From: Wim Nusselder (wim.nusselder@antenna.nl)
Date: Fri Nov 29 2002 - 23:20:16 GMT
Dear Matt K.,
You wrote 12/11 18:02 -0600:
'We've gotten ourselves into another redescription battle.'
If that is all, we'd better stop this discussion.
Our discussion started when you wrote 20/10 13:58 -0500:
'I don't think metaphysics is needed and ... metaphysics, by definition,
falls into an appearance-reality
distinction.'
If you agree that metaphysics can be defined in a way in which it doesn't
imply an appearance-reality distinction without defining something
unrecognizably different (which I guess you do) and if I agree that it can
be defined in a way in which it does (which I do), then discussing about the
second part of your statement is indeed only about redescription and futile.
I'm not interested in discussing how 'conventional' either of these
definitions is and whether the definition Pirsig uses looks more like the
one or like the other.
I already agreed in my 29/10 8:49 +0100 posting that a metaphysics that
presupposes an appearance-reality distinction is not needed. The question
that remains is then whether you agree that a metaphysics that does not
presuppose such a distinction can be useful.
You did write 29/10 16:03 -0600:
'It is helpful to understand the final vocabulary you are working with.'
As I wrote 29/10 8:49 +0100 that (if defined in my way)
'a formalized metaphysics ... can help us sort out communication that gets
stuck',
and as 'vocabulary' (even if I don't completely understand the way in which
Rorty uses this term) must have some role in communication,
we might agree that a metaphysics that doesn't presuppose an
appearance-reality distinction (if you agree such a metaphysics is possible)
can help to understand 'final vocabularies' and thus might be
helpful/useful.
I may have overstated my case by arguing that 'we can't do without
an -implicit- metaphysics'. It might be better to state only that
metaphysics (if defined in the right way) can be useful up to the point
where it -being a 4th level pattern of values- starts hampering the
migration of static patterns of values and our attempts at grasping Quality
beyond the 4th level.
I agree that 'in the historicist rendering of philosophy, questions are
created by the language we use. As such, they can be dissolved by changing
our language' and that historicism in this sense is valuable. The question
that remains is to what extent we can change our language. If you agree that
'communication requires a common language', the possibility to change our
language is at least limited by our identification with certain groups and
our need to communicate with those groups in the language that they
understand. To the extent that we CAN change our language, we might agree to
make that the task of metaphysics (when we are dealing with the more
fundamental questions created by our language) and of philosophy in general.
If you want to reserve the term 'metaphysics' to 'questions about ultimate
reality', which we want to get rid of, and make asking the 'question of
whether there is an ultimate reality' a task of philosophy, that's fine with
me, too. Then the task of changing our language to dissolve the questions it
creates would be the task of metaphysics.
That would however require (for a start) changing the language of all the
participants of this mailing list. We would have to write about a
'Philosophy of Quality' and would have to change the name of the list and of
the site into 'PoQ Discuss' and www.poq.org respectively. Do you really
think that worth the while to help get rid of the idea that there is a
reality separate from appearance/experience?
You say 'a weird convolution of foundational and Kuhnian philosophy' in my
statement:
'Answering metaphysical questions does not directly solve practical
problems, but it may create "solid ground upon which such a [theoretical]
structure can be constructed" ("Lila" chapter 5) that CAN solve practical
problems. "Solid ground" should be understood as "a language fit to deal
with these problems".'
Is a 'weird convolution of' something comparable to a 'strong misreading
of'? (-: As I have never read foundational philosophers or Kuhn that would
be interesting...
You wrote
'What I reject is the notion that what philosophy does somehow "holds up" or
provides "solid ground" for our conceptual machinery which can then perform
practical functions.'
For me 'constructing something on solid ground' is just a metaphor for the
relation between 'helping to understand final vocabularies' or 'dissolving
questions created by language' and solving practical problems. If your read
a 'notion' in that metaphor that creates problems if taken to extremes, than
the metaphor obviously has reached the limits of its applicability.
I don't claim 'that if scientists had clearer conceptual machinery, they
would do their jobs better'. I only claim that if they have a common
language that doesn't create too many questions (among themselves and with
those they are working for), they can communicate more efficiently and thus
do their jobs better. And if you hold that scientist can create a good
common language for themselves, without any need for philosophers and
metaphysicians, that is fine with me too, if only YOU then take upon
yourself the task to convince Horse that he should change the names of
website and discussion list into www.soq.org and SD. (-:
I think we agree that 'science ... might be done better' when not founded on
the presumption on a appearance-reality distinction. You're sure that
branding scientists as 'metaphysicians' (= believers in an Ultimate Reality)
will help them to become better scientists? Well, maybe you're right, but as
their conventional understanding of 'metaphysics' does not square with their
understanding of what they are doing themselves it does not seem the most
efficient way to me...
In answer to your last question
'why do we need contradictory conceptual machinery when there is a
non-contradictory alternative?':
maybe because non-contradictory conceptual machineries (without the 'logic
of contradictory identity') mire us in static intellect and hamper our
jumping to the moon with metaphors and paradoxes?
With friendly greetings,
Wim
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Fri Nov 29 2002 - 23:20:46 GMT