From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Fri Mar 18 2005 - 17:43:24 GMT
Ham,
Ham said:
You may
think it "a little strange" to ask such questions, but I suspect you'll be
quite surprised when you see the wide disparity among the MOQers'
understanding of the "primacy" principle. This is already evident in the
debate "over what that entails", and I intend to focus on these differences
when all the comments are in.
Scott:
No, I won't be surprised. Quite obviously, some people here are coming from
a more-or-less atheist or materialist perspective, and others from a
more-or-less religious or idealist perspective. That, to my mind, is what
makes this forum especially interesting.
Ham said:
In the meantime, you have taken a position that, insofar as I can see, has
no support from Mr. Pirsig. Your primary essence is Consciousness, which
you apparently believe can be equated with Value, although you put it in a
value-primacy "context":
> I'm obviously arguing that [metaphysical primacy] entails a ubiquitous
> consciousness, but others may disagree.
> Regardless, this argument (in this forum) comes within a context
> of value-primacy, not object-primacy or subject-primacy. And, I should
point
> out, while I argue for a ubiquitous consciousness, that does not mean I
> agree with this author's concept of consciousness -- my view is quite
> opposed to his alternative to objectivism. Rather, I go with
Merrell-Wolff's
> consciousness without an object and without a subject.
Scott:
First of all, you made the wrong substitution in quoting me. What should
have gone into the brackets is [value primacy] not [metaphysical primacy].
Second, I do not believe that consciousness and value can be "equated". They
are two different words, not synonyms. I do hold that they are both names
for the same (non-)thing. They may be said to denote the same (non-)thing,
but have different connotations. So what I mean, is that every event has a
value aspect, and has a consciousness aspect, and there are no events that
have one but not the other (or neither). The MOQ says that awareness implies
value. I am arguing that one should also say that value implies awareness.
Some agree, others apparently don't (there is some confusion on this point).
Before I read Lila, I was thinking in terms of consciousness-primacy, though
even then I regarded it as different from subject-primacy (that is, I
considered subjects and objects as being products of consciousness).
However, in this forum -- and in Lila -- only value-primacy is taken as a
given. One has the option of rejecting value-primacy (which means one
rejects the MOQ tout court, and acts as pure dissenter. An Objectivist, for
example, would be such a one). Or one has the option of arguing that
value-primacy entails X-primacy, where X is one's own starting point (X
could be God, or Plato's Form of the Good, for instance), which is what I
have been doing. (In addition to consciousness I have also been arguing that
Intellect is also entailed, but this is even more contentious, as it
requires a much greater amendment to the MOQ).
Ham said:
I've always appreciated your philosophical clarity and integrity, Scott.
And I would have expected Platt to concur with your
Comprehensive/Atman/Overman Consciousness belief system -- and maybe he
does -- but he's teetering on a Pirsigian expression that really makes
little sense in a non-SOM context, wouldn't you agree?
Platt said:
> Pirsig's beginning axiom is not that existence exists, but that "Some
> things are better than others." He makes this clear in the Copleston
> Notes:
>
> "Ferrier's first move is to look for the absolute starting point of
> metaphysics in a proposition which states the one invariable and essential
> feature in all knowledge, and which cannot be denied without
> contradiction. For the MOQ this is, "Some things are better than others."
Scott:
I think there is a confusion here on the meaning of "starting point". The
phrase "some things are better than others" is a reflection on data. It
started the chain of thought that leads to a rejection of SOM and its
replacement with the MOQ. "Value-primacy" is the starting point of the
presentation of the MOQ. The chain of thought is: I cannot deny value (that
some things are better than others), but value is not subjective, and it is
not objective. Therefore, I will place value prior to both subject and
object (with some help from mystical authority -- that mystics have reported
transcending the S/O form without loss of value, indeed, that such a state
is immensely *better* than the S/O state).
By the way, I also dissent from the above reasoning in some respects, but
that dissent does NOT involve arguing for SOM, of seeing value as
necessarily coming in the form of "I value X".
Ham said:
As I've pointed out before, if "betterness of things" is prerequisite for
Value, then there can be no value without objects or events, and we're all
stuck in SOM reality. The same can be said for Consciousness, insofar as it
implies awareness of things sensed. So, given that rejection of
subjectivism and objectivisim is the starting point of the MOQ, how can
either Consciousness or Value (Quality?) be metaphysically primary to
differentiated existence?
Scott:
See above. The MOQ rejects the claim that '"betterness of things" is
prerequisite for Value'. It does not presuppose that "thingness" is
necessary for value. Instead, it holds that value is the source of
"thingness". And I would say the same for Consciousness.
Ham ends:
But I guess my real question is: How can this debate over primacy have gone
on so long without anyone having noticed the elephant in the room?
Scott:
If you are going to beg the question, no wonder you see an elephant. What
you say above is *your* point of view. The MOQ's point of view is different.
Your argument is like saying "Copernicus must be wrong when he says the
earth goes around the sun, since in fact the sun goes around the earth." It
is not that the MOQ is necessarily right and you are wrong (nothing in
philosophy is so clearcut), but all you are saying is that your axiom is
better than the MOQ's. For example, you say " The same can be said for
Consciousness, insofar as it implies awareness of things sensed". Well, what
if I do NOT assume that it "implies awareness of things sensed"?
- Scott
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