From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Sun Dec 01 2002 - 00:01:03 GMT
Wim,
We've been having a discussion about philosophy and metaphysics and what
they are, what they can do, if we should still be doing them, etc. You
maintain that metaphysics, rehabiliated, is still useful. I maintain that
its not. Or, rather, that metaphysics under its many rehabiliated guises
is stretched to mean other things that already have a name and I much
prefer the former names, mainly so when I say, "Yes, I would like to eschew
metaphysics," I don't accidentally refer to the other things I like.
I leave metaphysics to mean a systemization using the appearance-reality
distinction.
Wim's formulation is roughly captured by these two quotes:
"a formalized metaphysics ... can help us sort out communication that gets
stuck."
"To the extent that we CAN change our language, we might agree to make that
the task of metaphysics (when we are dealing with the more fundamental
questions created by our language) and of philosophy in general."
The problem I see with making metaphysics in charge of changing language is
that I don't see the changing of language to be specific to any particular
discipline. Its something that everybody does. Under this definition, I
don't see the difference between "metaphysics" and "vocabularies". Some
mapped out, systematized form of our vocabularies may be useful, but I
leave that to philosophy as Sellars defined it. And, as Sellars defined
it, philosophy isn't a distinct discipline. Its just something people
engage in when they try and see how things hang together, whether they're
physicists or theologians or sculpters. Professional philosophers don't
have any more jurisdiction or authority than anybody else in this area.
So, as I see it, you're making metaphysics synonymous with philosophy and I
don't see the use in that.
I must say, though, I would've never have guessed you to partake in the
Platt School of Inferences. The Platt School says that the more amusing
(infuriating?) an inference is, the more reason to say it, context be
damned. Sometimes you hit the mark, most of the time not, but hey, when
its funny, who cares, right?
So, when you say, "We would have to write about a 'Philosophy of Quality'
and would have to change the name of the list and of the site into 'PoQ
Discuss'," I can only smile in response.
On weird convolutions and strong misreadings, a weird convolution could be
a strong misreading. However, both are judged by usefulness. In your
"strong convolution" or "weird misreading," I found that you were using
langauge from two vacabularies that are generally considered to be
incommensurate. That doesn't mean it can't be useful, but, on the other
hand, I didn't find the results very useful. Because of below:
On the foundation metaphor, I don't see that we need it and I don't see
that you need it. Seeing the foundation metaphor as "the relation between
'helping to understand final vocabularies' or 'dissolving questions created
by language' and solving practical problems," isn't quite useful because it
doesn't quite do justice to foundationalists who think the metaphor is
closer to what I said it was. Like metaphysics, I think foundationalism is
something that should be put aside and I don't see that we need to retain
foundationalist language after thinking that what is generally considered
to be a foundation is no longer needed.
On this paragraph:
"I think we agree that 'science ... might be done better' when not founded on
the presumption on a appearance-reality distinction. You're sure that
branding scientists as 'metaphysicians' (= believers in an Ultimate Reality)
will help them to become better scientists? Well, maybe you're right, but as
their conventional understanding of 'metaphysics' does not square with their
understanding of what they are doing themselves it does not seem the most
efficient way to me..."
I'm quite sure where I said science might be done better after eschewing
the appearance-reality distinction or why I said it. Well, maybe science
might be done better post-eschewment, but for my own sake it would have
been better of me to say that it doesn't really matter for the actual
day-to-day workings of normal science whether scientists eschew or don't
eschew the appearance-reality distinction.
I'm also not quite sure I said "that branding scientists as
'metaphysicians' ...will help them to become better scientists." I did say
in my last post to you that scientists typically conceive of themselves as
moving closer and closer to Truth. When they do this, I would "brand" them
metaphysicians. But I don't think scientists being ironists or
metaphysicians will help them, say, find out the mass of a distant planet.
And I just don't understand the last part of that paragraph.
In response to your answer of my last question, I don't think
non-contradictory conceptual machineries will mire us in staticness, mainly
because of the importance of metaphors to Rorty's philosophy.
Matt
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