Re: MD Contradictions

From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Mon Mar 21 2005 - 20:33:34 GMT

  • Next message: Mark Steven Heyman: "Re: MD Contradictions"

    Hi Scott --

    > By the way, have you been confusing "my friend" Franklin Merrell-Wolff (d.
    > 1985) with Christian Wolff (d. 1750-something)? In any case, you might be
    > interested in Merrell-Wolff as at least partially supporting your thesis,
    in
    > that he talks about "the more ponderable a thing is, the less real it is"
    > (that's not a direct quote).

    Yes, I picked up on Wolff from Runes Dictionary, not realizing it was
    another Wolff from the 18th century. What Franklin Merrell-Wolf actually
    said as his "Third Premonitory Recognition" was: "Substantiality is
    inversely proportional to ponderability". According to Tom McFarland, who
    apparently edited the Merrell-Wolff Fellowship website, this means that "the
    degree of true substance or reality is the inverse or opposite of the degree
    of ponderability. Thus, concrete objects of experience, which have a high
    degree of ponderability, are the least substantial. Subtle or abstract
    objects of experience, on the other hand, which are less ponderable, partake
    of a higher degree of substantiality and reality."

    I'm not sure what he means by "ponderability". Certainly we have more
    intelligent data to ponder on physical objects than on abstract concepts,
    but I would wager that a true Nirvana experience would be far more vivid
    than objective experience and leave us with much more to ponder. But while
    we may learn from a mystic like Wolff, it is second-hand experience which
    does not lend itself well to metaphysical ontology. (We end up
    philosophologizing about it, ref: most of the postings on MD.)

    > I'm aware of the dictionary definition of 'ontology', which is why I asked
    > what "you think" counts as ontology. For example, is a process
    metaphysics,
    > which privileges becoming over being, still an ontology? Probably. But
    does
    > contradictory identity count as an ontology? I'm not sure. It shifts away
    > from asking about the nature of being or what sorts of things are real, in
    > that it sees beingness and becomingness as products of contradictory
    > identity.

    You seem to be using "contradictory identity" as a metaphor for the polarity
    of differentiated existence. (If there's more to your concept, you'll have
    to enlighten me.) Anyway, I would place ontology at the fulcrum between
    "process" and "absolute (or static) reality" insofar as it is the theory of
    how the former is derived from the latter. I would also put "being" on the
    process side because of its association with existence, which is essentially
    the nature of process.

    > And no, my answer is not "unification as opposed to either/or". That
    option
    > is rejected in the third horn of the tetralemma ("not essence and
    > existence").

    I plead ignorance concerning "the third horn of the tetralemma", and am too
    lazy to look it up. My "unified" Essence is not contradictory -- not an
    "either/or". I explain Essence as "negational" in the sense that it denies
    itself to create otherness. (This roughly follows the metaphysics of
    Eckhart and Nicholas de Cusa.)

    > So you are presupposing an undifferentiated source (like the MOQ does).
    This
    > is one place I differ from the MOQ, in that I think the
    > undifferentiated/differentiated to be a contradictory identity, and hence
    > one should not be privileged over the other.

    Undifferentiated/differentiated is a contradictory modality, although I
    don't see why one is "privileged" over the other, except that true reality
    is undifferentiated, while physical reality is differentiated by finite
    intellection (experiential cognizance).

    > [Creation for creation's sake] is a copout if you are asking for the "why"
    of
    > creation.

    Unless your metaphysical ontology includes a teleological rationale, which
    mine does.
    I happen to think ontology demands a teleology; otherwise it offers no
    meaning or purpose for existential life. Remember, we're not dealing with
    empirical knowledge here, Scott; metaphysics is a hypothetical theory of
    reality.

    > I take creativity as a bottom-ing out term (like Quality, Consciousness,
    Intellect)
    > in that there is no deeper level by which they can be explained. One can
    > describe their activity, which bottoms out with contradictory identity.
    So,
    > for the "how" of creation, my answer is the same for the "how" of Quality,
    > Consciousness, and Intellect: contradictory identity, which amounts to
    > saying that the one is the other. But I'm afraid I do not have a detailed
    > description of that "how", nor am I sure one can get one. After all,
    > description (and explanation) doesn't work well without the laws of
    > contradiction and identity, which do not apply in talk of contradictory
    > identity.

    O.K.
    Ham also said:
    > It may be difficult to believe, but my participation in the MD is really
    > aimed at reaching a synthesis of the MoQ with Essentialism. So far it's
    > been an uphill battle against the nihilists. You and Platt would seem to
    be
    > among the last bastion of "primacy believers", and I'm no longer so sure
    of
    > Platt.
    >
    > Scott:
    > I wouldn't be so sure of me either. One advantage (as I see if) of taking
    > all of these (Quality, Consciousness, Intellect, Language, Will,
    Creativity,
    > Love, Power, ...) as "primary" is to lessen the tendency to idolatry, a
    > tendency that especially arises by seeing the undifferentiated side of
    them
    > as the "source", and the differentiated as lesser. This, again, is one of
    my
    > dissents from the MOQ.

    If I follow what you're saying here, I may agree with you to some extent.
    Man cannot experience Essence directly; he can only realize its Value(s)
    from its differentiated manifestations. But "idolatry'? That's a pretty
    strong word for finite experience.

    From all that you've stated, I still see you as an Essentialist -- somewhat
    confused, perhaps, but almost there. You're the only MoQer, in fact, who'll
    discuss ontology with me. Matt thinks it isn't necessary and wants to get
    rid of it, and Platt is stuck in Pirsig's levels & patterns.

    How about this? -- I'll explain my ontology if you'll explain yours.

    Essentially,
    Ham

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