From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Fri Nov 22 2002 - 23:38:37 GMT
Hi Platt:
I think we have come to the crux of our discussion:
>I understand the appearance-reality split to be
>exactly the same as the subject-object split and the mind-body split, all
>based on H.O I.E.-- Hypothesis of Independent Existence.
Most philosophers don't take all of these distinctions to be exactly the
same, especially the first two (appearance-reality and subject-object) with
the last (mind-body). This is actually why I think there is trouble
interpreting what SOM is. I think Pirsig conflates the subject-object
split with the mind-body split. In my Rortyan interpretation, I interpret
SOM as primarily being the appearance-reality split. The mind-body split
is a distinction that is in the main by-passed by many contemporary
philosophers (or, at the least, by-passed by the philosophers I've
studied). So, I will resist any attempt to conflate appearance-reality
with mind-body.
The interesting thing about Pirsig is that, while he seems to conflate the
two distinctions in question, it is fairly easy to start to interpret him
as primarily talking about the appearance-reality distinction when he
critiques SOM. One can do this by seeing that Pirsig's emphasis on static
patterns is very close to the Foucaultian slogan, "Everything is a social
construction," in the way that our conception of static patterns is through
the MoQ, which is itself an intellectual pattern (as I'm reading it). Once
we make that leap, we can make the leap to Sellars' slogan, "All awareness
is a linguistic affair."
Your interpretation will want to resist these leaps and this
interpretation, but this is why I see your interpretation falling into an
appearance-reality distinction. Because once you make a distinction
between first and second order realities, its startin' to look like one's
appearance and the other's reality.
>At the risk of raising your ire about my "assuredness," what don't I
>understand about the appearance-reality split as you see it?
No, you're not raising my "ire." The point I wanted to get across was why
you trust Watzlawick and Pirsig and not Rorty. Why you trust Pirsig's hot
stove example. I would say its because we have an intuition that Quality
is a preconceptual, prelinguistic reality. Why else would Pirsig trust the
force of his example? For instance, I don't take Pirsig's example to be
persuasive at all. I understand the intuition he's refering to, I once
found it persuasive, but now I find that incorporating this intuition
causes more trouble then its worth and its best to suppress it, as Rorty
recommends. Rorty suggests changing our intuitions (based on the intuition
that all intuitions are social constructions). This is why I see the
problem as about competing intuitions.
I'm not sure if I'm engaging you concretely enough, though, because I'm
having trouble understanding what you mean by this paragraph:
>So when I talk about intuitions, perceptions, conceptions, language,
>first and second order realities, I'm coming down on the appearance,
>subjective, mind side of the split or, if you prefer the Idealist, not
Realist
>side.
Let me know if I'm missing something.
Matt
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