From: David Buchanan (DBuchanan@ClassicalRadio.org)
Date: Sun Mar 20 2005 - 23:10:52 GMT
Matt, Scott and all MOQers:
First, a brief review of some recent comments...
Matt's definitions:
1) Metaphilosophy: What way of life are we going to follow?
2) Philosophy: How do things, in the broadest sense of the term, hang
together, in the broadest sense of the term?
3) Metaphysics: How do things _really_ hang together?
Matt said to Scott:
To my mind, speculators like Whitehead, Royce, Sanatayana, and Pirsig are
not trying to get Reality to pin down their moves. They are simply
redescribing large amounts of reality in terms of whatever.
Matt said to Scott:
For instance, you commented that you can do metaphysics without the
correspondence theory of truth, but I have no idea how you would do this,
partly because I was tailoring the definition of metaphysics to be identical
with representationalism/foundationalism. If I'm reading you correctly, you
think we can have foundationalism without representationalism, metaphysics
without correspondence, but I have no idea how that would be done.....
dmb replies:
I've drawn your attention to these assertions in order elaborate on my
assertion that you are misreading Pirsig. It seems that you want to let him
off the hook and can see "not trying to get Reality to pin down their
moves". And since, by you definition, metaphysics means finding out how
"things REALLY hang together" and metaphysics can't be done "without the
correspondence theory of truth", we might even conclude that the MOQ isn't
really metaphysics at all. But I think it THAT definition of metaphysics
that is getting you in trouble and would like to show you how Pirsig can
reject the correspondence theory of truth, refrain from claiming to know how
thing REALLY hang together while still doing something more than just
"redescribing large amounts of reality in terms of whatever". In fact, I see
no reason to believe that Pirsig ever intended to do that at all. (Feel free
to show me otherwise.)
"If objects are the ultimate reality then there's only one true intellectual
construction of things: that which corresponds to the objective world."
This might be the world's clearest and most simple description of SOM and
the correspondence theory of truth. (LILA ch29) There are many versions and
permutations, but the basic idea is there in them all. Whether it is God or
the material world, there is always the attempt to justify one's
metaphysical assertions in some foundation, some Reality or another. And so
we get to the issue here as to what Pirsig is doing. I mean, if we can't do
metaphysics without the correspondence theory and Pirsig rejects the
correspondence theory, why does he repeatedly point out that he is doing
metaphysics? He insists that the MOQ is an extension of pragmatism, which
means he nearly put them in the same sentence together.
"the MOQ is a continuation of the mainstream of 20th century American
philosophy. It is a form of pragmatism, of instrumentalism, which says the
test of the true is the good. It adds (THE MOQ ADDS) that this good is not a
social code or some intellectualized Hegalian absolute. It is direct
everyday experience. Through this identification of pure value with pure
experience, the MOQ paves the way for an enlarged way of looking at
experience which can resolve all sorts of anomalies that traditional
empiricsim has not been able to cope with."
dmb continues
This addition, he explains, "seems to unite pragmatism and radical
empiricism into a single fabric". There are two things I'd like you to
notice about these moves. By introducing the levels, pragmatism is no longer
easy pickings for the Nazis and such. As to how we keep the Nazis from
claiming theirs was an intellectual good and not just a narrowly viewed
social good, we can't. There is nothing that can be done to prevent people
from being wrong or dishonest, but I think the distinction is a good one
even if it is abused, ignored or misunderstood. Anyway, by adding a
distinction between the levels the MOQ escapes the intellectual paralysis
that results from the rather extreme position that the disappearance of
foundational metaphysics means there is no way to priviledge, say, the big
bang theory over creationism. Or the first amendment over the first
commandment. With the MOQ's moral hierarchy, we are not so hog-tied. And by
adding pure experience we get a starting point without a foundation. The
primary empirical experience is not some kind of external Reality, it is
just the first and most basic experience. I mean, not only does Pirsig
explicitly disavow the single truth theory, the correspondence theory and
SOM, it just doesn't make sense to view it that way because our intellectual
descriptions need only correspond to experience, not something else behind
it, not some Reality or God causing it or whatever. If a metaphysics based
on nothing but experience is not empirical, then nothing is. I mean, Pirsig
is not insisting on a single version of truth, but he's not just speculating
either. Even if truth is just a high quality intellectual explanation that
is bound to be replaced, I don't think it should be taken as a whimsical
thing. In the MOQ, such a thing is only outranked by the creation of a
better truth, by DQ. So basically these additions prevent the MOQ from being
used by Nazis, it prevents intellectual paralysis, it allows a much fuller
range of experience to be included. I'd even go so far as to say that
mystical and artistic experience are among the most profound and important
to everyone that I personally know. To my mind, any worldview that excludes,
marginalizes or is ill-equited to handle moral, art and mysticism is sorely
in need of fixing. I think the MOQ really goes after those problems, but I
don't see how your pragmatism does anything but exaggerate them. The MOQ
adds to 20th century mainstream philosophy, but yours strikes me as rather
extreme.
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