MD Confusion or disagreement?

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Mon Feb 21 2005 - 23:26:44 GMT

  • Next message: Ron Winchester: "Re: MD Pure experience and the Kantian problematic"

    DMB, Ant,

    Ant said to Scott:
    .., materialism sees everything in the universe as being composed of
    physical substance while the MOQ sees it as composed of value - physical
    substance being just one (probable) manifestation of value.

    Scott replied:
    True, this is different. But as I have argued, a manifestation of value only
    makes sense if there is awareness of value.

    Then Ant McWatt said:
    Well, I think this is the crux of the matter. Pirsig is assuming that all
    there has been and all there ever will be are values. If awareness is
    defined as self-consciousness it has only developed relatively recently and
    will possibly disappear at some point in the future. ...To deny that values
    are self-contained is to re-introduce SOM via having a "senser" and
    "something sensed".

    dmb chimes in:
    Exactly. Here's the crux of the matter. Ironically, Scott, Sam, Matt and
    some of Pirsig's other critics are insisting that Pirsig is the one who
    can't ahke off those SOM assumtions.

    Scott:
    See below about SOM assumptions. Here I'll just mention that I did not
    define awareness as self-consciousness. That is Ant's addition.

    DMB quotes Pirsig:
    "This means Quality is not just the result of a collision between
    subject and object. The very existence of subject and object themselves
    is deduced from the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of the
    subjects and objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause
    of the Quality!" [ZMM Ch19]

    Scott:
    I am disagreeing with this, not misunderstanding it. I assume mutual
    causation, if it even makes sense to speak of "causation" in this context.

    "The Metaphysics of Quality says pure experience is value. Experience which
    is not valued is not experienced. The two are the same." [LILA p418]

    Scott:
    And this, though the disagreement is subtle. I would say that experience and
    value are inseparable, that Quality and Experience are two names for the
    same (non-)thing. (I am using experience, awareness, and consciousness
    interchangeably). So my disagreement is to not ignore the different
    connotations that 'experience' and 'value' have.

    "I think the trouble is with the word, "experience." It is...commonly used
    as a subject-object relationship. This relationship is usually considered
    the basis of philosophic empiricism and experimental scientific knowledge.
    In a subject-object metaphysics, this experience is between a preexisting
    object and subject, but in the MOQ, there is no pre-existing subject or
    object....So in the MOQ experience comes first, everything else comes
    later..."

    Scott:
    And this. I would say that experience and S/O happen together, but I would
    add that there can be experience in other forms than S/O. But there is
    always some form: form is formlessness, formlessness is form.

    dmb continues:
    What can a person do to make it any clearer? I sincerely wonder. Scott and
    others keep asking the same question is various forms: who or what is doing
    the valueing?

    Scott:
    See below: I am NOT assuming that there is a "who or what [that] is doing
    the valuing". That is something you read into it what I said.

    Scott asked:
    Was there consciousness before the biological level came into being?

    dmb quotes Pirsig on that point too...

    "In the MOQ empirical experience begins with Quality which generates
    intellectual patterns. One of these intellectual patterns is named 'senses,'
    but this pattern is derived from the study of anatomy and is not primary in
    the actual empirical process."

    "The MOQ agrees that the senses are primary in an anatomical explanation of
    [the] empirical process. So the statement in Lila seems correct to me. But
    at the cutting edge of the actual Dynamic empirical moment these anatomical
    explanations are nowhere to be found."

    Scott:
    I fail to see how these quotes answer my question. Awareness does not
    require sense organs (we are aware of our thoughts, and there is mystical
    awareness). My question is: is there awareness in any random cubic
    millimeter 10 miles below the earth's surface? Pirsig says there is value
    there. I say that that implies that there is awareness there. Does the MOQ
    agree? (And note that I am not assuming self-awareness, or SOM awareness).

    dmb says:
    Right. One has to shed the idea that experience requires a pre-existing
    subject.

    Scott:
    So now I'll ask you: where did I give the impression that I assumed that
    experience requires a pre-existing subject? I do not think that I have. What
    has happened is that you have read that into what I have said. That is, the
    misunderstanding is yours and Ant's, not mine.

    DMB goes on:
    The MOQ's no-self mysticism eludes these same critics for this same
    reason. In their hands the mystical experience is confused with subjective
    experience, with biological or intellectual static quality rather than DQ.
    Those SOM goggles distort everything beyond recognition so that DQ is
    interpreted to be Kantian, theistic, Jamesian, or some other SOM based
    concept. But this is in the eye of the beholder. Here's another example...

    Scott argued:
    But (as I have argued) value implies awareness of value,

    Ant objected:
    Only if you take an SOM stance. The MOQ is intuitively "wrong" for the
    typical Western mind and it is this priority of subjects and objects before
    values which need to be mentally broken. Pirsig argues that metaphysics is
    improved by placing values first and I think you should examine the
    pragmatic results and consequences of his "Copernican inversion" in order to
    judge the merits of his system rather than begging the question in the first
    place.

    dmb says:
    Notice how we are still dealing with this same crucial issue? Despite the
    lenght of the post, I clipped everthing except the most conspicuous displays
    of this persistent misconception.

    Scott:
    First, note that I said "value implies awareness of value", not "value
    implies that there is something that is aware of value". I deliberately
    avoided mentioning a subject. Therefore, your assumptions that to say
    "awareness of value" implies a SOM stance must be from assuming that value
    is being taken as an object, or that there is awareness of some valued
    object. But that too I deny saying. What I am saying is that to speak of
    value implies speaking of awareness. And that is all I am doing with that
    statement. I am NOT assuming that awareness comes before value. I am NOT
    assuming that all awareness is SOM awareness. I AM stating that value
    implies awareness (and agreeing with the MOQ that awareness implies value).
    So is the former (that value implies awareness) consistent or inconsistent
    with the MOQ? As far as I can recall, Pirsig does not say one way or the
    other. Ant is saying it is inconsistent. If so, then I am disagreeing with
    the MOQ.

    Ant McWatt said to Scott:
    A conflation of intellect (as understood by Pirsig) with Dynamic Quality
    will be confusing if applied to the MOQ. A real spanner in the works which
    I'm opposed to.

    dmb says:
    Right. This one kills me too. The central assertion of philosophical
    mysticism is that DQ can only be apprehended by NON-RATIONAL means, which is
    to say that it can not be apprehended intellectually. Scott's conflation of
    the two claims the very opposite, defies the MOQ's static'/dynamic split and
    thereby demonstrates a misconception of the MOQ's most central ideas.

    Scott:
    If it kills you, you have only yourself to blame, because I have never said
    that DQ can be apprehended intellectually. Not only have I never said it, I
    have explicitly denied it several times in posts to you, yet here you are
    imputing that belief to me again. What I have said is that Quality and
    Intellect are two names for the same (non-)thing. This does NOT imply that
    the normal, S/O-based intellect can grasp Ultimate Reality. It does not even
    imply that a Buddha can intellectually grasp Ultimate Reality. It does imply
    that we can -- and I think we should -- think of everything as the play of
    Intellect. It was SOM that removed intellect from nature. The MOQ, by its
    definition of intellect, preserves that removal, by treating intellect in
    the same way that materialism does, assuming that it came into existence
    from a reality that didn't have it. I am arguing -- against materialism and
    against the MOQ -- that it be restored.

    - Scott

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