RE: MD A bit of reasoning

From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Mon Sep 20 2004 - 00:52:44 BST

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    Scott and all MOQers:

    Scott Roberts said:
    First, let me recap. The MOQ, it is true, puts Quality between and over the
    traditional division between mind and matter. That is good. What I am
    trying to convince people of is that the word Intellect should also be put
    in that spot, not to displace Quality, but to equate the two. The MOQ,
    however, makes a big deal of restricting intellect to humans, and considers
    it as a hindrance to achieving "pure experience". That I reject. It is the
    case that for most people most of the time, intellect is monkey mind, and
    that is bad, but the fix to that is to train and discipline the intellect,
    not to put it to sleep. And I've referred to various mystics, like
    Nagarjuna, Shankara, Nicholas of Cusa, and Franklin Merrell-Wolff to back
    me up.

    dmb replies:
    I'm trying to make the case that equating Intellect (the 4th level of static
    quality) and Quality (I suppose you mean Dynamic Quality) is incorrect and
    confusing. There are good reasons for making a distinction between the two.
    Its not that Pirsig makes a big deal out of restricting intellect to humans,
    its that Pirsig makes a big deal out of the KIND of intelligence that is
    unique to humans becasue it is the most advanced form of static quality. In
    an evolutionary metaphysics, that's a big deal. And I don't think Pirsig is
    making a case that we abandon the intellect, that's the mistake the hippies
    made, the Zen Beats and such and Pirsig warns againsts that as a form of
    degeneracy. And in fact putting the mind to sleep IS A FORM OF MENTAL
    DISCIPLINE that goes BEYOND intellect, where "pure experience" can occur. On
    this point, I think you've rejected a position that Pirsig does not hold.

    Scott said: You ..have not pointed out the flaw in my reasoning, that a
    "static pattern of value", to be valuable, needs to be appreciated as a
    pattern, and that means treating it *as* a pattern, a universal. If it is
    just a particular, then it cannot be changed, or valued, except insofar
    that it indicates the universal pattern of which it is particular, which
    (the pattern) can be changed.

    dmb replies:
    I think its quite a stretch to call that "reasoning". But seriously, you've
    changed the meaning of the term "static pattern" so that reality has been
    completely cleansed of particulars. Poof. They no longer exist. The keyboard
    I type upon presently has been transformed into an abstract entity called
    "keyboardness"? That bagel I had for breakfast didn't fill my belly becasue
    it was really a changless Platonic Form. (Changeless things are really hard
    on my digestive system.) I don't mean to be silly, but the implications of
    you re-definition lead to all kinds of absurdities. But more than that, as I
    tried to explain, the distinction between universals and particulars is the
    distinction between subjects and objects in disguise and the debates that it
    generates tend to disappear in the MOQ because the MOQ is such a thorough
    attack on the metaphysical primacy of subjects and objects. And finally, I
    can't see how that last sentence makes any sense.

    Scott said:
    .........................Having the social bridge is important for its
    moral arguments, but it is not sufficient to explain the apparent
    difference between our thinking and our perception, of why S/O should have
    arisen in the first place. Lila does not go into this, since it is about
    morality, so my criticism is that if one does go into problems of mind and
    matter, the metaphysical basis laid by the MOQ is inadequate. It needs to
    see that there is an essential difference between the fourth level and the
    other three levels, which is that the fourth level can reflect on itself,
    while the other levels, if a cosmic Intellect is ignored, cannot. So how
    did the ability to reflect come into existence? Well, simple, let us not
    ignore cosmic Intellect. But the MOQ does ignore it.

    dmb replies:
    Sorry dude, but you're just plain wrong. Its all in there. If you've read
    the book several times and still insist that it is not, then I hardly know
    what to tell you. The cosmic intelligence you say he ignores, that's called
    Dynamic Quality. Where SOM comes from in the first place? Well, if Pirsig's
    exploration of that development from the pre-Socratic sophists to the
    present and his explanation of it as a flaw in the process of giving birth
    to a new level of reality isn't enough for you, then I don't know what else
    to tell you. And its not that the MOQ is inadequate for a discussing of mind
    and matter, but rather the MOQ shows that these are SOM-based problems and
    not real questions. The difference between perceptions and thoughts is so
    simple in the MOQ that one is almost underwhelmed by it. Perceptions are
    sensory experience or biological quality, while thoughts are mental
    experience or intellectual quality. Both are experienced. Both are empirical
    and both are real, but they are different levels of experience. Making these
    distinctions, between different levels of static quality does not negate the
    cosmic intelligence, but instead demonstrates and manifests this cosmic
    intelligence in infinite detail, and the evolutionary levels only mark its
    progress. Exactly why and how the ability to think reflectively, and to
    comtemplate and to dream, how all that came into existence is probably
    beyond any mortal's ability to know. But this kind of ability is what puts
    it at the top of the heap and what distinguishes it from the rest of
    reality. Let's not spoil that by mixing it up with the mystic reality, of
    which intellect is only a subset.

    "RTA WAS THE 'COSMIC ORDER OF THINGS'."

    "...The physical order of the universe is also the moral order of the
    universe. RTA is both. This is exactly what the MOQ was claiming. It was not
    a new idea. It was the oldest idea known to man."

    "DHARMA, like RTA, means 'what holds together'. It is the basis of all
    order. It equals righteousness. It is the ethical code. It is the stable
    condition which gives man perfect satisfaction. DHARMA is duty. Not external
    duty which is arbitrarily imposed by others, It is not any artificial set of
    conventions which can be amended or repealed by legislation, Neither is it
    internal duty which is arbitrarily decided by one's own conscience. DHARMA
    is beyond all questions of what is internal and what is external. DHARMA is
    Quality itself, the principle of 'rightness' which gives structure and
    purpose to the evolution of all life and to the evolving understanding of
    the universe which life has created."

    [Scott quoted and commented:
    Pirsig, LC #111: "The "objects" in the MOQ refer to definition 1
    ["Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
    or touch; a material thing" . Objects are biological patterns and
    inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns."

    So, if we accept this, we cannot speak of intellectual and social things as
    objects of thought. So this redefinition on Pirsig's part is just silly.
    There are two meanings of "subject" in SOM. One is that which Pirsig calls
    intellectual and social SQ, the collection of thoughts, ideas, feelings,
    etc.. The other is that which perceives an object, or thinks about an
    object, and so forth (subject as implied in definition 5 [4 in the text]).
    The MOQ only dissolves the mind/matter distinction according to the first
    meaning. It does not dissolve the second. It just makes it unsayable.

    dmb says:
    Pirsig's attack on SOM is one thing, the confusion caused by our linguistic
    customs is another and I think you're confusing the two. In any case, the
    MOQ doesn't deny that an idea can be subjected to scrutiny or become the
    object of discussion. In factg, that's about all Pirsig ever does. This
    particular LC quote only says that physical things are to be categorized as
    orgainic and inorganic static quality. He's just telling the reader how to
    translate the most basic of terms. How could the MOQ forbid us to "speak of
    intellectual and social things" when Pirsig's books are almost purely that;
    talk of social and intellectual things? These objections of your seem
    increasingly wierd. I mean, its hard for me to imagine how you could fail to
    see this. I'll tell what, dish up a Pirsig quote that says social and
    intellectual static quality cannot be objects of thought and I'll eat my
    copy of Lila.

    > dmb had said:
    > If there is a duality in the MOQ it is the static/Dynamic split. In that
    > case, both mind and matter are on one side of that split, the static side.

    Scott replied:
     Yes, which ignores the difference that mind has the ability to
    reflect on things, including itself, which is not true of matter. This
    "dissolves" the problem by fiat, not in a way that promotes understanding.

    dmb says:
    Huh? OK, now I'm pulling my hair out. What does the static/Dynamic split
    have to do with the fact that matter cannot reflect upon itself. And who
    ever said it could? Why do you imagine that the difference between mind and
    mattter is ignored in making this split? Again, its hard to imagine how this
    could make any sense. I think these objections only reveal a great deal of
    confusion on your part.

    Scott said:
    Yes, I have flip-flopped. If nominalism is the idea that
    "universals aren't real", then the MOQ is not nominalistic, and that is
    where I agreed with Paul, acknowledging that the MOQ regards universals as
    real. But if nominalism is the idea that universals only exist in humans
    (which is how Peirce defines it), then the MOQ is nominalistic.

    dmb says:
    Why can't universals be real AND exist only in human beings? But as I keep
    trying to explain, these debates are a symptom of SOM, where ideas have a
    dubious ontological status. This is not a problem in the MOQ, where ideas
    are as real as rocks and trees. I think the fact that you've become hung up
    on this point only shows that you have failed to understand the problem with
    SOM and the MOQ as a solution.

    dmb had said:
    > But this cosmic intelligence, if you will, is not to be confused with the
    > intellectual level of static patterns, which is a much more speciific kind
    > of intelligence.

    Scott replied:
    Why not "confuse" it? If our intellect is a connection to cosmic
    intelligence, that is something extremely important to know, for the reason
    given in my opening remarks.

    dmb says:
    Seriously? I have to explain why its bad to confuse things? Don't you think
    that Pirsig has gone to great lengths the explain the difference between DQ
    and sq and then the differences between the various levels of sq? Don't you
    think that one would need an exceptionally good reason to erase this basic
    distinctions? I do. The differences and distinctions give us definition and
    meaning and that's what metaphysics is all about. Yes, they are connected.
    Pirsig also goes to great lengths to explain that...

    "Quality is indivisible, undefinable and unknowable in the sense that there
    is a knower and a known, but a metaphysics can be none of these things. A
    metaphysics must be divisible, definable, and knowable, or there isn't any
    metaphysics."
     
    "But he realized that sooner or later he was going to have to stop carping
    about how bad SOM was and say something postive for a change. Sooner or
    later he was going to have to come up with a way of dividing Quality that
    was better that subjects and objects. He would hace to do that or get out of
    metaphysics entirely. Its alright to condemn somebody else's bad metaphysics
    but you can't replace it with a metaphysics that consists of just one word."

    Scott concluded:
    Rocks, considered by themselves, are not intellectuals. But a rock is a
    particular. It points to SQ, the laws of nature, including the laws of
    rockhood, which are universals, which exist as universals whether or not we
    know what they are. If they were not universals, there could be no Quality
    evolution, only mindless, mechanical evolution.

    dmb replies:
    Rocks are not intellectuals. OK, I'll agree with you there, but I fail to
    see the logic or the point of everything that follows. You seem to be
    confusing universals with particulars and then assert this is necessary to
    avoid mindless mechanical evolution. This makes no sense to me whatsoever.

    I've tried to draw you out with the hope that an interesting problem would
    be discovered in the process, but now I am pretty much convinced that your
    criticisms of the MOQ have no merit or validity, but are rather predicated
    on some fundamental misconceptions in your approach. To be perfectly frank,
    I think you don't know what you're talking about. Unless you can provide
    some actual Pirsigisms, some actual assertions, quotes or ideas from the
    author himself, I shall find it impossible to take your objections
    seriously. So far they have all seemed quite ill-concieved, if not downright
    fictional.

    But thanks for your time. Sincerely,

    dmb

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