From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Tue Nov 12 2002 - 10:13:31 GMT
Dear Matt K.,
I had some problems with your defense of the redundancy of metaphysics of
29/10 16:03 -0600. So I left if unanswered for a while.
Having stated before:
'I don't think metaphysics is needed and ... metaphysics, by [a
conventional] definition, falls into an appearance-reality distinction.'
you now state:
'Pirsig sounds like he's [using a conventional definition] sometimes'.
Pirsig defines metaphysics in chapter 5 of 'Lila':
'Metaphysics is what Aristotle called the First Philosophy. It's a
collection of the most general statements of a hierarchical structure of
thought. On one of his slips he had copied a definition of it as "that part
of philosophy which deals with the nature and structure of reality." It asks
such questions as, "Are the objects we perceive real or illusory? Does the
external world exist apart from our consciousness of it? Is reality
ultimately reducible to a single underlying substance? If so, is it
essentially spiritual or material? Is the universe intelligible and orderly
or incomprehensible and chaotic?"'
This definition does not imply an appearance-reality distinction according
to me.
The questions Pirsig mentions can be answered with:
'our perceptions are real',
'our consciousness and the "external world" cannot be distinguished',
'reality can be abstracted to Quality, but this is not "single" (it is split
in DQ and sq at least), it doesn't "underlie" but "is" perception and it is
not "substance"' and
(because of the indistinguishability of consciousness and reality) 'the
universe is as intelligible and orderly as we are intelligent and ordering'.
Using the word 'metaphysics' doesn't imply that one believes there is an
'ultimate reality' (apart from direct experience). It only implies a
question whether there is.
I think you misunderstood me when you wrote:
'I wouldn't even say that there is a reality separate from individual
experience.'
I didn't say that either. I only said that there is AN IDEA that such is the
case.
You object against metaphysical questions as 'ahistorical questions that
each historical epoch or each individual philosophy has to own up to' with
'In the historicist rendering of philosophy, questions are created by the
language we use. As such, they can be dissolved by changing our language.'
I think that is what I meant when I wrote that 'implicit answers to these
questions ARE inevitable if we want to communicate with others'.
Communication requires a common language. It requires that we know what we
mean and what others mean when we use words like 'real', 'illusory', 'truth'
etc. especially as an 'appearance-reality distinction' IS used in everyday
communication to score points in discussions. We can try to 'dissolve' such
questions on this list by creating and using more MoQish language, but when
we explain what we are doing here to outsiders (and to new subscribers) we
must be able to answer their questions until they have adapted to our new
language.
You wrote:
'For instance, say we think that Descartes was successful in solving the
mind-body problem. What would that
do for us? Would it do anything for the children starving in Africa or the
people being slaughtered in mass genocides or the scientists working towards
cures for diseases and less polluting machinery? I don't think so.'
Answering metaphysical questions does not directly solve practical problems,
but it may create 'solid ground upon which such a [theoretical] structure
can be constructed' ('Lila' chapter 5) that CAN solve practical problems.
'Solid ground' should be understood as 'a language fit to deal with these
problems'.
If children starve because parents are too occupied with status games and
appeasing ancestor's spirits and not enough occupied with maintaining the
stability of their children's biological patterns of values, it may help to
sort out ideas about what is real and illusory, even if it is only a first
step.
If people are slaughtered in genocides because they are considered 'not
really human', it may again help to challenge some ideas about 'reality' ...
as a first step.
Also it is difficult to cure 'diseases' and to prevent 'pollution' if you
are not very clear about the 'reality' you are describing with those words.
If anyone needs metaphysics to clarify their language before they can start
the real practical work, it is scientists.
You wrote:
'If you are a metaphysician, then you think that your view is grounded by
some true final vocabulary, like Nature's or God's vocabulary.'
You obviously need word to paint black the opposite of the 'ironist' you
want to be, but I don't think 'metaphysics' in Pirsig's definition is enough
opposed to 'irony' to warrant using the word 'metaphysician' in that way
You wrote:
'Its when we start using "correspondence" that things start to look
representationalist (i.e. raising the appearance-reality distinction)
again.'
Not if we are only talking about correspondence between patterns of values
which we explicitly state to be equally real and deny the possibility to
define correspondence between DQ and sq (leaving us only metaphors and
paradoxes to communicate about the relation between DQ and sq).
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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