Re: MD Contradictions

From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Wed Mar 23 2005 - 22:24:58 GMT

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    Ham,

    Ham said:
    I'm not sure what he means by "ponderability". Certainly we have more
    intelligent data to ponder on physical objects than on abstract concepts,
    but I would wager that a true Nirvana experience would be far more vivid
    than objective experience and leave us with much more to ponder. But while
    we may learn from a mystic like Wolff, it is second-hand experience which
    does not lend itself well to metaphysical ontology. (We end up
    philosophologizing about it, ref: most of the postings on MD.)

    Scott:
    I would say we philosophize about it, not philosophologize. It
    (Merrell-Wolff's account) is data as well as philosophy, and if it doesn't
    "lend itself well to metaphysical ontology", then perhaps we should question
    what we want out of metaphysical ontology.

    Scott said:
    . But does
    > contradictory identity count as an ontology? I'm not sure. It shifts away
    > from asking about the nature of being or what sorts of things are real, in
    > that it sees beingness and becomingness as products of contradictory
    > identity.

    Ham said:
    You seem to be using "contradictory identity" as a metaphor for the polarity
    of differentiated existence. (If there's more to your concept, you'll have
    to enlighten me.)

    Scott:
    I use it for that polarity (N.b., Coleridge used "polarity" more or less the
    same way that I use "contradictory identity"), but also, and I think more
    importantly, for the polarity between the undifferentiated and the
    differentiated. And I don't see it as especially metaphorical.

    Ham said:
      Anyway, I would place ontology at the fulcrum between
    "process" and "absolute (or static) reality" insofar as it is the theory of
    how the former is derived from the latter. I would also put "being" on the
    process side because of its association with existence, which is essentially
    the nature of process.

    Scott:
    So if I deny that the former (process) is derived from the latter
    (absolute/static reality) (or vice versa) does that make mine a different
    ontology, or no longer an ontology?

    Scott said:
    > And no, my answer is not "unification as opposed to either/or". That
    option
    > is rejected in the third horn of the tetralemma ("not essence and
    > existence").

    Ham said:
    I plead ignorance concerning "the third horn of the tetralemma", and am too
    lazy to look it up.

    Scott:
    First horn: not essence
    Second horn: not existence
    Third horn: not essence and existence
    Fourth horn: not neither essence nor existence

    Ham said:
      My "unified" Essence is not contradictory -- not an
    "either/or". I explain Essence as "negational" in the sense that it denies
    itself to create otherness. (This roughly follows the metaphysics of
    Eckhart and Nicholas de Cusa.)

    Scott:
    Also the Kabbala. I'm not all that opposed to it, by the way. I just think
    one can turn the screw one more time and not assume a Somewhat (in your
    case, Essence, in the MOQ, DQ, or the "undifferentiated aesthetic continuum"
    of Northrop) prior to its negation.

    Scott said:
    > So you are presupposing an undifferentiated source (like the MOQ does).
    This
    > is one place I differ from the MOQ, in that I think the
    > undifferentiated/differentiated to be a contradictory identity, and hence
    > one should not be privileged over the other.

    Ham said:
    Undifferentiated/differentiated is a contradictory modality, although I
    don't see why one is "privileged" over the other, except that true reality
    is undifferentiated, while physical reality is differentiated by finite
    intellection (experiential cognizance).

    Scott:
    Your use of the phrase "true reality" is the privileging of one over the
    other. That is what I reject. Instead, I hold that "Finite intellection" is
    a concept to be eliminated. All intellect is a contradictory identity of the
    finite and the infinite, and as such is creation.

    Ham said:
    Unless your metaphysical ontology includes a teleological rationale, which
    mine does.
    I happen to think ontology demands a teleology; otherwise it offers no
    meaning or purpose for existential life. Remember, we're not dealing with
    empirical knowledge here, Scott; metaphysics is a hypothetical theory of
    reality.

    Scott:
    For me, purpose is not something that can have a rationale. It is, instead,
    yet another of the long list of names for the same (non-)thing, like value,
    consciousness, and intellect. Everything else's rationale needs explaining
    in terms of purpose (and the rest). That is, it is primal.

    By the way, if you've been reading my posts on empiricism, like my last one
    to DMB, you'll see I'm no stickler for the empiric.

    Ham said:
    If I follow what you're saying here, I may agree with you to some extent.
    Man cannot experience Essence directly; he can only realize its Value(s)
    from its differentiated manifestations. But "idolatry'? That's a pretty
    strong word for finite experience.

    Scott:
    See Owen Barfield's "Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry" for an
    interesting inquiry into idolatry (but don't blame him for what I am
    saying). Traditionally, it means anything that is put in the place of God.
    What I mean by it is anything that one can think about as Ultimate, such as
    your Essence, or the MOQ's DQ. The function of the logic of contradictory
    identity is to deconstruct any such concept, even one which "Man cannot
    experience ... directly", or maybe especially such. Not because "to be
    experienced" is the mark of the real, but because the unexperienced is in
    contradictory identity to the experienced.

    Ham said:
    From all that you've stated, I still see you as an Essentialist -- somewhat
    confused, perhaps, but almost there. You're the only MoQer, in fact, who'll
    discuss ontology with me. Matt thinks it isn't necessary and wants to get
    rid of it, and Platt is stuck in Pirsig's levels & patterns.

    How about this? -- I'll explain my ontology if you'll explain yours.

    Scott:
    And, of course, I see you as still a bit in the grip of idolatry, "but
    almost there", and I am not sure if having an ontology isn't a mark thereof.

    - Scott

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