Hullo Platt (and Squonk)
This morning my monthly discussion group met to discuss 'Quantum
Consciousness', a newspaper review of last years Tucson conference "Toward a
Science of Consciousness". The main point of this article was to explore the
Penrose and Hameroff theory of consciousness, with asides from that pesky
Australian David Chalmers. Then in my email intray was the latest Headless
Way Newsletter, a harmless British eccentricity that I quite enjoy. I liked
the quote from a review of a book by Harding, entitled
"The Science of the 1st Person".
The reviewer says "This book is about the heart of religious experience,
namely Enlightenment (which is finding the truth concerning oneself), and
about science (which is finding the truth concerning other things), and
about the relationship between them. It claims that Enlightenment is more
truly scientific than science itself; and that, without Enlightenment,
science is only half the story and therefore full of contradictions, of
insoluble problems both theoretical and practical. It shows how, when at
last one turns one's attention round and ceases to overlook the Looker - the
1st Person at the near end of one's microscope or telescope or spectacles -
these contradictions are resolved."
This fits well with Chalmers understanding of consciousness, for it is
surely the one thing I cannot doubt, that there is a 'looker' that goes on
to have ideas about things. The truth about oneself is more real than the
truths of science. (This seems to be Pirsig's position, too.)
Then along comes your article, Platt. (It should not surprise you to learn
that our next discussion in the group here is on synchronicity!)
There is too much in your article to respond to fully, so I will pick and
choose a bit.
Platt: "Dennett's explanation proved less than convincing".
Dennett was a bit of a 'damp squib', because at the end of the day he chose
to use, and confuse, two meanings of 'seeming'. He says that a theory of
experience needs to explain why things seem the way they do to us. Chalmers,
in The Conscious Mind, refutes him thus:
"There is a phenomenal sense of "seem", in which for things to seem a
certain way is just for them to be experienced in a certain way. And there
is a psychological sense of "seem" in which for things to seem a certain way
is for us to be disposed to judge thay are that way. It is in the first
sense that a theory of experience must explain the way things seem. But it
is in the second sense that Dennett's theory explains it. Once this subtle
equivocation is noted, the argument loses most of its force." (pp190-191).
Platt: "Consciousness emerges from an organic pattern of nerve cells and
synapses"
Hameroff disagrees, placing consciousness in the microtubules that make up
the skeleton of all cells including nerve cells. He is postulating that the
microtubules in each cell actually operate as 'quantum computers' allowing
each cell to develop approximately the calculating power of a whole brain.
But Chalmers, examining Penrose and Hameroff's ideas, says:
"nothing here seems to help with the explanation of conscious experience.
Why should quantum processes in microtubules give rise to consciousness? The
question here is just as hard as the corresponding question in a classical
brain. When it comes to the problem of experience, nonalgorithmic and
algorithmic processes are in the same boat." (p119)
Platt: "every life form, even that lowliest, knows what's good for it."
"'It's better here' or ' It's not so good here'" (Lorenz)
Yes! And this is a remarkable thing. This is where Pirsig, in my view, is on
the ball. But this is only one kind of quality, which I call organismic, and
it is not the whole spectrum of quality, which I am continuing to explore. I
like to say that the organism responds to what can help or harm it in the
environment, which I think is what Lorenz is also saying. How this occurs is
in my view one of the really big questions. I am currently writing my own
thesis on this.
Platt: "good to live and good to procreate" + "along the evolutionary line,
the benefits for survival of social cooperation became evident".
Henry Plotkin, in Evolution of Mind notes that Darwin was very concerned
with sexual selection, which was then largely ignored until recent times. He
says
"in at least some instances, the apparent opposition between culture and
biology may actually be a manifestation of an opposition between natural and
sexual selection."
If Plotkin is right, and I suspect he is, this has implications for Pirsig's
theory of levels. Plotkin also argues for "group selection", but only in
certain kinds of animal, of which human beings are one. (Plotkin also has
the best understanding of memes that I have come across, Squonk.)
Platt: "For the first time, an organism could respond to an imagined future
and plan ahead. Consciousness as we know it was born."
Yes and no. I certainly agree that memory and the ability to predict the
future are crucial factors in the development of the human intellect. But is
this consciousness? I would want to argue with Chalmers that the real issue,
the 'hard problem' as he calls it, is "that the causation of behavior should
be accompanied by a subjective inner life." (pxi) The ability to plan allows
us to exert deliberate control over behavior, which is part of the 'easy
problem', and amenable to exploration using the scientific method. "Why do
we experience the vivid reds and purples of sunset instead of some lesser
sensation - or none at all? Why does everything seem so...well, real to us?"
(Dan Huff, Quantum Consciousness) This problem, according to Chalmers, can
never be resolved scientifically.
I suspect you are investigating 'self consciousness', Platt, which is
another issue. I can only recommend Julian Jaynes amazing book, The Origin
of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, for a stimulating
exploration of self consciousness. And he argues that it is a very late
development indeed, much later than the cave paintings of Lascaux. I won't
try to condense his arguments - this is already too long.
Platt: "the transcendence attributes of the Good, the True and the
Beautiful - the quintessential characteristics of Dynamic Quality - have
never disappeared"
Bravo. But these in my view are not just characteristics of DQ, but
identifiable forms of quality. They inhabit different domains of existence.
Descartes wrote his three treatises on just these domains. Quality is
apprehended from within the individual consciousness as beauty. Quality is
apprehended from within society as the good. And quality is apprehended from
the the exterior, from the domain of science, as the true. Each is valid,
but none reduces to the other. (Here I am drawing on Wilber.) If this might
cause Pirsig's simple quality to become more complex, so be it. I am
currently exploring how best to put this understanding of quality in a more
inclusive framework. Its heavy going, but also enjoyable, as I feel I have
found my voice in this endeavour.
A great post, Platt, which I hope will get the attention it deserves. While
I disagree with many of your points, I am in broad sympathy with your
direction and the significance of consciousness and its link to quality.
John B
PS Chalmers' book is one of the most boring I have read, and Plotkin is not
much better, yet they are both critical for this debate. Sorry.
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