RE: MD A bit of reasoning

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@earthlink.net)
Date: Sun Sep 19 2004 - 05:11:17 BST

  • Next message: Scott Roberts: "Re: MD MOQ, Buddhism & suffering"

    DMB et al,

    First, let me recap. The MOQ, it is true, puts Quality between and over the
    traditional division between mind and matter. That is good. What I am
    trying to convince people of is that the word Intellect should also be put
    in that spot, not to displace Quality, but to equate the two. The MOQ,
    however, makes a big deal of restricting intellect to humans, and considers
    it as a hindrance to achieving "pure experience". That I reject. It is the
    case that for most people most of the time, intellect is monkey mind, and
    that is bad, but the fix to that is to train and discipline the intellect,
    not to put it to sleep. And I've referred to various mystics, like
    Nagarjuna, Shankara, Nicholas of Cusa, and Franklin Merrell-Wolff to back
    me up.

    > dmb says:
    > Well then all hope is lost because I think your assertion, that all SQ are
    > universals, is far too drastic and drastically incorrect. Nor do I see the
    > point of asserting it.

    [Scott:] If it is true, then that is the point of asserting it. You think
    it is not true, but have not pointed out the flaw in my reasoning, that a
    "static pattern of value", to be valuable, needs to be appreciated as a
    pattern, and that means treating it *as* a pattern, a universal. If it is
    just a particular, then it cannot be changed, or valued, except insofar
    that it indicates the universal pattern of which it is particular, which
    (the pattern) can be changed.

    > Scott said:
    > It is a myth that the MOQ has dissolved the mind/matter debates. It has
    > appeared to have done so only be redefining some words so that the debates
    > can no longer be adequately expressed. This is what materialism does,
    except
    > the MOQ has added the word "quality", so that anything mysterious can be
    > said to be done by DQ. which is no more help than saying it is done by
    God.
    >
    > dmb says:
    > No, the mind/matter split is not healed by "redefining some words", by
    > stashing all mysteries into a black hole callled "quality", nor by
    sweeping
    > anything under the rug. The two are joined by a middle term. Mind and
    matter
    > are connected by a third level of reality. Subject/Object dualism
    construes
    > reality as either mind or matter, but the MOQ says it ain't so. Between
    > biological static quality and intellectual static quality, there is the
    > social level of static quality and it acts as a sort of bridge so that the
    > MOQ can assert that mind and matter are not split off from each other at
    all
    > but exist in a "matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship". And UNLIKE
    > materialism, the MOQ does not hold that mind is a property of matter, nor
    > that it can be reduced to matter, but is nevertheless "as real as rocks
    and
    > trees". The difference between mind and matter is not denied in the MOQ,
    but
    > the gulf between them no longer exists as they are both seen as different
    > evolutionary levels within a reality that is ultimately unified. This is
    > just a brief sketch. I could have used a dozen quotes instead of a couple
    > phrases, but it is all explained in Lila. In fact, your criticism is so
    off
    > the mark that it only makes me wonder if you've read the book!

    [Scott:] Please. I am criticizing the book, and for that I had to have read
    it, which I have several times. I am aware of all the above, and claiming
    that it is insufficient. Having the social bridge is important for its
    moral arguments, but it is not sufficient to explain the apparent
    difference between our thinking and our perception, of why S/O should have
    arisen in the first place. Lila does not go into this, since it is about
    morality, so my criticism is that if one does go into problems of mind and
    matter, the metaphysical basis laid by the MOQ is inadequate. It needs to
    see that there is an essential difference between the fourth level and the
    other three levels, which is that the fourth level can reflect on itself,
    while the other levels, if a cosmic Intellect is ignored, cannot. So how
    did the ability to reflect come into existence? Well, simple, let us not
    ignore cosmic Intellect. But the MOQ does ignore it.

    >
    > Scott asked:
    > The mind/matter question is not resolved unless the following questions
    have
    > answers: If there was a time that there were no universals, how did the
    > first universal get created? What is the origin of language? Why does
    > thinking and feeling seem to come from "within" (to be "me") while sense
    > perception seems to come from "without" (to be caused by "not me")? Why
    does
    > simply thinking that subject/object dualism is "just a static pattern of
    > intellectual value" not allow one to dissolve the difference between me
    and
    > not-me? Why is being aware of what I just thought different from being
    aware
    > of the tree in front of me? (note: in SOM these are two different kinds of
    > objects. In the MOQ one cannot say that, since in the MOQ only inorganic
    and
    > biological patterns can be objects of awareness.) Is mind identical to the
    > brain (or: can there be mind, or consciousness, without a brain)?
    >
    > dmb says:
    > The MOQ doesn't RESOLVE the mind/matter debate so much as DISSOLVE the
    > questions. They become meaningless questions. Or at least they don't seem
    so
    > important and loose their metaphysical implications.

    [Scott:] Dissolved by redefining terms, which does not dissolve them. The
    same but vain hope that Rorty tries.

     In any case, you have
    > failed to show the connection between these questions and any failure of
    the
    > MOQ. The origins of language? Surely we can only speculate on that and I
    > hardly think its fair to knock Pirsig for leaving that question
    unanswered.

    [Scott:] As I said to Mel, I don't expect that there is an answer, since
    language is fundamental. So I am not knocking Pirsig for not answering the
    question, but for not realizing that everything is semiotic.

    > And what give you the impression that the MOQ does not allow us to treat
    > ideas or consciousness itself as an object of awareness? I think it not
    only
    > allows such a thing, but both of Pirsig's books do exactly that. In fact
    its
    > one of the things they go into in the Guidebook to ZAMM, the idea that a
    > subject can be an object of the subject's awareness. SOM gets a person all
    > tangled up in that sort of thing, but not the MOQ, where everything we
    know
    > is some kind, mixture of static quality.

    [Scott] Pirsig, LC #111: "The "objects" in the MOQ refer to definition 1
    ["Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
    or touch; a material thing" in the actual text, the numbering got typo-ed,
    as Dan Glover has acknowledged]. Objects are biological patterns and
    inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns."

    So, if we accept this, we cannot speak of intellectual and social things as
    objects of thought. So this redefinition on Pirsig's part is just silly.
    There are two meanings of "subject" in SOM. One is that which Pirsig calls
    intellectual and social SQ, the collection of thoughts, ideas, feelings,
    etc.. The other is that which perceives an object, or thinks about an
    object, and so forth (subject as implied in definition 5 [4 in the text]).
    The MOQ only dissolves the mind/matter distinction according to the first
    meaning. It does not dissolve the second. It just makes it unsayable.

    >
    > Scott said:
    > And so on. The MOQ's answers amount to dualism. There was matter (static
    > particulars) and then there was mind (static universals). Unless DQ is God
    > and created universals ex nihilo, in which case the MOQ is theistic.
    Unless
    > universals "really are" reducible to particulars (say neural events), in
    > which case the MOQ is materialist. In short, the MOQ provides nothing new
    > for a philosophy of mind.
    >
    > dmb says:
    > If there is a duality in the MOQ it is the static/Dynamic split. In that
    > case, both mind and matter are on one side of that split, the static side.

    [Scott:] Yes, which ignores the difference that mind has the ability to
    reflect on things, including itself, which is not true of matter. This
    "dissolves" the problem by fiat, not in a way that promotes understanding.

    > As mentioned above, they are embedded in an evolutionary hierarchy. And
    in a
    > non-theistic, only-if-you're-very-careful, mystical sense of the word,
    "God"
    > and Dynamic Quality do refer to the same thing.

    [Scott:] Fine, if one allows that DQ is also Dynamic Intellect.

    > Scott said:
    > Unless you can give me a nuts and bolts explanation of how intellect
    > (complete with reflective consciousness, universals, etc.) came into being
    > from a universe that didn't have any of this (which is what the MOQ
    claims)
    > then there is a mind/matter distinction. I don't believe such an
    > explanation exists, so in fact I agree that there are not two substances,
    > one called mind and one called matter. Rather, I believe that intellect is
    > primordial, and that it expresses itself dualistically. So my complaint
    > with the MOQ is not that I think that SOM is really true, rather my
    > complaint is that the MOQ has ignored some things about mentality, and it
    > does so because it continues a SOM-based bit of nonsense called
    nominalism.
    > This is the belief that ideas/universals exist only in humans, yet it
    > offers no explanation of how humans came to have universals.
    >
    > dmb says:
    > I thought you already disposed of this nominalism charge, with Paul's
    help.
    > In any case, I've already sketched out the postion of minds and matter in
    > the MOQ in terms of their evolutionary relationship, but this next
    question
    > might let me get at it in a fresh way...

    [Scott:] Yes, I have flip-flopped. If nominalism is the idea that
    "universals aren't real", then the MOQ is not nominalistic, and that is
    where I agreed with Paul, acknowledging that the MOQ regards universals as
    real. But if nominalism is the idea that universals only exist in humans
    (which is how Peirce defines it), then the MOQ is nominalistic.

    >
    > Scott said:
    > So a particle is conscious? Then, since a particle is also value,
    > then we've got intellect/language from the beginning. Value is only value
    > if it is appreciated, and that means appreciating that things could be
    > other than they are. Hence, there are generals/universals, that is, what
    > is, in the context of what could be, and the connection between the two.
    >
    > dmb says:
    > Who knows what a particle knows? BUT Pirsig does seem to ascribe some kind
    > of ability to express a preference even among subatomic particles. And I
    > think it nice to go ahead and imagine that this is not just a way to
    > redescribe the data, but expresses a truer picture. In the MOQ, then, the
    > laws of physics are not laws so much as "extremely consistent patterns of
    > preferences", as Pirsig puts it. And so static quality is and always has
    > been conscious to some degree. Its built into the very fabric of reality
    > from the inorganic all the way up in increasing degrees until we get
    > full-blown self-consciousness. They are not seperate or different, except
    in
    > degrees of awareness, in increasing levels of ability to express
    > preferences. The preferences expresses by rocks don't involve intellect or
    > language, however, and asserting that it does strikes me as a little bit
    > crazy. Its not that particles dream of someday becoming a wave or hoping
    for
    > a brighter future, but I think its useful to drop the idea that inorganic
    > reality is completely subject to the "laws" of nature. And to imagine
    > instead that the whole of reality is alive and aware in some sense or on
    > some level.
    >
    > But this cosmic intelligence, if you will, is not to be confused with the
    > intellectual level of static patterns, which is a much more speciific kind
    > of intelligence.

    [Scott:] Why not "confuse" it? If our intellect is a connection to cosmic
    intelligence, that is something extremely important to know, for the reason
    given in my opening remarks.

    Rocks, considered by themselves, are not intellectuals. But a rock is a
    particular. It points to SQ, the laws of nature, including the laws of
    rockhood, which are universals, which exist as universals whether or not we
    know what they are. If they were not universals, there could be no Quality
    evolution, only mindless, mechanical evolution.

    - Scott

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Sun Sep 19 2004 - 20:35:31 BST