MD truth

From: Matthew Ketchum (mketchum@stetson.edu)
Date: Thu Feb 10 2000 - 21:21:42 GMT


I've been asked to describe my position on the issue of truth. Well, here
it goes:

First of all, we have to distinguish between facts and theories. Getting
them confused can get us into a lot of trouble. Facts are true propositions
about the universe. Examples include "2 + 2 = 4" (an analytic fact) and "my
desk is made of wood" (a synthetic fact). The truth of propositions is
independent of belief. A proposition held as a belief is verified in one of
two ways. If it is analytic, it is verified by logic, for analytic facts
are true by definition. If it is synthetic, it is verified by sensation and
perception, for this is the way in which we experience existence. Sensation
and perception, of course, can be flawed, so we can never be absolutely
certain of the accuracy of synthetic beliefs, but there are nevertheless
facts "out there" that are independent of belief.

Theories, on the other hand, are another can of worms. They are merely ways
of explaining a group of facts (or propositions that we believe to be facts)
and how they are related. Theories can be neither true nor false. They are
merely either useful or not useful (or somewhere in between). The theory of
gravity isn't true, it is just a way of explaining why objects seem to
always stick to the Earth. It is highly useful in predicting future
behavior, so useful, in fact, that it is now called a law. However,
Einstein's theory of relativity, for example, is more useful than Newton's
theory of gravity, because it explains and predicts facts more accurately.
Pirsig notes how he believes that the same is true for MOQ as compared to
SOM. It is only in this sense that "truth" is relative and philosophical
pragmatism is a viable position.

So, where does free will fit into this idea of truth. The first step, from
my point of view, is to deal with our conception of self. I believe that
the self is merely a collection of predispositions and experiences. This
position logically rules out the possibility of free will in the traditional
sense for there is no entity left to exercise such "freedom". Of course,
the question of the existence of a self independent of predispositions and
experiences is an empirical one, and the answer is that it is either a fact
or a false proposition. In my view, there is no empirical evidence that
supports it as a fact. This leaves us with two logical possibilities.
Either human actions are determined by predispositions and experiences or
they are completely random. Both could be held as theories, but one is
infinitely more useful than the other.

- Matt

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