Roger, Dan
(sorry for my delay, Roger, but I'm so busy.....)
I noticed that the problem of defining patterns in levels is not still solved. IMO, in order to solve it, we must distinguish patterns from .... "individuals" or "things", or "entities".
Dan:
> The problem in defining patterns of value is that they operate on all
> four levels simultaneously.
I don't agree. Patterns are not "existing things". (I'm not a pattern, I'm an entity, that is a mix of different patterns. Every pattern is "active" at one precise level, while every entity interacts with the environment following different behaviors which are explained by patterns.
Bo provided a good example some month ago, talking about the Leonardo's Monna Lisa, which can be considered Inorganic, Biologic, Social or Intellectual:
Bo (19 Jan 2000 to MF):
> If freezing to death Leonardo's Mona Lisa is valuable as fuel for a fire that may
> save one's biological self. Afterwards when safe the social self will
> grit its teeth when thinking about what that painting could have
> brought of money or fame. The intellectual self may deem Leonardo
> a kitsch painter and thus influence the social reality.
You can't say that a picture painted, for example, on a wooden frame, IS intellectual. The picture is an entity which is able to interact with the environment according to patterns of behavior. It can burn like every wooden slice; it saves a termite's life; it can be socially valuable (in US$); and it can communicate the author's thought. This to say that we can't objectively argue that something IS a pattern, we must always consider its interaction with everything else. Patterns describe interactions (quality events), not statuses.
Roger:
> In previous posts, I have admonished others for the folly of forcing things, many of
> which are complex collections of patterns of various levels, into a single
> level. It is probably best that I follow my own advice here as well
And I agree, but let me say that following the example of Leonardo's Monna Lisa, it would be weird to consider every possible pattern as having the same relevance. It's obvious that social and intellectual patterns are in this case preeminent.
So, going back to the "Human Rights" thread, Roger, when you write:
> Pirsig explains human rights as "tweeners" between the intellectual and
> social. I would label such modern rights as "free speech" as
> intellectually-influenced social patterns. They concern social contracts of
> how people are treated and allowed to interact -- a classic example of a
> social pattern -- albeit an intellectually influenced one
I answer that the "Human rights" you are talking about are "entities". Take for example the freedom of speech. It's obvious it's social, and it's also obvious it's intellectual. When this right is discussed as fundamental basis for the intellectual diffusion of ideas, it's interacting with an intellectual environment; when it's applied during a trial, it's interacting with a social environment.
I call "patterns" the models used to explain those interactions.
Of course, you have noticed that I often refer to these entities as being intellectual, or social, or whatever else. Doing it, I want to evidence the possible environmental interaction which is IMO more important. Of course the freedom of speech is social and intellectual, but IMO its intellectual aspect has more relevance than any other aspect.
At the contrary, there are entities we can discuss mainly as social: for example, we use to say "hello" to the people, and this is obviously a social behavior. Of course, if I write a treatise on the different ways human beings use to begin conversations all over the world, I'm focusing on an intellectual (very scientific and objective) aspect. The same term "hello" is social or intellectual, but, let me say, in this case I do prefer consider it preeminently social.
I've begun with this personal view on patterns and levels, as this is probably the key to solve part of the discussion I'm having with Roger.
MARCO:
> Intellectual patterns are small pieces of DQ turned into a static
> intellectual form. When we take a small piece of DQ and put it into a
> "made-of-signs" form we create an intellectual pattern. The tool we use to
> create intellectual patterns is IMHO intelligence (Latin "Intelligere" from
> "In" and "legere"=to read ) that is the skill to "read into". [...]
Roger:
> I believe that feature or pattern detection is a biological talent that is
> widely used throughout the biological and the social levels.
MARCO:
> In conclusion, my definition of intellectual pattern is:
> Intellectual static patterns of value are small pieces of dynamic quality
> turned by intelligence into a coded and socially shareable form .
We agree: when I wrote "by intelligence", I was just meaning we use a biological tool (intelligence) to create patterns, that is, to explain interactions and behaviors.
ROG:
> I believe you have just given a workable MOQ definition of a meme!
Yes, I guess. And I'm glad that I offered this definition when I hadn't ever listened the term "meme".
MARCO:
> From this point, it's clear that modern art is a form of language, as it can
> be used to communicate significations ( for example: the author's thoughts
> and feelings). Ergo, art can be intellectual. It depends on the purpose of
> the artist, and of the beholder/user of the masterpiece.
ROG:
> This gets to where we part paths. I don't see communication or pattern
> identification as intellectual. I think animals do both. Both are cognitive,
> which in my book places them as biological patterns.
IMO the solution is in the first words of this post. If I put the focus on the brain's functionality, of course I consider communication, or pattern identification, as biological. But if I consider how ideas, science, technology and arts interact each other in the intellectual environment (by the mean of messages made of signs ), I'm looking at the intellectual interaction. The message is indepent by the biological brain. I will sadly die, but this post could survive after me, and interact with your intellect exactly like if I was alive. This simple fact is IMO the proof that message is not biological.
MARCO:
> meaning (or significance) exists
> when intelligence "defines" the perceived value by the use of signs in order
> to share it socially. For example, the cat feed has an high biological
> value, but no "meaning", to my cat.
ROG:
> I used to have a cat that would run from anywhere in the house into the
> kitchen every time I used the electric can-opener. To the cat, that sound
> MEANT "feeding time" as we fed it canned cat food. The cat couldn't read or
> use language, but it could detect patterns and it could communicate. You've
> heard of "Pavlov's dog," this is "Roger's cat."
I love pets, so I don't want to deny them the possibility of being intelligent. So I change the subject. The water has a biological value for a tree, but no "meaning". OK NOW? :-)
Then you offer a long description of Intellectual level. I'm sorry, I didn't read it with enough depth, so I don't comment for now. Hope tomorrow. I just say that I've the impression that you are valuing only the "rational" side of human brain, and leave secondary the "intuitive" side. I discussed it two days ago on MF. Your position, that is very common on this forum, contains the risk of forgetting the "best" part of our mental possibilities.
I can't imagine ART being less than intellectual. I can't imagine Picasso being less than Einstein. One possibility is the fifth level, but I'm very negative about it. We don't need it. IMO the best view is to consider ART and SCIENCE being two wonderful intellectual possibilities. If only we could enlarge this poor vision of intellect......
A presto
Marco.
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