From: Elizaphanian (Elizaphanian@members.v21.co.uk)
Date: Wed Nov 27 2002 - 09:06:45 GMT
Hi Scott,
Fair comments about Phaedrus, I think you're right and I'm wrong on that
front.
I also think I was too hasty to 'absolutise' the two; they are a spectrum I
think. (Although historically they often have been absolutised). I think I
was wrong to exclude manipulation of symbols from 2nd degree; they are
included, but I would still maintain that 2nd degree can't be defined as
'manipulation of symbols'.
However, having said that, I'm glad that the broad distinction is acceptable
to you. I'm dubious about the equation of '2nd degree' with dynamic
intellect though. (Although I don't at all deny that, like Poincare, it is
the source of much dynamic thinking). I think there is far too much that can
be said about it, and that people can be trained in it, and - crucially for
me - it is dependent on character traits for it to be 'dynamic' in a DQ -
and therefore undefinable - sense. If you just mean that it is where the
interesting intellectual things come from then that's more plausible.
But I'd be interested in your two pennies on Pirsig's conception. Am I fair
in saying he doesn't talk much (in Lila, not ZMM) about 2nd degree? ie his
understanding of intellect seems shaped primarily around 1st degree thinking
to me.
Sam
www.elizaphanian.v-2-1.net/home.html
----- Original Message -----
From: "Scott R" <jse885@spinn.net>
To: <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Sent: Wednesday, November 27, 2002 4:09 AM
Subject: Re: MD individuality
> Sam,
>
> I'm pretty much in agreement with you on distinguishing these two types of
> thinking, but think that the way to distinguish them is to call them
static
> intellect and Dynamic intellect -- or static reason and Dynamic reason
> (Coleridge called the former 'understanding' and the latter 'reason', by
the
> way). The Poincare story (getting a brilliant solution to a long-pondered
> mathematical problem while thinking about something else -- retold in
ZAMM)
> is a classic case of Dynamic reason. It wouldn't have happened without the
> long-pondering, and the instant recognition of it as the solution is a
case
> of Dynamic Quality breaking into a heretofore static state. When the
static
> state is mathematical or scientific or philosophical we can call it
reason,
> when artistic, art.
>
> Yet one can also call it the "manipulation of symbols". After all, doesn't
> the MoQ amount to moving certain symbols around, namely the words
'subject',
> 'object', 'value', 'quality', etc.? That is, the manipulation of symbols
can
> be very humdrum but can also be very creative. One can say, by comparison,
> that Michelangelo manipulated paint very creatively.
>
> (By the way, I am in disagreement with Pirsig about sticking to dictionary
> definitions. One can't do that and philosophize, since the words of
interest
> do not have clear denotations. Short of neologizing, the only way to be
> creative in philosophy is to shift connotations, e.g., of the words
> 'subject' and 'object').
>
> In your bit about Phaedrus' coldness, I think you have confused two
things.
> Phaedrus is cold socially, but only with people (Lila and Rigel) who do
not
> share his excitement over things intellectual. I would guess he was quite
> warm with Dusenberry. So when you say "The whole structure of Lila is
built
> around the idea that the intellect is 'cold' in this way, that Phaedrus is
> emotionally distant, that he _doesn't_ display any emotional wisdom." I
> think you are confusing social emotion (where he is 'emotionally distant'
> with not-particularly-intellectual folks) with intellectual emotion. True,
> there is not much discussion of the latter in Lila, but then it was
> discussed in ZAMM, and in fact, getting too emotional over his discoveries
> turned out to be disastrous for Phaedrus. That was part of the story in
ZAMM
> (the madness), but it is not so much in Lila. In Lila he is going back
over
> his ideas, and any narration of intellectual ideas is bound to be
> undramatic, since by then they are (to the author) static. The reader
might
> get emotional intellectual highs, however.
>
> - Scott
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- >
> > It might help if we put to one side questions of what 'reason' actually
is
> > for a second, ie, not get into a tussle over definitional questions. It
is
> > quite possible that I am incorrectly equating 'reason' with 'logic', but
> > hopefully if I explain myself a bit further things will be clearer - and
> > then you can say whether you agree with me or not.
> >
> > Let's just talk about 'thinking' for the moment, and not try to define
it
> > further. (After all, according to Pirsig, 'intellect is simply
thinking').
> >
> ...
>
>
>
>
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