RE: MD Further comments to Matt

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Fri Jan 21 2005 - 12:23:44 GMT

  • Next message: Sam Norton: "MD Understanding Quality and Power"

    Hey Chuck,

    I'm a little surprised anyone took up the "challenge," mostly because I
    expressed my feeling that they were impossible questions. And the questions
    certainly should've felt redundant, as they were all after the same point.
    All of the removed questions gradually spiral into the first, root question,
    “How do we know when we are Dynamic?” The gist is that as long as the
    answers use a certain conceptual form, the skeptic’s questions are
    pertinent. Given that I think the questions impossible to answer, you can
    assume that I'll ask another round of skeptical questions. So, what I need
    to know is why you don't think the skeptic in need of an answer. I don't
    think saying, as Paul more or less answered, "He's an idiot. Let him ask
    the questions," suffices because you can't do that during a conversation
    without looking like a fool yourself. I think the only way to shake the
    skeptic is to change your language enough, your vocabulary, your
    metaphysics, etc., to not allow the skeptic a foothold. You have to get rid
    of the conceptual machinery that allows the problematic.

    An instance of the problem, Paul said that we have absolute certainty in
    Dynamic Quality (or from DQ). Paul has also held the line that the
    difference between static patterns and Dynamic Quality is simply a
    description between two different kinds of experience. Question: is
    absolute certainty better than less-than-absolute-certainty? Then why
    doesn't that privilege in an awkward, skeptical question inducing manner?

    Another instance, Dynamic Quality is often used to justify or explain the
    betterness of a reply or innovation or whatever. Question: If a person has
    privileged access to their Dynamic Quality experience (other people aren't
    privy to it), then why can't a person ask, "How do you know what you just
    experienced was Dynamic Quality?" And more importantly, how could a person
    respond to such a question without detaching the idea of Dynamic Quality
    from the parts of the justification or explanation doing the actual work?

    I'll run through Chuck's reponses to expand on the above two points.

    Matt said:
    "How do you know capitalism is more Dynamic than communism?" (Jan 9)

    Chuck said:
    I don't. "Capitalism" and "communism" are conceptual systems. I don't know
    that one is more Dynamic than the other intrinsically or in and of itself.
    If you want to use specific examples, say present-day American Capitalism v.
    present day Chinese Communism, if we agreed that those specific systems were
    in fact examples of capitalism and communism, than I might give you an
    answer backed-up with specific examples and points on fact. The theories
    themselves, on paper, I suspect, they lack any Dynamic Quality. In other
    words, such theoretical sytems are static until practiced, at which time
    they acquire some Dynamic Quality, which, in turn would be constantly
    fluctuating, I suspect.

    Matt:
    I was alluding to the section in Lila where Pirsig says that capitalism is
    more Dynamic than communism. The reason I would ask this question is
    because, as your answer brings up, the answer would be "backed-up with
    specific examples and points of fact." I think the more specific you get to
    actual cases and examples, the more extraneous any mention of Dynamic
    Quality will become, turning into an ornament. Pirsig's answer in Lila is
    basically a substitution of "Dynamic" for "free" from typical American
    explanations of the preference for capitalism over communism. He thinks it
    is an improvement, but I can’t really see how. You can substitute “free”
    for “Dynamic” every time and still make just as much sense. In the context
    of historico-sociological explanations, Dynamic Quality doesn't play a role
    in the explanation. Freedom does all the work.

    Matt said:
    "How do we know when we are being Dynamic? How do we know when we are
    following Dynamic Quality and not static patterns? How do we verify it?"

    Chuck said:
    We discussed "the sweet spot" some time ago around here. I prefer "being in
    the zone," but I think both turns-of-phrase refer to pure Dynamic Quality,
    being in absence of thinking. Have never had that experience? Do you know
    to what phenomenon they refer? That's being Dynamic.

    Matt:
    This punches up the privileged access each individual has to Dynamic
    Quality. So if a person has never had this experience (or more the case
    from a Pirsigian standpoint, has never thought to call it DQ), and absolute
    certainty, betterness hangs in the balance, how do you explain or justify
    your own experience of Dynamic Quality? How do you get the person to accept
    the certainty you feel for the betterness?

    Also, why is "being in absence of thinking" better than "being in presence
    of thinking"? How do you have Dynamic Quality experiences that leap off of
    intellectual patterns if DQ is the absence of thought? How do you have
    Dynamic thoughts, philosophical innovation, conceptual growth? How is the
    MoQ a Dynamic growth over SOM if the Dynamicness is the absence of thought?

    Matt said:
    "If unmediated reality is better than mediated reality, then how do we know
    when we are apprehending unmediated reality?"

    Chuck said:
    This is the same as the Dynamic Quality question. I think, though I'm not
    sure, that Dynamic Quality is like pornography; I can't define it, but I
    know it when I see it.

    Matt:
    Why should that be? How is it that you "see" a thought? Aren't we running
    back into the dangerous Platonic/Cartesian idea of using visual metaphors to
    describe the search for truth?

    Matt said:
    "How do you establish criteria for determining which is which, criteria that
    will satisfy the skeptic?"

    Chuck said:
    I think one must determine this on a moment-by-moment basis. Phaedrus made
    a list in ZMM of criteria for a quality writing as it pertains to the
    English essay/paper though I don't have it in front of me at the moment.

    Matt:
    But what could these criteria be except static patterns? Again, the work
    done in the determination of betterness is not done by Dynamic Quality.

    Matt said:
    "Why does Pirsig not need to answer the skeptic when the determination of
    good and evil, better and worse, hinges on distinguishing between static
    patterns and Dynamic Quality?"

    Chuck said:
    Because the determination of good and evil, better and worse does not hinge
    on anyone's ability to distinguish between "static patterns" and "Dynamic
    Quality."


    Regardless, the determination of good and evil, better and worse, hinges on
    choosing what is best at the moment and that is Dynamic Quality.

    Matt:
    Choosing what is best at the moment is Dynamic Quality? Don’t we always do
    that, though? Who would choose what was worse? If “choosing what is best”
    is DQ, then, again, DQ completely swings free from the determination of
    better and worse.

    And besides, I thought Dynamic Quality was betterness? Why would it swing
    free from our determination of such things?

    Matt said:
    "How do you know a "simple, unambiguous and direct" [Dynamic] response is
    better than a "complex, ambiguous and indirect" [static] one?"

    Chuck said:
    Are you serious? What's the point of communication, after all? Find the
    answer within the question.

    Maybe I missed the point of this one.

    Matt:
    The point is that “communication” is a statically patterned affair. Once we
    move into static patterns, there’s no problem with establishing things like
    the efficacy of “simple, unambiguous, and direct.” But, if DQ is undefined,
    how do we know its “simple, unambiguous, and direct” except defining it that
    way, as betterness, as simple, unambiguous, and direct?

    Matt said:
    "Can we look at a philosophical proposition and instantaneously know whether
    it is good or not? Isn't this what Pirsig's implying, that the Dynamic
    insight is the one immediately in front of you [knowledge by acquaintance]?"

    Chuck said:
    That depends on one's experience or baseline, specifically, background of
    philosophy or exposure to such ways of thinking.

    Matt:
    One’s experience, or baseline, or background in philosophy, or exposure to
    such ways of thinking are all different names for static patterns. Dynamic
    Quality, i.e. kenntnis or “knowledge by acquaintance,” is different from
    that. Are you saying that our acceptance of a proposition swings free from
    Dynamic Quality?

    Matt said:
    "How do we know this immediate flash of insight is leading us aright and not
    afoul?"

    Chuck said:
    If it is pure, it is aright. The trick is recognizing real insight or the
    purely Dynamic and, again, that depends on one's experience.

    Matt:
    How do we know purity? That’s even fuzzier than “simple, unambiguous, and
    direct.” If “real insight” or “the purely Dynamic” depends on our
    experience, then you’re saying it depends on our static patterns. But how
    could recognizing DQ depend on our static patterns? Wouldn’t that mean that
    our “insights” would simply be endorsements of the static patterns? Isn’t
    DQ supposed to be a rupture of static patterns? But if that’s the case, how
    do we tell a good _rupture_ from a bad one, Dynamic from degenerate?

    Matt said:
    "How do you know the way you've 'described' Dynamic Quality is the right
    way?"

    Chuck said:
    I don't.

    Matt:
    Then how can you be so incredulous at my questioning of “simple,
    unambiguous, and direct”?

    And isn’t DQ supposed to supply absolute certainty?

    Chuck said:
    Regarding the "appearance/reality distinction," I don't see a problem there.
    Doesn't Pirsig acknowledge this distinction as being illusionary, but an
    illusion we're forced to cope with?

    Matt:
    What’s an illusion that we are forced to cope with? Are you saying that we
    can’t get rid of it? If we can see something as an illusion, can’t we
    figure out a way to dispel it?

    And anyways, my problem isn’t with what Pirsig directly says about any
    appearance/reality distinction or SOM. It’s the way he says everything
    else. He denies with the left and takes with the right. I’m claiming about
    Pirsig the same thing Pirsig claimed about Plato. Why can Pirsig
    investigate such a claim and I can’t? Why do I have to have it repetitively
    pointed out to me that Pirsig denies what I see him doing subconsciously?
    Isn’t that the entire point of me saying I detect an “appearance/reality
    distinction _unbeknownst_ to Pirsig or his mainline interpreters?”

    Matt

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