Matt: Um, excuse me, but isn't this exactly the kind of stuff Pirsig was
trying to get past? Sounds like SOM to me. And aren't we supposed to be
discussing the MOQ here? Just curious. DMB
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Matthew Ketchum [SMTP:mketchum@stetson.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 2:22 PM
> To: moq_discuss@moq.org
> Subject: MD truth
>
> I've been asked to describe my position on the issue of truth. Well, here
> it goes:
>
> First of all, we have to distinguish between facts and theories. Getting
> them confused can get us into a lot of trouble. Facts are true
> propositions
> about the universe. Examples include "2 + 2 = 4" (an analytic fact) and
> "my
> desk is made of wood" (a synthetic fact). The truth of propositions is
> independent of belief. A proposition held as a belief is verified in one
> of
> two ways. If it is analytic, it is verified by logic, for analytic facts
> are true by definition. If it is synthetic, it is verified by sensation
> and
> perception, for this is the way in which we experience existence.
> Sensation
> and perception, of course, can be flawed, so we can never be absolutely
> certain of the accuracy of synthetic beliefs, but there are nevertheless
> facts "out there" that are independent of belief.
>
> Theories, on the other hand, are another can of worms. They are merely
> ways
> of explaining a group of facts (or propositions that we believe to be
> facts)
> and how they are related. Theories can be neither true nor false. They
> are
> merely either useful or not useful (or somewhere in between). The theory
> of
> gravity isn't true, it is just a way of explaining why objects seem to
> always stick to the Earth. It is highly useful in predicting future
> behavior, so useful, in fact, that it is now called a law. However,
> Einstein's theory of relativity, for example, is more useful than Newton's
> theory of gravity, because it explains and predicts facts more accurately.
> Pirsig notes how he believes that the same is true for MOQ as compared to
> SOM. It is only in this sense that "truth" is relative and philosophical
> pragmatism is a viable position.
>
> So, where does free will fit into this idea of truth. The first step,
> from
> my point of view, is to deal with our conception of self. I believe that
> the self is merely a collection of predispositions and experiences. This
> position logically rules out the possibility of free will in the
> traditional
> sense for there is no entity left to exercise such "freedom". Of course,
> the question of the existence of a self independent of predispositions and
> experiences is an empirical one, and the answer is that it is either a
> fact
> or a false proposition. In my view, there is no empirical evidence that
> supports it as a fact. This leaves us with two logical possibilities.
> Either human actions are determined by predispositions and experiences or
> they are completely random. Both could be held as theories, but one is
> infinitely more useful than the other.
>
> - Matt
>
>
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