MD Re: Emotion and DQ

From: John Beasley (beasley@austarnet.com.au)
Date: Sat Dec 22 2001 - 07:58:35 GMT


Hullo Zykaine,

Your question is a good one, but it suggests to me that you are in some way
minimising emotions. You say if there is no difference betwen DQ and
emotions, then DQ may not exist, hence this implies emotions may not exist.
Did you mean this?

Only recently someone recommended a book by Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Upheavals
of Thought', and the first chapter is available on the internet in The New
York Times site. (18.11.2001) I found it fascinating.

Nussbaum argues that emotions are "intelligent responses to the perception
of value". Hence anger can be a response to the recognition that something
of value to me is under threat, and may be lost. Nussbaum suggests that each
emotion is tied to a complex set of beliefs. In the case of anger these
include "that some damage has occurred to me or to something or someone
close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was
done by someone; probably, that it was done willingly. It seems plausible to
suppose that every member of this family of beliefs is necessary in order
for anger to be present."

She goes on to assert that "instead of viewing morality as a system of
principles to be grasped by the detached intellect, and emotions as
motivations that either support or subvert our choice according to
principle, we will have to consider emotions as part and parcel of the
system of ethical reasoning."

She makes one further point. "The emotions are in this sense localised: they
take their stand in my own life, and focus on the transition between light
and darkness there, rather than on the general distribution of light and
darkness in the universe as a whole."

Seen from Pirsig's vantage point, emotions are very close indeed to DQ, in
that they are the immediate perception of value. However, the element in
Nussbaum's analysis that goes beyond Pirsig is the recognition that these
values are linked to a complex of beliefs held by an individual. Pirsig is
prone to minimise the 'self', possibly due to his Benares training, or his
interest in Zen, or possibly because he is actually 'enlightened', in mystic
terms. So Pirsig tends to see the individual in terms of the patterns of
values that comprise him or her. In other words, for him the patterns come
before the person, who emerges as a sort of epiphenomenon. Nussbaum reverses
this. The person is the focal entity who discriminates value in terms that
relate to the very concrete situation in which that person exists. I rather
tend to agree with Nussbaum. I see the person as an agent, who plans action.
As an agent I react with emotion to those events and persons who can
frustrate or assist my well-being.

If you are interested in going into this further, I know one of my posts to
this forum a few months ago had a quote from 'Gestalt Therapy', where Paul
Goodman explores the qualities of 'contact', and I think this list is very
valuable for sorting out some of the deeper aspects of 'immediate
perception'.

I hope this has been helpful.

John B

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