From: Joseph Maurer (jhmau@sbcglobal.net)
Date: Tue Feb 01 2005 - 20:18:38 GMT
On 31 January 2004 10: 59 PM Ham writes to Joe
<snip>
[Ham] I don't know where the term "pure experience" originated, but assume
that it came from Pirsig and not Kant who applied "pure" only to reason. In
fact, I don't know of anything in the life-experience that can be considered
"pure".
Even the taste of plain vanilla is a combination of sweetness and an
ethylated butter-like flavor.
Hi Ham and all,
I don't know that Pirsig uses the term pure experience. He does write in
Lila: "Quality is a direct experience independent of and prior to
intellectual abstractions." Lila chapter 5.
[Ham] What piqued my interest was the distinction noted by Scott, and echoed
by all of you, between appearance and reality. I find it strange that there
seems to be no support in this discussion for the proposition that
appearance IS reality. Would that not be the true empirical view --
including the view of MoQ whose author claims an empirical foundation?
[Joe] For me language is a toolbox for communicating. Logic is used to
describe appearance. Analogy is used to focus my attention on direct or
mystical experience. Metaphor is used to indicate order or show my belief.
IMO metaphor describes an order. The way I recognize order is in the denial
of existence, no order. Pirsig posits a social order of evolution based on
organic evolution from inorganic evolution. I see that order in terms of
existence. IMO "Appearance is reality" is a dogma of faith, as there is not
any order in the existence of 'reality' except by analogy. If 'appearance is
like reality' is used, then I am focused on the direct experience of quality
and I can agree or disagree that is my experience. It is in terms of analogy
or the mystical that I use "evolutionary analogue". IMO evolution in time
follows an evolution in Quality.
<snip>
[Ham] The reality of essentialism is Essence, which (I assume) would qualify
as
your "analogue". Inasmuch as Essence is absolute, uncreated and
undifferentiated, I can say without reservation that it is non-evolutionary.
I should also note that Essence is not an SOM existent and is not
experienced objectively. Inasmuch as it is incapable of direct experience,
most of you are likely to regard Essence as nothingness. While that would
be a "reasonable" conclusion, remember that rationality (Pirsig's
"intellect") is precisely what creates the problematic dilemma.
[Ham] All metaphysical theories are hypothetical. I have postulated Essence
as
the antithesis of nothingness. This gives Essentialism a distinct advantage
over MoQ: it is emphatically a non-empirical philosophy. It is also free of
the contentious arguments and suppositions having to do with the SQ/DQ
split. The only "split" in my philosophy of Essence is differentiation
itself. And that is due to the "negational nature" of Essence which is the
primary cause of existence.
[Joe] I do not see Essence used in this way as an analogy, but rather as a
social metaphor indicating an unknowable limit in the social order or as a
dogma of faith.
Joe
>
> Hello Joseph (and all) --
>
> I'm pleased to see that there's some genuine philosophy going on here amid
> all the left/right wing polemics. It was Scott Roberts, I believe, who
> started this thread on 1/29 by posting the following assertions:
>
>> The MOQ differs from Kant in that it does not assume that the conceptual
>> structure is fixed and necessary, but keeps the idea that it is
>> conceptual
>> structure (static intellectual patterns of value) that cuts us off from
>> reality (DQ). The MOQ claim that DQ is "pre-intellectual" is a Kantian
>> pattern. The main conceptual structure that produces non-real appearances
>> is the subject/object form.
>>
>> Hence the MOQ includes both types of A/R distinction, the Kantian and the
>> mystical. That is, it advocates a mystical program of putting
>> intellectual
>> SPOV to sleep in order to experience reality. So in this means of getting
>> back into touch with reality, it also reinforces the Kantian duality
>> between the conceptual and reality. As James, and most philosophies of
>> mysticism have done since Kant.
>
> I don't know where the term "pure experience" originated, but assume that
> it
> came from Pirsig and not Kant who applied "pure" only to reason. In fact,
> I
> don't know of anything in the life-experience that can be considered
> "pure".
> Even the taste of plain vanilla is a combination of sweetness and an
> ethylated butter-like flavor.
>
> What piqued my interest was the distinction noted by Scott, and echoed by
> all of you, between appearance and reality. I find it strange that there
> seems to be no support in this discussion for the proposition that
> appearance IS reality. Would that not be the true empirical view --
> including the view of MoQ whose author claims an empirical foundation?
>
> Kant argued convincingly, I think, that because certain aspects of
> experience -- namely, quantity, quality, relation and modality -- are
> synthetic (pre-intellectual) and necessary to human understanding, there
> is
> no way of judging their applicability to objects transcending experience.
> This does not mean that Kant rejected an "ultimate" reality beyond
> experience, but simply that our rational perspective prevents us from
> defining it. For all practical purposes, then, experience IS reality,
> which
> is to say that all metaphysical propositions are necessarily hypothetical.
>
> Now in response to Scott's assertion that the MoQ accepts a "conceptual
> structure" (SQ) which "cuts us off from reality" (DQ), you have sought to
> express this metaphysical divide as it applies to four belief systems
> using
> an "analogous" logic with which I'm unfamiliar, although I'm mentioned as
> number four in your list. Thus, in your 1/30 posting, you say:
>
>> IMO logical positivism is the pattern using inorganic and organic as the
>> evolutionary analogue.
>>
>> Metaphorical existentialism is the pattern using the social level as the
>> evolutionary analogue.
>>
>> Analogical pragmatism is the pattern using the intellectual level as the
>> evolutionary analogue.
>>
>> I have no idea what Ham Priday is using as the analogue 'essentialism'.
>
> I'd like to be able to provide the missing "evolutionary analogue", Joe,
> but
> am frankly confused by your terminology.
>
> If by "evolutionary" you mean the process by which objective reality is
> thought to evolve, then I can accept your analogous definitions for
> logical
> positivism, existentialism, and (possibly) pragmatism, as all of these
> philosophical perspectives are based on a finite, dimensional reality
> (beingness) which is the object of experience. As such, they avoid the
> Kantian premise that space/time relations are "intellectualized
> constructs",
> which I also happen to believe. Therefore, it seems to me, your defined
> analogues are applicable only to an SOM philosophy in which the
> experiential
> modality is "evolutionary", that is, perceived as occurring in time.
> Whether it also includes MoQ, despite the author's denial, is apparently
> still in contention.
>
> The reality of essentialism is Essence, which (I assume) would qualify as
> your "analogue". Inasmuch as Essence is absolute, uncreated and
> undifferentiated, I can say without reservation that it is
> non-evolutionary.
> I should also note that Essence is not an SOM existent and is not
> experienced objectively. Inasmuch as it is incapable of direct
> experience,
> most of you are likely to regard Essence as nothingness. While that would
> be a "reasonable" conclusion, remember that rationality (Pirsig's
> "intellect") is precisely what creates the problematic dilemma.
>
> All metaphysical theories are hypothetical. I have postulated Essence as
> the antithesis of nothingness. This gives Essentialism a distinct
> advantage
> over MoQ: it is emphatically a non-empirical philosophy. It is also free
> of
> the contentious arguments and suppositions having to do with the SQ/DQ
> split. The only "split" in my philosophy of Essence is differentiation
> itself. And that is due to the "negational nature" of Essence which is
> the
> primary cause of existence.
>
> For two years I held out hope that Mr. Pirsig or Paul Turner or Anthony
> McWatt -- SOMEBODY in this forum -- would see the light and admit to a
> primary source for the MoQ. Sadly, I've had to abandon that hope. It
> would
> appear that belief in a supernatural reality requires a 'leap of faith'
> that
> is unseemly for a post-modern philosophy.
>
> And so a brilliant idea is lost in endless speculation and confusion.
>
> Essentially yours,
> Ham
>
>
>
>
>
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