From: Scott Roberts (jse885@earthlink.net)
Date: Fri Aug 20 2004 - 00:34:13 BST
Paul,
> Paul:
> I think there is a basis for a philosophy of mind in the MOQ. First, the
> evolution described in the MOQ is an evolution of value patterns, not
> substance. Substance is a description that may be applied to the bottom
> two levels but the levels are not continuous. This resolves the
> metaphysical obstacle of how mental reality may evolve from physical
> reality by grounding both in value. In other words, there is no
> metaphysical imperative to explain mind in terms of matter.
True, it shows "no metaphysical imperative to explain mind in terms of
matter", but that does not address the problem of mind, which is: why are
there these two distinct categories of mind: thinking and observation, of
which one seems to be under my control (at least partially) and the other
is not? Since the MOQ just defines "mind" as "symbolic activity", this
dichotomy is simply ignored. There is, in the MOQ no philosophical
anthropology, that is, what it means to be a human being. How do thinking,
perceiving, feeling, and willing all make up the sense of me? For the MOQ,
we are simply another level of SPOV, which I found useless as a basis for
self-examination.
>
> Second, the MOQ points towards an historic emergence of mind from a
> certain sophistication of social patterns e.g. symbolic language. I
> think Jaynes (although he points towards biological factors as well) is
> an example of how this idea can be a sound basis for a philosophy of
> mind.
It is not, since Jaynes tries to work this out from a materialist point of
view. Barfield, on the other hand does the job right (and as I've said many
times, Barfield does all these things that I am criticizing the MOQ for not
doing).
> Paul previously said:
> > Why do sense perceptions *require* continuity? For some reason, I am
> > thinking about the arguments of the ancient Greeks about this, Zeno's
> > paradox and such, although I forget the detail.
>
> Scott said:
> Because sense perceptions are extended and have parts, but are perceived
> as wholes.
>
> Paul:
> Or, sense perceptions are whole but are perceived as parts?
Same difference. Each whole is made of parts, and each whole is a part of a
greater whole, and the fact that we can shift focus up and down the scale
is a very interesting one.
>
> Scott said:
> One perceives a melody, one doesn't perceive a note, then another note,
> and then in a separate act put them together.
>
> Paul:
> If they are already whole there is no need for a separate act to put
> them together, rather the "separate act" is to take them apart. Another
> explanation is that I think the MOQ argues that the perception of
> "harmony," in its broadest sense, is the fundamental nature of
> perception which constructs our static reality in the first place. We
> are, in a way, predisposed to perceive harmony. This is the basis of
> unity between Poincare's epistemology and Phaedrus' metaphysics in ZMM.
Right. And this is the reason for denying absolute spacetime, and so
Darwinism goes out the window.
>
> Scott said:
> Or one can focus on a note, but it extends through time also. This
> putting together happens subconsciously, if it can be said to "happen"
> at all.
>
> Paul:
> I think this "putting together subconsciously" corresponds to Pirsig's
> pre-intellectual value. If it is, it not only happens, it is what
> happens prior to anything else.
Yes. The melody, or the note, exists ab initio as a whole (which implies
partness, and being part of a greater whole), and the best analogy for this
sort of thing in our experience is the idea. So to call its pre-perceived
state "pre-intellectual" or "undifferentiated" is a mistake. It is only
that because we can't picture a non-spatio-temporal holon (to use Wilber's
term) that leads us to assign these epithets, a fallacy deriving from what
Coleridge calls "the despotism of the eye". Perception, then, turns the
idea into an object of space, time, and mass, which is the same kind of
thing as our turning our ideas into speech. This is how mind and matter can
be discursively unified (felt unity is another matter, requiring Reason
rather than understanding). Matter is the speech of the intellect of the
other, mind is what I turn into speech for others.
- Scott
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