RE: MD Philosophy and Metaphysics (I)

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Mon Mar 21 2005 - 21:25:03 GMT

  • Next message: Matt Kundert: "RE: MD Contradictions"

    David,

    I appreciate you're interjection.

    The pieces of quotes from Pirsig you offer showing Pirsig eshewing
    representationalism and foundationalism are the same ones I read when I need
    to be reassured that Pirsig is trying to be a pragmatist. Those are not the
    ones at issue. Its other quotes that sound representational and
    foundational, and then when you combine them with the ones you've provided,
    it doesn't make a lot of sense.

    When you go on to the second part about the moral hierarchy and the primary
    empirical reality, that's where I think Pirsig attempts something
    _philosophically_ that can only be done practically. When you say that "By
    introducing the levels, pragmatism is no longer easy pickings for the Nazis
    and such. As to how we keep the Nazis from claiming theirs was an
    intellectual good and not just a narrowly viewed social good, we can't,"
    this is where I would claim that Pirsig's distinction between levels doesn't
    do us any good at the philosophical level. It only has a use at more down
    to earth levels, like in politics. This is why, in that long ago series of
    posts "Begging the Question, Moral Intuition(s), and Answering the Nazi," I
    claimed that looking for an answer to the Nazi at the philosophical level is
    a mistake, because it can't be done, which I see you as willing to go along
    with at this point. Its why I claimed that looking for a response to Nazis
    in James' _pragmatism_ was a mistake, moreorless analogous to the category
    distinction Pirsig makes between the social and intellectual level. I'm
    claiming that its like trying to answer an ethical dilemma by opening a
    physics book. James' _politics_ is what held his response to the Nazis
    because pragmatism only makes a negative philosophical point about things
    like representationalism and foundationalism. When Pirsig tries to tie it
    together with something else, like a moral hierarchy, I think it will get
    bogged down in old problems if he tries to put it to use.

    If philosophy is a practical endeavor in which we try and see how the world
    hangs together and move the conversation foward to better and better
    descriptions of how it hangs together, then I think the attempt to include a
    moral hierarchy that helps us in our relations to others (including Nazis)
    founders when it is put to use. Because either you have to go
    transcendental (and look for a traditional foundational pivot point) or you
    beg the question. The first will go nowhere (as Pirsig's pragmatism shows
    us) and the second shoots us to another conversation: like a political one.
    And this is already how we deal with the Nazi, so I'm not sure what the MoQ
    adds to our revulsion of the Nazi. You talk about "moral paralysis" the
    same way Pirsig does, which is what wet liberals get when they're trying to
    not be ethnocentric, but I'm not sure that a "moral hierarchy" is the salve
    that will eliminate it. At the level of generality we're working at, it
    just sounds like something we'd need an epistemology to hold up. I don't
    see how moral problems and ethical dilemmas have suddenly become
    "scientific," which is what Pirsig, and Anthony after him, claim. How have
    they become scientific except in such a wide sense of "science" that
    includes every inquiry and debate ever held?

    And "speculation" in my usuage isn't frivolous. Its what all the great
    poets and philosophers and physicists and all have done by creating the
    intellectual patterns with which we know the world. Speculation, as I'm
    using it, is that stab in the dark towards Whitehead's "dim apprehension."
    You say Pirsig is doing something more that redescribing lots and lots of
    stuff, more than speculation, but I'm not sure what you mean by that.
    Redescribing lots and lots of stuff is what philosophers do when they
    construct a system or a theory or a metaphysics or a new intellectual map,
    or whatever else you want to call it. Sometimes they think they are doing
    something else, like discovering the hidden reality behind appearances, but
    I know you don't think that's what Pirsig's doing. So what else is there?

    Matt

    _________________________________________________________________
    Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE!
    http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/

    MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
    Mail Archives:
    Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
    Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
    MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

    To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
    http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Mar 21 2005 - 21:55:09 GMT