RE: MD Them pesky pragmatists

From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jan 21 2005 - 09:11:31 GMT

  • Next message: Matt Kundert: "RE: MD Further comments to Matt"

    Hi Matt

    Matt said:
    I'm not sure that everyone is on the same page. I'm not sure that it's
    quite understood what the full force and significance of the skeptic is
    and I'm pretty sure that I don't have the power to do that much
    backgrounding.
    The discouraging thing for me is that, people here constantly claim that
    the MoQ is the best philosophy they've seen, or that it dissolves all of
    philosophy's problems. I can't see that such claims hold much water if
    people aren't actually attuned to the problems and vicissitudes of
    philosophy, outside of such claims being simply references to what
    Pirsig's claimed in his books. Inattention to the history of philosophy
    is a common problem here, which wouldn't be a problem if people were
    willing to reign in their claims about what they know. I would never
    claim that people have to do or understand mainstream philosophy. But
    if you are going to claim Pirsig's superiority to mainstream philosophy,
    it would be nice if it were backed up somehow. My interest in Pirsig is
    in his intersection with the history of philosophy, how Pirsig joins in
    that conversation. But I don't know how to express those thoughts if
    there isn't a general understanding of how the history of philosophy has
    played itself out. (I'm certainly not claiming to be an expert, but I
    am claiming to have a general knowledge of it.) I'm certainly not ending
    the dialogue, I simply want to note my discouragement and frustration.
    I'll keep trying to figure out ways of saying what I want to say, but I
    feel like I'm playing with a handicap.

    Paul:
    I'm going to take the unusual step of replying to the same post twice
    because two kinds of answer came to mind. The other reply is more the
    usual 'point by point' answer, and that will come in a short while. This
    one is more of a response to your posts in general.

    Some time ago it became clear to me that, for some people, the first
    important thing to do with anything - e.g. art, music, people,
    literature, philosophy - was to categorise it or identify it with
    something else. In the case of philosophy I noticed that this was mainly
    done so that the arguments against any "new" ideas would then be
    available off-the-shelf. As a result, ideas could sometimes be promptly
    and easily discredited. There are several methods for doing this. One is
    as simple as homing in on one or two words which other philosophers have
    used to enable you to establish identity from resemblance. Another one
    is to slightly change the words of a philosopher to match another's and,
    again, make a statement of identity. Sam has recently gone down the
    oblique route of "conceptual inheritance" to suggest identity, or at
    least profound similarity between Pirsig and, ultimately, Immanuel Kant.
    Explicitly provoked by Pirsig's similar observation of this process in
    LILA, your "Philosophologology" essay on the Forum Home Page is, I think
    in part, a justification for this (common) method of doing philosophy.
    This justification is achieved by collapsing one side of Pirsig's
    philosophy/philosophology distinction into the other, i.e., one can't
    properly do philosophy without 'philosophology', thus denying the title
    of philosophy to non-academic contemplation and effectively setting up a
    false dichotomy between sophisticated academic philosophers and armchair
    dilettantes, leaving us in no doubt about on which side of this fence
    you reside.

    Now, I think the source of your frustration may not be just that you are
    being prevented from following a line of inquiry by the varying levels
    of knowledge on this forum but could also be that you are trying to
    identify the MOQ with this or that system, for the reason I've stated
    above, and your attempts to do it are, thus far, being resisted. It
    would be as frustrating as buying a whole selection of tools and gizmos
    to take something apart but not being able to find the right fit to
    remove the most important nut with any one of them. You have said that
    "[w]hat I (and Sam) am concerned with is not the particular _words_ or
    _concepts_ Pirsig uses, but the _work_ being done with them. The work
    done by our words and concepts is how we determine how we translate
    words from one language to another, from one philosopher's jargon to
    another's." So, as I see it, you, or "we," (which I presume means proper
    philosophers) are most concerned with looking to translate e.g. 'Dynamic
    Quality' and 'static quality' into the lexicon of some other system, to
    fit it into a dialogue that has already occurred, in preparation for
    wheeling out one refutation or another.

    The vindication for doing this seems to be based on your argument that,
    whether it likes it or not, any philosophy cannot help but exist in a
    relationship to the history of philosophy and that, in fact, the MOQ is
    only what it is because of the entire history of philosophy. Therefore,
    one cannot properly understand, study, nor claim success for Pirsig's
    philosophy without placing it in the context of the entire history of
    western philosophy. Either accept that or don't make any claims about
    what philosophical problems it is supposed to solve, right? This is
    supported by your proposition that the history of philosophy is a series
    of explicitly and implicitly connected conversations i.e., assertions of
    one's own position and denials of another's. If we are going to do this
    philosophy thing properly, the thing to do is to find out who Pirsig is
    in conversation with, implicitly or otherwise, and see how the
    conversation ends.

    Firstly, if this is indeed your position, I reservedly agree with this
    characterisation of philosophical history but add that these historic
    conversations are not necessarily over. Sure, they are paths that have
    been well trodden but there is absolutely nothing stopping anyone taking
    a stroll down them once in a while and maybe seeing some new trails to
    blaze in the process. Sellars has not ended the conversation on "the
    given." Quine has not ended the conversation on the analytic/synthetic
    distinction. And of course, Pirsig has not ended the conversation on the
    subject/object distinction. No matter how convincing they are, these
    arguments do not preclude the use of the propositions and terms that
    they have refuted, as if they were pieces of legislation, particularly
    because this direct translation between philosophers you want to perform
    is not always possible. So with respect to your frustration about this
    Forum's lack of reference to the history of philosophy, what you
    describe as an absence of attention may be more positively described as
    an absence of acquiescence. You seem to treat some ideas like an old
    currency that is just no longer accepted anywhere whereas, whilst this
    would no doubt be convenient to your project, I just see them as
    changing worth.

    Secondly, if we are looking to understand the MOQ in its inescapable,
    albeit implicit, historic context then let us not exclude the history of
    eastern philosophy nor indeed accounts of Native American mysticism.

    Finally, whether or not implicit connections with the great dialogues
    are unavoidable, I think creditable philosophy can occur without
    explicit reference or intellectual debt to the history of philosophy. In
    fact, I have just spent a week away on business and, over a few drinks,
    have discussed (what a "philosopher" would describe as) epistemology and
    appearance and reality (amongst other topics) with clients who (at least
    claimed to) have not completed any study of philosophy but have
    nonetheless contemplated their own experiences and lives in a
    sophisticated way. One of these guys is from New Zealand, one is from
    India and one from the UK. What seemed wonderful to me was that we could
    all talk about certain experiences and thoughts which were common to us
    all without exception. So, albeit based on my own limited experiences
    and community of acquaintances, I just think it is an over-eager
    generalisation to suggest that one cannot properly contemplate
    philosophical questions unless you have studied its history. To suggest,
    as you do in your essay, that one would not even be aware of central
    philosophical questions unless you had directly studied them seems a
    little supercilious. Philosophical contemplation is embedded in
    literature, art, plays, film and so on. Did philosophy invent the
    contemplation of experience or did the contemplation of experience
    invent philosophy?

    I guess the question remains: Do we get a better philosophy if we have
    studied the works of others? If the answer is yes, then the MOQ would
    say that one should study the history of philosophy. But I think it
    would also say that too much emphasis on static patterns may restrict
    the ability of ideas to grow towards Dynamic Quality. It provides two
    answers.

    Regards

    Paul

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