Hi Gary:
> Pirsig believes in things
> beyond the sense, hence he is not a narrow/strict empiricist.
I doubt it. As I mentioned, Pirsig is a strict empiricist who adds to the
list of physical senses a "sense of value" which accounts for our
intuitions and intentions. Nowhere in LILA do I find any suggestion that
Pirsig believes in apparitions "beyond the sense."
> It seems clear by the briefest analysis of Pirsig's writing which I did in
> my August 4th 11:16 am post, does demonstrate that Pirsig considers the 4th
> level to be equivalent to the mind. And a clear reading of Lila and ZMM
> shows that Pirsig believes that we have a mind. Minds and non-minds, this
> recognizes the existence of Internal [to the mind] and External [to the
> mind].
Pirsig defines mind as intellectual patterns of value. You internal/external
split represents the intellectual pattern of SOM which he recognizes as
having some value, but not as much value as QM. You tend to mix apples
with oranges. I know it's hard not to think in terms of in/out,
internal/external, interior/exterior, etc. because this division has been
drilled into us since childhood along with the rest of SOM. Nor does
Pirsig recommend we dispense with SOM entirely. But in QM, basic
SOM divisions are replaced by Dynamic/static Quality and the hierarchy
of static Quality levels.
> I am interested in asking the question: How do
> you come to know the structure of reality? That question yields a map of
> reality that focuses on the process of gaining knowledge. Thus my map
> builds out from inside a mind. My map focuses on internal/external,
> private/public, words/things, maps/territory. What I am doing is
> re-arranging the parts of Pirsig's map in order to answer a question other
> than the one Pirsig asked and answered. I never intend to violate the
> rules of MOQ I just am shifting its focus.
The answer to your question is found in Chap. 9 of LILA where Pirsig
describes how a baby learns. Here is the relevant passage, with certain
portions deleted in the interests of time and space:
"One can imagine how an infant in the womb acquires awareness of
simple distinctions such as pressure and sound, and then at birth
acquires more complex ones of light and warmth and hunger. We know
these distinctions are pressure and sound and light and warmth and
hunger and so on but the baby doesn't. We could call them stimuli but
the baby doesn't identify them as that. From the baby's point of view,
something, he knows not what, compels attention. This generalized
"something," White-head's "dim apprehension," is Dynamic Quality.
If the baby ignores this force of Dynamic Quality it can be speculated
that he will become mentally retarded, but if he is normally attentive to
Dynamic Quality he will soon begin to notice differences and then
correlations between the differences and then repetitive patterns of the
correlations. But it is not until the baby is several months old that he will
begin to really understand enough about that enormously complex
correlation of sensations and boundaries and desires called an object to
be able to reach for one. This object will not be a primary experience. It
will be a complex pattern of static values derived from primary
experience. Once the baby has made a complex pattern of values
called an object and found this pattern to work well he quickly develops
a skill and speed at jumping through the chain of deductions that
produced it, as though it were a single jump. This is similar to the way
one drives a car. The first time there is a very slow trial-and-error
process of seeing what causes what. But in a very short time it
becomes so swift one doesn't even think about it. That is why we think
of subjects and objects as primary. We can't remember that period of
our lives when they were anything else. In this way static patterns of
value become the universe of distinguishable things. Elementary static
distinctions, between such entities as "before" and "after" and between
"like" and "unlike" grow into enormously complex patterns of knowledge
that are transmitted from generation to generation as the mythos, the
culture in which we live."
This is how we gain knowledge. Notice the emphasis on the "mythos" in
determining what we know. We interpret raw experience largely by how
we've been taught to interpret it by the culture we depend on for survival.
Included in that mythos are such SOM entities as before/after,
like/unlike and your favorite, internal/external.
> When I follow the process of how we acquire knowledge I
> find that I must use words like internal/External, public events or public
> things, and private events and private things.
In the above passage, Pirsig "follows the process of how we acquire
knowledge" without using the words you find necessary.
> I have shifted focus in my MOQ map. I have not abandoned the MOQ
> principles. I have shifted the focus and hence the map coordinates in
> order to examine a question that Pirsig was interested in ZMM but was no
> longer of interest when he wrote Lila. My map is more of a ZMM map than a
> Lila map. My primary interest at least in this thread and most of my
> statements so far on this site has been on questions of how we acquire
> knowledge and hence more ZMM focus than Lila focus.
Perhaps this is the nub of our disparity. My focus is on LILA where
Pirsig changed his views on what he wrote in ZMM, his earlier work. So
ZMM doesn't accurately reflect his metaphysics. I'd be interested to
see how your LILA map might differ from your ZMM map.
Platt
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