From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Sat Mar 05 2005 - 02:55:46 GMT
Platt,
> Scott said:
> Neither are analogous, since there is nothing contradictory about these,
> *unless* one brings in awareness of the constantly changing forms or body.
> It is quite possible to imagine (as materialists do) that there can exist
a
> world of flux but without awareness, in which certain forms keep their
> shape, like vortices. But it is when one brings in awareness that
> contradictions arise. If that body has its eyes directed at that vortex,
> and we assume that both are only that of which "nothing stays put", then
> there is no continuity across that ceaseless motion, and so no possibility
> of awareness. Hoever, though there is a contradiction, this is not what I
> consider a case of contradictory identity. That is because we can simply
> reject one of the two: awareness, or the materialist picture. I reject the
> latter.
Platt said:
I'm puzzled by your explanation. Doesn't a materialist, like everyone
else, presuppose awareness? Is he not aware that he cannot possibly
divorce his awareness of phenomena from phenomena itself, that his models
of reality leave out the mind that created the model?
Scott:
There are, roughly, two kinds of materialists, those who think there is some
problem with awareness, and those who think there isn't. The former include
John Searle, Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers -- the latter going so far as
to say he is a "naturalist dualist". The issue comes down to what to make of
the question "is there more to pain than brain states". This group thinks
there is. The other group, which includes Rorty and Dennett, think there
isn't, that we have just gotten into the habit of talking as if there is
more. I myself don't understand how they can think that. (N.b., Matt, who
aligns with this second group, may give a more plausible picture.)
> Life a series of choices between no choices of life and death.
>
> Scott: I see no contradiction here. If I play a game of chess, I make
> choices of moves, and I have no choice to make non-chess moves (like
> sneaking a captured player back on the board) and still be playing chess.
> So whether or not we have chosen to be alive, once alive we are in the
> "being alive" game, and can make choices until its over.
Platt said:
I intended to convey the duration of life across the changes of daily
living.
Scott:
Ok, then I would call it a contradictory identity, if one emphasizes the
sense of a continuing self over a lifetime, given that the self is always
changing from one moment to the next.
> Nothing is a state of being necessary for the beginning of anything.
>
> Scott: Close. I would make it more contradictory-identity-like by stating
> it as "nothing is the ground of anything, and anything is the ground of
> nothing". However, this needs to be taken in a more "real" way than just a
> semantic observation, that two opposite words, like hot and cold, are
> defined by each not being the other. That is, the substantiality of a
thing
> depends on its not being substantial.
Platt said:
Not sure what you mean by "substantial." Are you suggesting a distinction
between words and reality with reality consisting solely of tangible
things?
Scott:
In philosophy, "substance" means something that exists causa sui, or as
Buddhists put it, has inherent self-existence. The Buddhist says that
nothing has substance, but that everything exists in dependent
co-origination with everything else. Thus a particular thing is what it is
by being everything other than itself. (No, this doesn't make sense -- it is
a contradictory identity.)
Platt said:
No doubt that consciousness, time and change are linked. We can only
conjecture what reality is like without consciousness. (I use
consciousness and awareness interchangeably to refer to any activity that
appears to be value-driven, intentional behavior.)
I suspect you're illustrating the limitations inherent in logic and reason
that mystics for centuries have encouraged all to recognize. Contradictory
identity as you describe it is one way to show that. I'm content with more
banal paradoxes to illustrate reason's limits, like "Time could not have
been created since it takes time for creation to occur."
Scott:
Actually, I am saying something much stronger than that logic and reason
have these limits. I am claiming that contradictory identity is the way
things happen, not just that our reasoning about things happening cannot go
beyond a certain point, though that is of course also true.
- Scott
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