
subjective view of free will to be severely curtailed; does this mean I have
to discard the notion altogether? - can't I continue to believe in free will
as a concept which enjoys a complex (and therefore sometimes unpredictable)
relationship with the other concepts floating around my particular universe?
why would I need to objectify it?
Also, in the argument about the man in the locked room, why would we have to
assume that, if the man was in error for assuming that the decision to leave
the room was his alone, that it therefore must be someone else's instead? -
it could be a Yale lock which accidentally engaged!
regards,
ppl
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