From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Tue Aug 17 2004 - 22:52:16 BST
Hi Paul,
> Platt said:
> I've looked through LILA and can't find where Pirsig made it clear that
> "perception" as used in the MOQ means something different than its everyday
> SOM meaning. Same goes for "experience" and "awareness."
> Paul:
> As far as I am aware, a SOM sees neither that Quality is synonymous with
> awareness, nor that this Quality awareness is the source of all subjects
> and objects. Rather, a SOM sees a subject and/or an object as the source of
> awareness. In terms of the texts, does this quote from ZMM answer your
> question?:
>
> "He simply meant that at the cutting edge of time, before an object can be
> distinguished, there must be a kind of nonintellectual awareness, which he
> called awareness of Quality...Since all intellectually identifiable things
> must emerge from this preintellectual reality, Quality is the parent, the
> source of all subjects and objects." [ZMM, p.247, Ch 20]
Not really. The question still hanging out there is, "Awareness by whom?"
Paul:
> Or this from LILA?:
>
> "The low value that can be derived from sitting on a hot stove is
> obviously an experience even though it is not an object and even though it
> is not subjective. The low value comes first, then the subjective thoughts
> that include such things as stove and heat and pain come second." [LILA Ch
> 8]
In this case, the answer to who is experiencing low value is the stove
sitter.
> Platt said:
> I can't find a single instance in LILA where Pirsig, in explaining the MOQ,
> divorces perception (awareness, experience) from a subjective human being.
>
> Paul:
> Does the LILA quote above address this? Metaphysically speaking, the
> subjective human being comes after the value experience.
Maybe metaphysically speaking. But not in everyday, common-usage-of-the-
language-speaking. Experience is always associated with a person, or at
least a life form.
> Also, within
> the MOQ it is assumed that experience occurs at the inorganic level
> without the presence of subjective human beings, if it didn't, evolution
> wouldn't have gotten started.
Ah, now we get to the nub. "Atoms experience." Seems Dan Glover, who knows
the MOQ as well as anybody, disagrees. He wrote recently: "I didn't say an
atom 'values' nor am I aware of Robert Pirsig saying so. That would
indicate awareness. I believe 'preference' is the term he uses."
Way back in the early days of MOQ discuss we had a lengthy debate about
the issue, "Are atoms aware?" As I recall the general agreement was that
the proposition had to be accepted if the MOQ was to logically hold water.
This seems to be your position today. But you can see the problem: try to
convince someone that atoms are sentient in any way whatsoever, even if
just a wee bit. Most people will think your crazy. I hate to see the MOQ
flounder on the proposition that atoms possess some sort of inner
sensibility.
> Platt said:
> In fact, in the LS, Note 59, Pirsig states flatly, "The MOQ, like
> science, starts with human experience." Once you bring in a human, you
> bring in a subject, at least in the common definition of the word,
> "subject."
>
> Paul:
> I think you've taken that quote out of context. The full quote reads:
>
> "Within the MOQ, the idea that static patterns of value start with the
> inorganic level is considered to be a good idea. But the MOQ itself doesn't
> start before sentience. The MOQ, like science, starts with human
> experience. Remember the early talk in ZMM about Newton's Law of Gravity?
> Scientific laws without people to write them are a scientific
> impossibility."
>
> He is refuting to the statement that, "The static patterns of value
> start with the inorganic level. This implies that the MOQ existed before
> sentience." I don't think this has anything to do with my denial that
> subjects and objects are the starting point of reality in both SOM and the
> MOQ.
It does get confusing when you try to explain this. The starting point of
reality doesn't require a person, but the reality of the MOQ does require
a person.
> > Platt said:
> > Further, Pirsig says we can never know ultimate reality (the
> > conceptually unknown). But that's saying we know something about it.
> >
> > Paul:
> > We can't know it *intellectually* but we can intellectually accept
> that it
> > exists nonetheless and work from there. We *can* know it by
> experience,
> > given that it *is* experience. Again, I thought this was made clear in
> ZMM
> > and LILA.
Again, ultimate reality can be known by a person through personal
experience. That "person" keeps hanging around no matter how hard we try
to ignore him, except presumably when it comes to atoms.
> Platt said:
> Again, where in these books was it "made clear?" A couple of quotes
> would help.
>
> Paul:
> That it is known by experience:
Thanks for all the quotes. In the interest of space I won't repeat them,
though I'm sorely tempted to replay what Pirsig says about socialists. .
Correct me if I'm wrong, but in every one of the quotes you offered, a
person or persons is presupposed.
Best,
Platt
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