From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Mon Nov 25 2002 - 12:51:52 GMT
Hi Scott, David, Wim, everyone.
As I say, it is the 'narrow' conception of intellect that I object to; if it
is conceived broadly then there isn't a problem. (For example, Augustine's
'memory, reason and will' - any definition of intellect which includes
emotional discernment and doesn't restrict it to 'reason' would do). In one
sense the problem, as I see it, is that on the one hand Pirsig blithely says
that anyone capable of reading Lila knows what intellect is, and on the
other he (apparently) sets out a different understanding of what intellect
is for the purposes of the MoQ. Either intellect is given its common
understanding - which is SOM based, and tends to exclude emotion and
especially value - or it is given a specific MoQ meaning, in which case he
needs to spell it out.
Pirsig does start to do this in Lila's Child. He gives a number of
descriptions and examples of 'intellect', so let's try and gather them
together. Perhaps it would be useful to try to come to some measure of
agreement about what Pirsig means by 'intellect' and 'intellectual' before
trying to criticise it in the way that I have been doing. These aren't the
only interesting references, but I think they're the clearest/ most useful
(so let's all buy the book when it comes out!!).
Pirsig's comments:
"We must all use terms as they are described in the dictionary or we lose
the ability to communicate with each other." (note 24)
"In Lila, I never defined the intellectual level of the MOQ, since everyone
who is up to reading Lila already knows what "intellectual" means. For
purposes of MOQ precision, let's say that the intellectual level is the same
as mind. It is the collection and manipulation of symbols, created in the
brain, that stand for patterns of experience." (note 25)
"For precision in the MOQ it's better to limit intelligence to symbol
manipulation, as defined earlier. I think that a lot of perceived fuzziness
of these levels can come from expanding terms beyond their ordinary
dictionary meanings when there is no need to do so." (note 40)
"It is only Dynamic Quality I think is impossible to define. I think
definition is both possible and desirable for the static levels. I just
didn't do it because these levels seemed so obvious." (note 44)
Commenting on Bo's SOLAQI idea, he writes (note 50) "This seems too
restrictive. It seems to exclude non-subject-object constructions such as
symbolic logic, higher mathematics, and computer languages from the
intellectual level and gives them no home. Also the term "quality" as used
in the MOQ would be excluded from the intellectual level. In fact, the MOQ,
which gives intellectual meaning to the term quality, would also have to be
excluded from the intellectual level. If we just say the intellect is the
manipulation of language-derived symbols for experience, these problems of
excessive exclusion do not seem to occur."
"I don't think the subject-object level is identical with intellect.
Intellect is simply thinking, and one can think without involving the
subject-object relationship. Computer language is not primarily structured
into subjects and objects. Algebra has no subjects and objects." (note 95)
"In the MOQ, and in William James' pragmatism, truth is described as high
quality intellectual patterns." (note 104)
On SOLAQI again: "I've always thought this is incorrect because many forms
of intellect do not have a subject-object construction. These include logic
itself, mathematics, computer programming languages, and, I believe some
primitive languages (although I can't remember what they are)." (note 129)
"In German there are two words for "know," kennen and wissen. The Zen
approach reduces Wissenschaft (scholarly knowledge) and thereby improves
Kenntnis (recognition without intellectual interposition).... Soto Zen
meditation is a carefully contrived situation where as little as possible is
happening and this rational voice tends to run down like an alarm clock that
nobody is winding. When it stops completely enlightenment can happen.... The
voice is just static intellectual patterns reacting in fear of the Dynamic
Quality that has been present all along." (endnotes)
"The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a "self" that is
independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual patterns. There
is no "self" that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self.
This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge.
In Zen, there is reference to "big self" and "small self" Small self is the
patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality.... the big self invents intellectual
patterns that invent the small self and that collection of small selves
known as "we." ...The question, "Why?" is always an intellectual question.
It is always part of the static patterns of the small self. Any intellectual
answer it gets will by necessity also be a part of the static patterns of
the small self. Since the big self cannot be contained by small-self
patterns, there is no intellectual, patterned answer to "Why?" A lot of the
enigmatic unpatterned nature of Zen results from teachers trying to give
non-intellectual, non-patterned answers to "Why?" That is, they are trying
to give, as an answer, the big self itself, which surpasses all questions
and is the only correct answer that can be given." (note 29 plus end-notes)
"Phædrus is overwhelmingly intellectual. He is not a mask, really, just a
literary character who is easy for me to write about because I share many of
his static values a lot of the time. I don't think big self and small self
are involved here. My editor wanted me to make him a warmer person in order
to increase reader appeal. But making him warmer would have made him more
social and weakened the contrasts between himself and Rigel and Lila that
were intended to give strength to the story. The fact that everyone seemed
to think that Phædrus was me came as an unpleasant surprise after the book
was published. I had assumed that everyone would of course know that an
author and a character in his book cannot possibly be the same person."
(endnotes on annotation 39)
"After the beginning of history inorganic, biological, social and
intellectual patterns are found existing together in the same person. ... A
social pattern which would be unaware of the next higher level would be
found among prehistoric people and the higher primates when they exhibit
social learning that is not genetically hard-wired but yet is not symbolic."
(endnotes on annotation 52)
"Dynamic Quality is value and thus is very easily distinguished. When one
creates a word for it and tries to distinguish this word from other words in
a set of static intellectual patterns, confusion results. But the confusion
is caused by the static patterns that seek to subordinate Dynamic Quality to
themselves." (endnotes on annotation 69)
"Those aspects of a language that a microphone or camera can pick up are
objective and therefore biological. Those aspects of a language which a
microphone or camera cannot pick up (i.e., meaning) are subjective and
therefore social. If the gorilla understands what is meant in ways that are
socially learned, then the gorilla is acting socially. If the gorilla can
read and write and add and subtract then it is acting intellectually."
(endnotes on annotation 129)
"Both "the genius" and the mentally retarded person are at the social level.
At the intellectual level would be the law that requires them to be treated
equally." (note 137) "My statement that "Both 'the genius' and the mentally
retarded person are at the social level." is intended to refute the
statement that "the genius appears to be on a higher evolutionary level." A
person who holds an idea is a social entity, no matter what ideas he holds.
The ideas he holds are an intellectual entity, no matter who holds them....a
difference in social standing is not a difference in evolutionary level in
the MOQ" (endnotes on note 137)
~~~
Having gathered all these together, I have some tentative conclusions, which
it would be good to discuss further.
Firstly, David's contention that the character Lila has no part of intellect
is unsustainable. Or, more specifically, Pirsig wouldn't agree with him
about it (if a gorilla can read... it's acting intellectually)
Second, intellect (according to Pirsig) is 'simply thinking', the
manipulation of symbols. Those symbols are abstract representations of
social constructions, ie they are derived from language (which is in origin
the social level). You could perhaps say that intellect is the
'meta-language' of society. Slightly different is the emphasis on the idea
itself as the intellectual level.
Third, there does seem to be a contradiction along the lines that Rick has
pointed out. Social patterns are 'subjective', they exist in the mind. Yet
so are intellectual patterns. I think this is one of the problems with
Pirsig's account (which IMHO my alternative 'eudaimonic' account overcomes).
Perhaps the difference is that the intellect is 'symbolic', but that seems
to suggest a 'more or less' distinction, not the discrete difference Pirsig
requires. Moreover, Pirsig is pretty clear that all of human history has
both social and intellectual components. This would support Wim's
perspective I think.
I'd love to hear further views from people before I weigh in with some more
comments.
Sam
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