From: Paul Turner (paul@turnerbc.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jan 21 2005 - 17:43:36 GMT
Hi Matt
The second reply. The one in which I play the fool and answer your
impossible questions.
Matt said:
Can we look at a philosophical proposition and instantaneously know
whether it is good or not?
Paul:
You can instantly know whether you like it or not. This may change on
reflection and upon analysis but the MOQ predicts that you can have an
absolutely certain immediate response to it. However, it says that one's
overall value judgment is mostly a combination of Dynamic Quality and
accumulated static patterns i.e., the direct experience of value itself
combined with the reflection of that value within the conceptualised
scale of fixed values created from previous experience. This was
proposed with respect to rhetoric papers in ZMM.
Matt said:
Isn't this what Pirsig's implying, that the Dynamic insight is the one
immediately in front of you? But how do we know that our immediate
impulse of accepting a proposition as true is Dynamic Quality and not
the coherence that proposition has with our other beliefs?
Paul:
The immediate impulse in a new experience is always Dynamic. Whatever
the explanation, whatever you deduced to have 'caused' the immediate
impulse, e.g. coherence with other ideas, are hypotheses which come
later and are thus part of static patterned reality.
Matt said:
Furthermore, how do we know this immediate flash of insight is leading
us aright and not afoul? As Wittgenstein said, "If intuition is an
inner voice-how do I know how I am to obey it? And how do I know that
it doesn't mislead me? For if it can guide me right, it can also guide
me wrong." (Philosophical Investigations, No. 213) How do we know our
immediate flash of insight is better and not degenerate?
Paul:
The experience of liking or disliking one's insight, before you can say
why, is completely certain. If it turns out that within the context of
your static patterns, which you are then unwilling to give up, the
insight causes more problems than it solves then one may conclude that
you were "mislead." Also, there are at least two kinds of right and
wrong in the MOQ, as is explained in LILA.
Matt said:
The hot stove example is commonly trotted out to defend the certainty of
Dynamic Quality, immediate sensation/impression/intuition/etc. If you
touch a stove, you will immediately sense it as low quality.
Paul:
That is the case in the example but the experience of quality may be
positive or negative; but either way, completely certain. The MOQ is
saying that you experience low quality first and then associate the low
quality with touching a hot stove. The cause of the quality is always
deduced from the experience of the quality, which comes first.
Matt said:
Or will you? I have consistently trotted out my own counterexample and
I have yet to see it answered (and I'm not quite sure how it would be).
What if the person touching the stove is a masochist? If a masochist
touches a hot stove, they'll sense it as high quality.
Paul:
You can predict that, yes. A masochist is almost defined by exhibiting
value judgments (i.e. associating value to things) that are peculiar
compared to the culture in which they live. Independently of e.g.
stoves, the high and low quality experienced is the same for anyone but
what that quality is associated with is different for everyone. The
masochist, in this example, associates high quality with touching a hot
stove but the MOQ is proposing that that pure experience of high quality
is the same as that which some people associate with e.g. sexual
pleasure. Rather than subordinating quality to the object, it is saying
that the masochist wouldn't even be aware of the hot stove if there was
no high quality experienced to 'bring it about'.
Matt said:
But maybe the emphasis has been wrong when the hot stove example has
been ushered onto stage. Maybe the emphasis should be on _having_ an
immediate impression, that we do have privileged access, epistemological
authority, over our immediate impressions, that we can be absolutely
sure that "this sucks/is great!" But what if we come across a person
who says he's in pain whenever he eats cheese cake? He eats the cake,
groans in pleasure, and says sincerely, "I'm in pain!" Is he in pain or
is he wrong? I think we might come to the conclusion that he is simply
misusing a word. Which raises the question of how we are ever to know
with absolute certainty that a person is actually feeling something or
misusing the language. At this point, we should wonder what this
absolute certainty, this epistemological authority, does for us. This
leads to Rorty's early dictum that "the price of retaining one's
epistemological authority is a decent respect for the opinions of
mankind."
Paul:
As you suggest, we can't know with any certainty what someone else is
experiencing, so how do you know for certain that the groans are groans
of pleasure? I agree with you here that what this absolutely certain
immediate impression of value does for us is to be questioned and we
have never really gotten round to that because you are always too busy
trying to discredit the idea before we get there.
Matt said:
This is how my question, "How do you know a 'simple, unambiguous and
direct' response is better than a 'complex, ambiguous and indirect'
one?", gains flesh. All of the above questions were driven to eliminate
the notion of absolute certainty, which is the epistemological dream.
Paul:
I already said that pure experience of value is that which is absolutely
certain, not testimony. The MOQ is stating that liking or disliking,
prior to abstraction, association, or analysis, is absolutely certain.
Matt said:
When I talk about "what criteria are you going to give the skeptic" I'm
asking you how you determine when you've hit upon something safe and
solid, how you are going to stop the infinite regress of questions. You
located it in knowledge by acquaintance, but I kicked the skeptical
questioning up to the next level. The skeptic's purpose is to make the
entire search for absolute certainty look hopeless.
Paul:
Yes, I am aware of that, Matt. How do you know when you have knowledge?
The ultimate in circularity. It's dead clever isn't it?
In the MOQ, the something assumed to be "safe and solid" is that all
experience is valued. No more than that is proclaimed as certain. From
there, we can build up to the assertion that propositions are valued,
that some are valued more than others, and that a highly valued
proposition is the beginning of a definition of truth.
With respect to the skeptic, doesn't one have to presume an
appearance/reality distinction to even be a skeptic? That is, isn't the
skeptic saying that e.g. the low quality experience of sitting on a hot
stove may be *apparent* but it could *really* be high quality? But if
experience is the only reality, and appearance is whatever is
experienced, what could it mean to say that the experience of low
quality is just an appearance. As opposed to what?
Also I may add that skepticism is easily shown to be self-refuting. For
how is it possible for one to be certain that certainty is impossible?
Matt said:
How do you know the way you've "described" Dynamic Quality is the right
way? How do you know when you are experiencing Dynamic Quality? How do
you know whether you are being Dynamic or degenerate? How do you know
whether you are following static patterns or being Dynamic?
Paul:
The same way you 'know' if you are choking or breathing. Once you are
familiar with the experience, it is easily recognised. You can be given
some ideas about what the difference is, and this is provided in LILA,
but some things just can't be described. But this doesn't make them
unreal, unless you start with the assumption, as you do, that all
awareness is under a description. As I said before, some people, like
those at the AHP Conference, were willing to simply try an exercise to
experience the difference.
So, how do we know for sure if what I describe as Dynamic Quality is
what you describe as Dynamic Quality? We don't. How do we know if
anything I describe is the same thing that you are describing? We don't.
However, could I ask you to buy me a glass of water and get one? More
than likely. Do *you know* what it feels like to like a doughnut?
Absolutely. When you say you like doughnuts, do I know what you mean by
"like"? More than likely. Do *you know* what it feels like to laugh?
Absolutely. When you laugh do I know what you are feeling? More than
likely.
Matt said:
C.S. Peirce said this many years ago:
"Now it is plainly one thing to have an intuition and another to know
intuitively that it is an intuition, and the question is whether these
two things, distinguishable in thought, are invariably connected, so
that we can always intuitively distinguish between an intuition and a
cognition determined by another.. There is no evidence that we have
this faculty, except that we _feel_ we have it. But the weight of the
testimony depends entirely on our being supposed to have the power of
distinguishing in this feeling whether the feeling be the result of
education, old associations,
etc., or whether it is an intuitive cognition; or, in other words, it
depends on presupposing the very matter testified to." ("Questions
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man")
We feel like we can distinguish between whether our immediate impression
is the result of static patterns ("education, old associations, etc.")
or Dynamic Quality ("intuitive cognition"), but it would appear that
we'd have to assume we were able to do it to do it, which does nothing
in the way of establishing our ability to do it.
Paul:
I am not equating DQ with 'intuitive cognition' which is a term weighted
with all kinds of psychological theory; neither does Pirsig, as far as I
am aware. Immediately liking something new regardless of what your
reasoning is as to why you like it, or what the thing even is, is partly
what DQ is referring to. Whether your deduction of the reason for the
immediate liking determines education and old associations as the main
cause or if it can't explain it at all is irrelevant to the fact that
the immediate liking occurred, well, immediately.
Matt said:
So in response to the originally insipid question, "How do you know a
'simple, unambiguous and direct' response is better than a 'complex,
ambiguous and indirect' one?", I think you have two options. One option
is to claim that you have an intuition that "simple." is better than
"complex.," which is another way of saying that it's Dynamic that
"simple." is better, or it is better that "simple." is better. These
are all those bad answers that lead to Peirce's claims, that lead to you
having a superintuition about your intuitions.
Paul:
I could almost just sit back and allow you to complete this dialogue
yourself. As said, DQ is not intuition so, clever as Peirce's statements
are, it's wasted on me. What I'm saying about "simple, unambiguous and
direct" is that these are terms I associate with my experience of what
Pirsig is talking about but they are not a definition. When I am in
absolutely no doubt as to what is good, I am not caught in two minds, I
will see my action through without distraction or hesitation. Generally,
though, there is doubt and ambiguity because static patterns
discriminate and dominate one's behaviour and prevent the immediate
action i.e., hang on....is it good for my health, or for her, or for
next week, for my employer, for this thesis, for this research? etc.
Matt said:
The other option, which I think will be the first one that will occur to
you (based on how I've seen you respond in the past), is to claim that
"simple." has proven to work better in the past, so it is a good bet
that it will work better in the future. This is a pragmatist answer,
but it won't work as a response because it completely cuts off the
criteria ("simple, unambiguous and direct") from the contested notion of
DQ.
Paul:
Look, I'm not saying that everything simple, unambiguous and direct is
Dynamic Quality. Do you not know what it feels like to know that
something new is good? If you don't know what Dynamic Quality refers to
then, when all is said and done, I can't help that. It's like you are
writing to me to ask me to tell you how to write. I mean, the low
quality you immediately experience from my posts is what I'm trying to
get you to experience. Are you uncertain about whether you like or
dislike my ideas?
Matt said:
I think one other way of putting my difficulties are in response to
Dan's misguided reply: "To answer Matt's question: The best way I know
of is to ask oneself, is this a Quality path I am on? Only you will know
the answer(kenntnis). If the answer is no, then go a better way."
Okay, so I ask myself, "Am I on a Quality path? Is my cross-examination
of Pirsig's philosophy going in the right direction? Am I really
detecting an appearance/reality distinction unbeknownst to Pirsig or his
mainline interpreters?"
Answer: "Oh yeah, absolutely."
How does one respond to that?
Paul:
Well, what you are saying is that you associate quality with the idea
that there is "an appearance/reality distinction unbeknownst to Pirsig
or his mainline interpreters." Therefore, one says, "Great, then you are
already certain about what Quality is."
Regards
Paul
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