Re: MD individuality

From: Scott R (jse885@spinn.net)
Date: Wed Nov 27 2002 - 04:09:15 GMT

  • Next message: Elizaphanian: "Re: MD individuality"

    Sam,

    I'm pretty much in agreement with you on distinguishing these two types of
    thinking, but think that the way to distinguish them is to call them static
    intellect and Dynamic intellect -- or static reason and Dynamic reason
    (Coleridge called the former 'understanding' and the latter 'reason', by the
    way). The Poincare story (getting a brilliant solution to a long-pondered
    mathematical problem while thinking about something else -- retold in ZAMM)
    is a classic case of Dynamic reason. It wouldn't have happened without the
    long-pondering, and the instant recognition of it as the solution is a case
    of Dynamic Quality breaking into a heretofore static state. When the static
    state is mathematical or scientific or philosophical we can call it reason,
    when artistic, art.

    Yet one can also call it the "manipulation of symbols". After all, doesn't
    the MoQ amount to moving certain symbols around, namely the words 'subject',
    'object', 'value', 'quality', etc.? That is, the manipulation of symbols can
    be very humdrum but can also be very creative. One can say, by comparison,
    that Michelangelo manipulated paint very creatively.

    (By the way, I am in disagreement with Pirsig about sticking to dictionary
    definitions. One can't do that and philosophize, since the words of interest
    do not have clear denotations. Short of neologizing, the only way to be
    creative in philosophy is to shift connotations, e.g., of the words
    'subject' and 'object').

    In your bit about Phaedrus' coldness, I think you have confused two things.
    Phaedrus is cold socially, but only with people (Lila and Rigel) who do not
    share his excitement over things intellectual. I would guess he was quite
    warm with Dusenberry. So when you say "The whole structure of Lila is built
    around the idea that the intellect is 'cold' in this way, that Phaedrus is
    emotionally distant, that he _doesn't_ display any emotional wisdom." I
    think you are confusing social emotion (where he is 'emotionally distant'
    with not-particularly-intellectual folks) with intellectual emotion. True,
    there is not much discussion of the latter in Lila, but then it was
    discussed in ZAMM, and in fact, getting too emotional over his discoveries
    turned out to be disastrous for Phaedrus. That was part of the story in ZAMM
    (the madness), but it is not so much in Lila. In Lila he is going back over
    his ideas, and any narration of intellectual ideas is bound to be
    undramatic, since by then they are (to the author) static. The reader might
    get emotional intellectual highs, however.

    - Scott

    ----- Original Message ----- >
    > It might help if we put to one side questions of what 'reason' actually is
    > for a second, ie, not get into a tussle over definitional questions. It is
    > quite possible that I am incorrectly equating 'reason' with 'logic', but
    > hopefully if I explain myself a bit further things will be clearer - and
    > then you can say whether you agree with me or not.
    >
    > Let's just talk about 'thinking' for the moment, and not try to define it
    > further. (After all, according to Pirsig, 'intellect is simply thinking').
    >
    ...

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