From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Fri Mar 18 2005 - 07:27:25 GMT
Scott (and Platt):
You said:
> Given that the MOQ rejects both objectivism and subjectivism -- indeed,
that
> rejection is the starting point of the MOQ -- it seems a little strange
that
> you should be asking people here where they stand on this essay. But maybe
> I'm missing what you are getting at. The MOQ assigns metaphysical primacy
to
> value, so what the debate is is over what that entails.
According to his biographer, late in his life Merrell-Wolff (to whom you
appear to subscribe) defined his keynote as "a tendency to drive toward the
Root . . . from which all comes". I suppose I've reached for the
philosopher's stone, also, in looking for fundamental premises. You may
think it "a little strange" to ask such questions, but I suspect you'll be
quite surprised when you see the wide disparity among the MOQers'
understanding of the "primacy" principle. This is already evident in the
debate "over what that entails", and I intend to focus on these differences
when all the comments are in.
In the meantime, you have taken a position that, insofar as I can see, has
no support from Mr. Pirsig. Your primary essence is Consciousness, which
you apparently believe can be equated with Value, although you put it in a
value-primacy "context":
> I'm obviously arguing that [metaphysical primacy] entails a ubiquitous
> consciousness, but others may disagree.
> Regardless, this argument (in this forum) comes within a context
> of value-primacy, not object-primacy or subject-primacy. And, I should
point
> out, while I argue for a ubiquitous consciousness, that does not mean I
> agree with this author's concept of consciousness -- my view is quite
> opposed to his alternative to objectivism. Rather, I go with
Merrell-Wolff's
> consciousness without an object and without a subject.
I've always appreciated your philosophical clarity and integrity, Scott.
And I would have expected Platt to concur with your
Comprehensive/Atman/Overman Consciousness belief system -- and maybe he
does -- but he's teetering on a Pirsigian expression that really makes
little sense in a non-SOM context, wouldn't you agree?
Platt said:
> Pirsig's beginning axiom is not that existence exists, but that "Some
> things are better than others." He makes this clear in the Copleston
> Notes:
>
> "Ferrier's first move is to look for the absolute starting point of
> metaphysics in a proposition which states the one invariable and essential
> feature in all knowledge, and which cannot be denied without
> contradiction. For the MOQ this is, "Some things are better than others."
As I've pointed out before, if "betterness of things" is prerequisite for
Value, then there can be no value without objects or events, and we're all
stuck in SOM reality. The same can be said for Consciousness, insofar as it
implies awareness of things sensed. So, given that rejection of
subjectivism and objectivisim is the starting point of the MOQ, how can
either Consciousness or Value (Quality?) be metaphysically primary to
differentiated existence?
But I guess my real question is: How can this debate over primacy have gone
on so long without anyone having noticed the elephant in the room?
Essentially yours,
Ham
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