From: Sam Norton (elizaphanian@kohath.wanadoo.co.uk)
Date: Mon Apr 11 2005 - 11:57:52 BST
Hi MSH, Ian, Adam, Platt, anyone listening in,
Perhaps it is my turn to do some ground clearing so that the argument
doesn't get bogged down with begged questions. Let me start by drawing some
distinctions.
The first is to do with the level of emotional involvement in the answer to
a question. It seems to me that 'ideal' science - calling it 'ideal' to
signify that the actual practice of scientific enquiry is different -
'ideal' science is built around what I call the apathistic stance, ie the
amount of emotional involvement in the investigation is reduced as far as
possible, ideally to zero, on the very sensible grounds that an emotional
investment in a particular outcome (a particular belief being shown to be
true) can prejudice the investigation.
The second is to do with the subject matter at issue. Let's use the standard
levels of the MoQ for differentiation, and classify beliefs according to
whether they concern physical, biological, social or intellectual matters.
The third is about what counts as 'faith based'. As I understood Adam's
original point, there is a parallel between religion and science in that
they each depend upon unproven premises. Whether that is 'faith', or whether
there remains a distinction still to be drawn between religion and science
(I think there is) is what we are discussing. (I take it as fairly
UNcontroversial that the practice of science does depend upon unproven
premises, or do you disagree with that? [You said to Scott in another thread
"Pirsig is quite clear that every metaphysics derives from unprovable
assumptions." - doesn't that have knock on effects for the physics based on
metaphysics?] The premises may be confirmed by bearing fruit, but that says
that the premises are useful rather than true, so the question as a whole
then changes - are we talking about utility or about truth (with various
Platonic ghosts wafting around - we might need to do a digression on what
'truth' is....).)
> sam:
> Do you think _all_ scientific assumptions are made for pragmatic
> reasons?
>
> msh says:
> No. Being human, some scientists might make and for a while cling
> to assumptions for selfish reasons. However, the pressure for
> results, clarity, and cross verification is so immense that bad
> assumptions are always, eventually, brought to light.
I think you're being a bit intellectualist here. What I was trying to get at
were the really obvious and unquestioned elements, eg, that the earth has
existed for a very long time, that the universe is consistent in its
operations etc. (even the use of English and mathematics) In other words, I
think there are elements which are simply assumed for the purposes of
further enquiry. (BTW the notion that the universe is amenable to rational
enquiry descends from particular theological assumptions and developments in
the middle ages - it's not an accident that western science arose where it
did).
On top of which, your statement "the pressure for results, clarity, and
cross verification is so immense that bad assumptions are always,
eventually, brought to light" seems remarkably like a declaration of faith.
How do you reconcile that with the Kuhnian argument that scientific views
change, in the end, simply because those opposed to them die out? In other
words, that the question of evidence is itself part of the problematic, and
that the change of views - whilst it can readily be described as a response
to higher Quality - does not lend itself easily to being described in terms
of evidence etc. That was the rhetoric of the nineteenth century. I'm not
sure that there is *evidence* for your declaration, or that there
conceivably could be.
> Besides, even
> if some assumptions are made for selfish reasons, career advancement,
> money from sponsors, fame and fortune, there is an element of
> practicality, evidence and reason, that is missing from faith-based
> assumptions.
I think you're again begging the question. Perhaps we should agree on
something that is a 'faith-based assumption'. How about the claim that Jesus
is the Son of God? We can *then* start to make comparisons about the
'practicality, evidence and reason' employed.
<snipping some minor points that I don't think need great attention>
> sam:
> I think you're assuming the strength of the arguments against God in
> making those points. There are lots of cases where people have
> indeed been 'persuaded' away from belief in God.
>
> msh asks:
> But would you classify these defections as routine? If so, wouldn't
> the percentage of believers decline over time?
Only if the arguments are high quality. (HighER quality than the
alternative). If they are not of higher quality, then of course the
percentage of believers would not, necessarily, decline over time. Again,
you're assuming the strength of the arguments against God in making your
point.
> What would you say it
> is that starts most people along a particular religious path,
> critical analysis of the various options followed by rational
> selection? Or high pressure enculturation?
It is 'the inherited background against which we judge'. Why do we speak
English? Our most basic beliefs are not the product of ratiocination. That
doesn't mean that they can't (or shouldn't) be open to rational
investigation should that become necessary. But undoubtedly most religious
beliefs come as part of the package of the cultural environment that a
person is brought up in. (Calling it 'high pressure' seems to have the
anti-religious rhetoric, a la Dawkins, hovering in the background. It's no
more high pressure than the current emphasis on science or capitalism in
western society.)
<snip the bit about Wegener as the points about Kuhn above cover the same
ground>
msh:
> Can you imagine a similar series of scientific events that would
> cause people to stop believing in God?
Is belief in God a scientific belief? If not, why should a series of
scientific events affect such a belief? Moreover, is belief in God more or
less fundamental to scientific beliefs? While we're about it, what's the
understanding of scientific belief that we are using?
> msh:
> Well, let's see what you think after reading the above. And try to
> resist <snipping> my questions, please.
>
> <snip the bit about Newton>
>
> msh:
> See what I mean? I think that was an important bit.
Really? OK, let's bring it back in.
msh said: Now you're talking about ego. I'm interested in the perfect
scientist, who would be egoless. There's also a distinction to be
made between theoretical and applied science, But I think we can work past
this. The question is, did Newton care so much about his
assumptions that he would have refused to drop them in the face of powerful
contradictory evidence? What if Newton had met Einstein? I
don't know of course, but my guess is that Newton was enough of a mensch to
admit when he was wrong.
This relates closely to my 'apathistic' point above - which I intend to
spend a lot of time on, once we've got some other things clear. But I think
discussing whether Newton's ego was sufficiently small to allow him to
change his mind is both very interesting and very distracting to what we're
arguing about. That's why I don't think discussing him - to be honest - is a
good use of the time I can give to this thread.
The point about ego, yes, is very important, but I don't think we're going
to miss out on talking about it.
> sam:
> <little snip>You seem to make the assumption that caring about the
> truth in this sphere is a flaw.
>
> msh:
> If you're speaking of the religious sphere, I say caring about the
> truth is essential. But it seems to me that, in the religious
> sphere, faith, more often that not, impedes the search for truth.
> Maybe it's supposed to.
I think you need to spell out what you mean by faith etc. Otherwise I'm just
going to keep on saying 'you're begging the question' (ie you're assuming
that faith is non-intellectual). But at least we're agreed that truth is
something that should be cared about.
> msh:
> Yeah, Witt can be annoying, all right. In fact, science has solved
> many of life's basic survival problems, could indeed solve them for
> everyone, if power struggles between political and other privileged
> elites did not prevent it. But anyone who expects science to solve
> their personal emotional problems, to give them a sense of comfort
> and well-being, an individual significance and purpose in life will,
> as Witt suggests, be disappointed.
Let's not make the polarity between 'basic survival problems' and 'a sense
of comfort and well-being' - let's stick to Pirsig's hierarchy. Do you think
science has solved any problems relating to the third and fourth levels? If
so, can you give an example that we can then work through?
> I'll respond to the Dawkins stuff in my next post.
Look forward to it.
Cheers
Sam
"No one _can_ speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He
_cannot_ speak it; - but not because he is not clever enough yet. The truth
can be spoken only by someone who is already _at home_ in it; not by someone
who still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on
just one occasion." Wittgenstein, 1940
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