From: Scott Roberts (jse885@localnet.com)
Date: Tue Mar 22 2005 - 16:56:32 GMT
DMB,
DMB said:
But the MOQ is empirical from head to toe. It asserts nothing without
evidence.
Scott asked dmb:
What is the empirical evidence that there is value at the inorganic level?
(I've been asking for this for several months, from you, Paul, and Ant, and
have yet to receive an answer. If the answer is that subatomic elements
"prefer" some states over others, I would ask how do you know that that is
"preferment" and not, say, chance?)
dmb ansers:
By chance? Huh? "Preferment" is the appointment to higher office or station.
"Preference" is the word you want there. And chance has nothing to do with
it. Also, I already answered by pointing out that the "evidence" is the very
same data that is derived in all the science labs. The reading on the dials
to not change. Saying that physical reality acts according to a very
consistent pattern of perferences is based on those same readings. And it is
not intended to overturn "chance" but rather its oppostie; the laws of
physics. Preferences replace laws because the idea of unalterable physical
laws begins to break down at the sub-atomic level. As Pirsig points out, the
evidence starts to look screwy when viewed through the idea of laws and so
he would rather get rid of the idea of laws than the evidence. That's how
empirical he is, see? He'll get rid of metaphysical assumptions BEFORE he
will abandon the evidence.
Scott:
What you are saying is that the choice of a "preference" interpretation of
the quantum data is being made a priori, not a posteriori. A determinist
will make the choice for a Hidden Variable or Many-Worlds interpretation
instead, also a priori. A positivist will choose the Copenhagen
interpretation, also a priori. Since the MOQ claims to be based solely on
experience, I am asking what experience leads to the choice of the
preference interpretation? All you have said above is that the preference
interpretation is being made to maintain the idea that value is everywhere.
You state that "unalterable physical laws begins to break down at the
sub-atomic level", but there is in fact no evidence of that. There is
evidence that spatio-temporal laws break down at that level, but who is to
say that there aren't just as strict non-spatio-temporal laws?
Scott riddled me:
What is the empirical evidence that, all else being equal, the more dynamic
is better than the less dynamic?
dmb replies:
Again, the assertions of the MOQ are based on the very same evidence that
you already know about. The MOQ is an attempt to explain this world and
proceeds on the facts derived from this world. What makes you think there
are secret experiments or hidden data or whatever?
Scott:
Huh? All I am asking for is empirical evidence for the claim. It is you that
claims that the MOQ is 100% empirical. What is the evidence to reply to a
radical conservative who thinks that change is not a good thing?
Scott concluded:
Please note that I think that there is value at the inorganic level, and
that the more dynamic is better, but I fail to see how either statement can
be justified empirically.
dmb says:
Maybe that's because SOM's sensory experience is the only thing that counts
as empirical in your book. If intellectual quality is being compared to
social quality, for example, we will not be able to see the difference under
a microscope. Its not detectable with the senses. But I think experience
tells us pretty clearly that the first amendment is better and more dynamic
than the first commandment. In any case, I think its quite incorrect to
insist that sensory experience is the only valid kind and that the word
"empirical" can simply mean "based on experience" without causing any
confusion at all.
I have very little hope that you will read this rightly, but there it is.
Scott:
I didn't specify that the experience should be sensory. But as usual, you
are avoiding the issue with a red herring (my supposed SOM-based
misunderstanding).
My point in pursuing this is that a 100% empirical metaphysics is a
ridiculous notion. With the same data one can come to different conclusions
as a result of interpreting it differently. The value of the word
'empirical' was that in some cases, one can point to experience to decide
between different claims. That's not possible when the claim is something
like "everything is value" or "the more dynamic is better than the less
dynamic". I have been presenting a somewhat different metaphysical view
based on a somewhat different interpretation of mystical data. There are
several such interpretations. One of them is the Northrop/Pirsig/ Watts/etc.
interpretation. Another is offered by Leuba, another by Marechal, another by
Katz. The Northrop/Pirsig one has no more claim to empirical validity than
the others. The Northrop interpretation has an anti-theist, anti-rationalist
bias. Leuba has a materialist bias. Marechal has a pro-theist bias. Katz has
a Wittgensteinian bias. I have a pro-rationalist bias. Similarly with one's
choice of how to interpret quantum data. The idea that the MOQ has somehow
uniquely escaped any a priori argumentation by being empirical "from head to
toe" is a dangerous illusion.
- Scott
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