Re: MD Contradictions

From: Matt Kundert (pirsigaffliction@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Apr 02 2005 - 19:35:58 BST

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    Hey Ham,

    Ham said:
    I asked what the distinction was between philosophy and philosophology that
    you implied couldn't be made.

    Matt:
    Yeah, well, I've been telling you.

    The distinction that I don't think can be made is between

    philosophy and philosophology

    philosophy's substance to philosophy's history

    philosophy's center to philosophy's periphery

    philosophy's heart to philosophy's bladder

    The "natural kind" of philosophy pans out, as far as I can see (and as I
    mentioned before), to the "problems of philosophy," whatever those may be.
    By saying that the "problems of philosophy" are naturally conspicuous to all
    you can supposedly teach, e.g., "the problem of free will" without teaching
    Aristotle, Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, blah, blah, etc., etc.

    Except you can't. Because even if you drop their names and their idioms,
    you're still inadvertantly teaching them because without them we wouldn't
    even know what counted as a "problem of free will," let alone an answer.

    See, it doesn't matter really what I say about the distinction, how its
    held, what it amounts to, because I don't want the distinction. All me
    defining it will do is empty out my experience of dealing with people who do
    hold the distinction. What matters is how _you_ define it, how _you_ hold
    it. Because it certainly isn't incumbent upon me to answer what the
    substance of philosophy is, 'cuz I don't think there is one. However, it is
    incumbent on you to answer the question, "What is this fire people are
    circling, but never getting warm by?" with more than "the substance of
    philosophy" because I already know that part. What _is_ the substance of
    philosophy?

    Everything in your replies to me is a reflection of your first: "Matt,
    you're glorifying philosophology." But that begs the question. It is the
    distinction between philosophy and philosophology that is at issue. I don't
    think philosophy would turn into some polite after-dinner conversation
    (though that's not bad either), but the only reason you think so is because
    somehow what we (or some people at least) are doing now is _different_ from
    dilettantish, intellectual gossip, that you are performing a serious Kantian
    superscience and I would simply have us enact a snippy Socratic
    conversation, and it hinges on our maintaining a distinction between
    philosophy's substance and philosophy's history. However, I'm arguing that
    _nothing would change_ in our actual practice of philosophy because our
    actual practice of philosophy doesn't hold a distinction betwen philosophy's
    substance and its history. Philosophy would go on its own merry way,
    changing, evolving, all depending on the idiosyncratic needs of the present
    culture and participants _just as it always has done_.

    Obviously, you think differently on that last point, but whatever else,
    philosophy's practice couldn't possibly hold the distinction. Substance and
    history are, if they are distinguishable, inextricably bound together.

    The point I'm trying to make, essentially, is that what we do here, the
    exchange of (more or less) informed opinions, is not peripheral to
    philosophy, not just something we do in our "spare time" whereas _real_
    philosophy is our regular job, as you would have it, but just as much apart
    of philosophy as sitting in solitude writing a thesis on the ontology of
    Being. Its _all_ philosophy. Plato's Dialogues, Aristotle's treatises,
    Augustine's Confessions, Montaigne's essays, Spinoza's
    geometrically-inspired proof on God/reality, Kant's transcendental
    deduction, Hegel's Phenomenology, Nietzsche's polemics, Frege's logic,
    Carnap's semantics, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Wittgenstein's aphorisms,
    Camus' novels, Sartre's plays, Heidegger's voice of Being, Foucault's
    genealogies, Derrida's deconstruction, MacIntyre's histories, Pirsig's
    quasi-novels/metaphysics, Rorty's dilettantish
    essays-about-whatever-it-is-he-feels-like-writing-today-----------------they're
    all philosophy.

    Matt said:
    I think modern philosophy has shown itself to be a dead end. We need to
    find something else for philosophy to be.

    The reason we want to understand the past is to understand what the past was
    up to and that way be able to decide whether or not we want to continue
    doing it.

    Ham said:
    This sounds suspiciously like political expediency. Are we to decide what
    our personal philosophy should be on the basis of whether it matches the
    current trend or not? There would seem to be some lack of intregity in that
    approach. (Incidentally, I fear that our friend Mr. Pirsig may have fallen
    into that trap.) Do you not concede that a philosopher should march to the
    beat of his own drum, regardless of what others do? If I felt that my
    thesis had nothing new to offer, I would not have tried to get it published
    or put it on the Internet.

    Matt:
    This is the same thing as before. Expediency as opposed to what? How are
    we to figure out what we are supposed to do? Do people naturally wake up
    one day and go, "OH MY GOD!!! If we live in a cause and effect world, how
    are we to have free will? And if there's no free will, how are we to have
    moral responsibility?!?" No, they go to Phil 101 and Teach pumps'em full of
    that nonsense. If if they do wake up one day thinking something like that,
    what does that mean for almost everyone else who sleeps soundly? Are they
    dumb? Ignorant? Unenlightened? Inattentive to their humanity?

    And who said anything about basing personal philosophies on current trends?
    Oh, wait, that was you----because what else could the "problems of
    philosophy" be except the current trends of philosophy. Except that you
    think the "substance" of philosophy is eternal, perennial, never-changing
    (oh, and also unknowable). Well, then how do you account for the
    conspicuous changes in philosophy? The fact that Plato isn't really
    interested in the same things as Descartes, and certainly not the same
    things as Carnap? Plato never had a picture of the "mind" as a
    philosophical concept. Plato never thought there was a problem with free
    will. How do you account for these changes? Are the _real_ problems of
    philosophy coming to be found as we more forward, make progress in
    philosophy? But what about all this other crap going on? How do you
    distinguish the "correct trends in philosophy," the ones that unearth what
    philosophy's really always been about, from the "incorrect" ones, the red
    herrings? _Especially_ if "ultimate truth is beyond reach of intellect," as
    you say.

    See, I don't think we need to match our philosophy with current trends,
    obselete trends, dominant trends, peripheral trends, or non-existent trends:
    we can do whatever we want. The question is: what do you want to do? If
    you want to become a professional philosopher, then you'd better study the
    "current trends" because that's the only way you'll get a job. But what
    about after that, after you get tenure? At that point, you _can_ do
    whatever you want and keep your job. But why would we call you a
    philosopher if you talked about the economic progression of contemporary
    Russia, if that's what you wanted to do? What's more, what if you don't
    want to be a professional philosopher? How would you know what you wanted
    to do was philosophy? Except maybe by looking at the "trends" of philosophy
    (old or new)?

    So while I don't think we need to "match" our philosophy with anybody elses,
    there's a question as to whether what we are doing should be called one
    thing or another, despite the author's wishes. What makes philosophy
    philosophy? And not literature? Or physics?

    Ham said:
    Matt, I have no aversion to informed opinions and, in fact, find you
    extremely well informed in Philosophy. What I'm challenging is the general
    reluctance of MD participants to go out on a limb and stand for something --
    whether it meets with popular/professional/historical acceptance or not. If
    nothing else, a philosopher should be autonomous.

    Matt:
    I do find it funny that you would accuse people here of not going out on a
    limb. It seems to me that people here do just about anything they want
    whether or not it has an obvious hook into what people would traditionally
    call "philosophy." It sounds like babble sometimes, but that's the price of
    autonomy.

    Basically, while attempting to protect the professional's charge of the
    "substance" of philosophy, what real, serious philosophers would all be
    doing, you go for the great antiprofessionalist stick, which is exactly what
    Pirsig and most people here do, and is exactly what the
    philosophy/philosophologist distinction is for: "There would seem to be some
    lack of intregity in [Matt's trendy, historically conscious] approach. ...
    Do you not concede that a philosopher should march to the beat of his own
    drum, regardless of what others do?"

    Then why the _hell_ should I give a damn about your "substance" of
    philosophy?

    And that's the question you can't answer, as far as I can see, with a
    philosophy/philosophology distinction intact.

    Matt

    p.s. I have to apologize for the Thorn essay because I won't be able to
    read it. I have much too much on plate already to read it, try and figure
    out what its about, and then write something coherent and/or interesting
    about it. My (barest) impression of Rand (besides political revulsion) is
    that she seems like a pragmatist in some respects, but in the end she
    becomes a foundationalist (why else all that "objective" junk, after all?).
    All I can suggest for getting to know my position any more than you already
    do is using Pirsig as our "mutually experienced object" and most of my
    current position is spelled out in my "Confessions" and "Philosophologology"
    essay (though there is also a review posted, and another one on McWatt
    hopefully soon to be posted, not to mention two or three other essays in the
    works, and then of course our conversation).

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