RE: MD Empiricism

From: Simon Magson (twix_570@hotmail.com)
Date: Wed Nov 17 2004 - 11:10:45 GMT

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    Scott Roberts wrote
    >That's not what Pirsig said. He said "The MOQ denies this. (That Reason
    >perceives truths which are incapable of verification in sense-experience."
    >Mathematical truths are not verified in sense-experience. They are verified
    >through reason, so if you now say that the rational verification process is
    >itself experience, in order to keep with the next sentence: "Reason grows
    >out of experience and is
    >never independent from it.", then you are saying that, in the case of
    >mathematics, reason grows out of reason.

    I recommend reading ZMM. In it you will find that Pirsig proposes, with the
    help of Jules Henri Poincare, that the choice of conventions and axioms from
    which mathematical truths are derived is made on the basis of
    preintellectual value. Mathematical truths are thus patterns of values.
    Value is phenomenal, it is sense experience. Therefore, mathematical truths
    are verified by sense experience. Reason itself is a pattern of values.

    "To solve the problem of what is mathematical truth, Poincaré said, we
    should first ask ourselves what is the nature of geometric axioms. Are they
    synthetic a priori judgments, as Kant said? That is, do they exist as a
    fixed part of man's consciousness, independently of experience and uncreated
    by experience? Poincaré thought not. They would then impose themselves upon
    us with such force that we couldn't conceive the contrary proposition, or
    build upon it a theoretic edifice. There would be no non-Euclidian geometry.

    Should we therefore conclude that the axioms of geometry are experimental
    verities? Poincaré didn't think that was so either. If they were, they would
    be subject to continual change and revision as new laboratory data came in.
    This seemed to be contrary to the whole nature of geometry itself.

    Poincaré concluded that the axioms of geometry are conventions, our choice
    among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts, but it
    remains free and is limited only by the necessity of avoiding all
    contradiction. Thus it is that the postulates can remain rigorously true
    even though the experimental laws that have determined their adoption are
    only approximative. The axioms of geometry, in other words, are merely
    disguised definitions.

    <....>

    Mathematics, he said, isn't merely a question of applying rules, any more
    than science. It doesn't merely make the most combinations possible
    according to certain fixed laws. The combinations so obtained would he
    exceedingly numerous, useless and cumbersome. The true work of the inventor
    consists in choosing among these combinations so as to eliminate the useless
    ones, or rather, to avoid the trouble of making them, and the rules that
    must guide the choice are extremely fine and delicate. It's almost
    impossible to state them precisely; they must be felt rather than
    formulated.

    Poincaré then hypothesized that this selection is made by what he called the
    "subliminal self," an entity that corresponds exactly with what Phĉdrus
    called preintellectual awareness. The subliminal self, Poincaré said, looks
    at a large number of solutions to a problem, but only the interesting ones
    break into the domain of consciousness. Mathematical solutions are selected
    by the subliminal self on the basis of "mathematical beauty," of the harmony
    of numbers and forms, of geometric elegance. "This is a true esthetic
    feeling which all mathematicians know," Poincaré said, "but of which the
    profane are so ignorant as often to be tempted to smile." But it is this
    harmony, this beauty, that is at the center of it all.

    <...>

    Poincaré's contemporaries refused to acknowledge that facts are preselected
    because they thought that to do so would destroy the validity of scientific
    method. They presumed that "preselected facts" meant that truth is "whatever
    you like" and called his ideas conventionalism. They vigorously ignored the
    truth that their own "principle of objectivity" is not itself an observable
    fact...and therefore by their own criteria should be put in a state of
    suspended animation.

    They felt they had to do this because if they didn't, the entire philosophic
    underpinning of science would collapse. Poincaré didn't offer any
    resolutions of this quandary. He didn't go far enough into the metaphysical
    implications of what he was saying to arrive at the solution. What he
    neglected to say was that the selection of facts before you "observe" them
    is "whatever you like" only in a dualistic, subject-object metaphysical
    system! When Quality enters the picture as a third metaphysical entity, the
    preselection of facts is no longer arbitrary. The preselection of facts is
    not based on subjective, capricious "whatever you like" but on Quality,
    which is reality itself. Thus the quandary vanishes."

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