ELEPHANT TO CHRIS RE CHRIS TO ELEPHANT:
CHRIS WROTE:
> Overall the emphasis is on discrete/particular/known/NAMED vs
> continuous/general/unknown/unnamed. The former takes on the label of
> "objects" and the latter of "relationships" this because there is a
> transformation process going on where "relationships" can be summed to
> create an "object" but CONTEXT will identify the 'hardness' of that object.
> (there is also the reverse process)
ELEPHANT:
I am really on your side here, in thinking that this is where all the
interesting issues lie. But i just don't think we can associate them neatly
the way you do, writing down all the left sides of some disperate
dichotomies in one block, and the right sides in another. There are many
*different* problems here which need to be sorted out on their merits, and
your broad brush approach just isn't going to help us do that. I really
agree with you: the questions of discreteness and particularity are very
closely connected: but they are still not the same question. I would argue
that the existence of particular requires the creative application of
discreteness onto the continuous flux. But look, this is something I would
want to *argue*, not something I could simply establish by putting the words
together, separated by a '/'. Similarly, like you, and against
Wittgenstein, I think that naming *is* an important move in the language
game. But this is a *difficult* complex matter, and we can go wrong so
easily without noticing it if we don't pay clear attention to where we are
and exactly what we are saying. A *classic* case in point is your use of
"relationships" as a coverall for "continuous/general/unknown/unnamed".
this simply won't do. Continuity can't be a relation, as it is precisely
the absence of any distinct term that could be related. Likewise, calling
"general" terms "relationship" words can carry alot of dangerous
philosophical baggage: it casually makes it look as if all the universals
depend on the particulars, when this is a contentious point (e.g. between
Aristotle and Plato) which needs to be argued about. And how can we make
any sense of the idea that either the unknown or the unnamed are
"relationships"? Chris, I'm interested, but I won't be able to keep that
interest up very long if I can't make head or tail of what you are saying.
CHRIS WROTE:
> For example, the set of all concepts includes itself but the set of all dogs
> does not.
ELEPHANT:
Example of WHAT, Chris?
a very
PUZZLED ELEPHANT
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:00:53 BST