From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Mon Apr 18 2005 - 19:22:19 BST
David, Sam (and all) --
Ham asked:
> If the whole structure is based on Experience, then why isn't Experience,
> rather than Quality, "the primary empirical reality of the world"?
dmb answered:
> Yikes. If Quality is the "primary empirical reality" then it should be
> pretty obvious that we are talking about experience. In that sense,
Quality
> is experience. Quality is empirical. See? If Pirsig had decided to call
his
> system "the metaphysics of experience" it might have been mistaken for
> something Jimmy Hendrix dreamed up. There are lots of other reasons for
> making that choice too, I suppose. But mostly it has to do with the
problems
> with SOM, namely the difficulties of locating quality in subjects or
> objects.
It's interesting that you entertain the idea of positing Experience (which
we know to be empirical) as the primary reality, but defend Quality more for
reasons of "dialectical convenience" than logical consistency. The logic
is, as you state, "Quality IS Experience". Regardless of its possible
confusion with cultural clichés and SOM
ontology, what we're really dealing with here is individual Experience. I
don't think that message has been emphasized sufficiently to be clear to all
MD participants, and I know it isn't obvious to the casual reader of ZMM or
LILA.
To assert that reality starts with Quality as opposed to Experience
immediately introduces an epistemological problem. The author has
essentially constructed his thesis out of this problem. Quality is primary,
he argues, because experience is an SOM phenomenon, and only Quality as an
abstract principle can resolve the duality paradox. It is virtually
impossible for the average person to conceive of a qualitative attribute as
anything but a subjective judgment about an observed object. To consider
Quality a universal principle that exists independently of subjective
awareness is a flight of fancy that stretches logic beyond anything even
hinted at in platonic idealism.
Now, having said that, I sympathize with Pirsig's dilemma because I, too,
believe in the unity of ulimate reality. And I can appreciate the need to
base metaphysics on something more integral to experience than mind and
matter. I can even understand the choice of Quality to express the
fundamental ground of existence. But neither Quality nor Value can stand on
its own as the primary essence. They are derivatives of a source which
transcends subject/object existence. By rejecting an ontology that would
allow a transition from secondary, derivative precepts to a primary,
absolute source, Mr. Pirsig's MoQ theory is mired in a meaningless
categorical conundrum.
dmb said:
> Pirsig points out that the senses are just one level of experience, the
> biological level. And this is the sense in which you are using the idea of
> empirically-based facts.
> Ham replied:
> Right. But I can't "know a fact" without intellectualizing it. So
> empirical experience must also involve Intellect. Also, some of the facts
> we know, if not most of them, relate to inorganic objects and social
events.
> Therefore, it seems to me that -- unless the experience referred to is
> nothing more than an itch or a toothache -- sensible (sentient?)
experience
> involves all four of Mr. Pirsig's pattern levels.
>
dmb says:
> Pirsig made a choice to divide static
> reality into four distinct levels and it seems to me that this is a pretty
> darn good choice. But similar systems construe it differently. The most
> common and simple ones only use three. (body, mind and spirit.)
I would settle for that, and so would most thinkers -- if "spirit" were
posited as the transcendent reality.
> See, this is not dogma. Its just
> an idea. And the idea has to be logically consistant and it has to agree
> with experience. That's enough to count as intellectual truth. It does not
> claim to be the only truth or even the best truth. It just has to work. In
> the case of the MOQ, these four levels really work to explain what has
been
> happening in recorded history, it really works to explain the conflict
> between religion and science. It is meant
Is it DESIGNED "to deal with the problems that we presently face"? If so,
it isn't a philosophy in the traditional sense but a polemic agenda for
social dissent leading to cultural upheaval or revolution, as the remainder
of your response would seem to suggest.
> I mean, how many more millions have to die before this conflict is
> resolved. Do you not see how murderous the reactionaries have been for the
> last several hundred years? Do you not see that the Hitlers, the Stalins,
> the Bin Ladins and the Pat Robersons of the world are extremely
destructive?
> The one thing these wildly different characters all have in common is an
> anti-intellectual, anti-Modern stance at the heart of it all.
Your repeated use of the term "anti-Modern" is suspicious to me. How do you
define "Modernity"? Are we to infer that contemporary philosophy must be
atheistic, anti-spiritual, and politically motivated? Is this all we may
expect from philosophy from here on out? I certainly don't make that
assumption.
> So I'm saying
> that one of Pirsig's BEST moves is to make a distinction between the
social
> and intellectual levels. Its a tool that allows us to sort out all kinds
of
> issues. Maybe this is what Mark was getting at when he suggested that you
> don't understand what you're saying. Its not that your Essentialism will
> necessarily lead to genocide of the reintroduction of theocracy in the
West,
> but it certainly won't help to prevent it. I mean, it seems to me that you
> are on the wrong side of evolution.
I don't know what side of evolution that is, but the cultural thrust of
Essentialism is to free mankind from the rule of external authority. Does
this sound like support for theocratic governance?
Ham said:
> You balk at the notion of a "prime mover" or creator, and you make a "low
> quality thing" out of faith; yet the implicit trust that you and your
> cohorts profess for this quaternary blueprint of reality is no less than
> what I'd expect if Moses himself had handed it to you on a stone tablet
> brought down from Mt. Sinai.
>
dmb says:
> Its not that I have faith in the word
> of "the famous author". I just see that it agrees with experience, with MY
> experience. It makes sense. As a student of history I was especially
> interested in the rise of Modernity and the impact of the death of God.
Apparently, man has "evolved" to fulfill Nietzsche's vision of a nihilistic
world.
> Ham asked:
> There are all kinds of epistemological schemes out there. So why is this
> one so sacred?
>
> dmb continues:
> By analogy, we live in a pluralistic society where we
> are supposed to embrace all kinds of perspectives and cultures. There is
> lots of room for nearly everyone, but does it make any sense to embrace
the
> KKK in the name of pluralism? Heck no! Show me a guy who thinks otherwise
> and I'll show you a guy who does not understanding the meaning of
pluralism.
> (This is just an analogy and I'm NOT calling you a racist.)
I sense some desperation here, David. By any chance, did you have
"political correctness" in mind when you typed this tirade? That's one
impractical contribution to Modernism that we may agree on.
Ham said:
> You have no proof that Intellect exists in the abstract (which,
> for me, rules out Level 4 as a legitimate static pattern). That phrase
> simply means that you can find human beings almost anywhere with the
> intellectual capacity to deal abstractly with empirical knowledge -- and
to
> construct theories like this to explain things about which they have no
> empirical knowledge.
dmb replied:
> I don't understand what you're saying here. I'm just saying that anyone
can
> grasp an idea just like anyone can grasp a stick. I'm just saying that it
> makes sense to view ideas as real - as real as rocks and trees. In fact,
it
> strikes me as quite absurd to assert otherwise. I mean, try telling Neil
> Armstrong that scientific ideas are "just subjective". I'm just saying
that
> the idea of an intellectual level of reality makes sense and agrees with
> experience.
Scientific ideas, while based on empirical observation, are nevertheless
subjective
precepts understood intellectually by individuals like Neil Armstrong, you
and me.
dmb asked:
> Is there any evidence of any kind WHATSOEVER that we live after death?
> Please put it on the table.
Ham asserted:
> Along with many scientists, I believe that the universe exhibits
> intelligent design. This not only implies a primary Designer, but a
> teleology for the design. For the design to be meaningful to man, the
> purpose of his creation would logically extend beyond finite existence.
dmb said:
> The world is such an amazing place that I can almost sympathize and
respect
> the idea if intelligent design. Almost, but not quite. I think that its
> really just creationism in a tuxedo. This answer will be too short to
> satisfy, but I think the intelligence and beauty on display is really just
a
> case of being enthralled with our own interpretations. This is a matter of
> falling in love with our own reflections while not even realizing that
we're
> looking at ourselves.
>
Ham asserted:
> Were we to have access to empirical proof of continuity hereafter, it
> would violate the principle of man's autonomous freedom; hence such proof
is
> disallowed by the Intelligent Creator. In fact, the absence of such proof
> tends to confirm the concept.
dmb said:
> This is the kind of statement that leads me to have such a profound
> disrespect for theology. Its completely circular and begs all the
questions.
> Yuk! "The absense of proof tends to confirm the concept"? That's a heaping
> helping of stinky dung. That's exactly the kind of thing that gives
> metaphysics a bad name.
The "absence of proof" in this context is unique in that there is no other
innate (some geneticists believe) psycho-biological propensity in human
behavior whose goal is not achievable in the life experience. That's why I
assert that "the inscrutability of life's meaning confirms the teleological
nature of our experienced world".
Ham asked:
> Why are things better now than they were before? Death is a biological
end
> for all living organisms, but I don't see how many deaths over time
improves
> things.
dmb replied:
> Yes. There is an interesting concept that you may not have heard of. Its
> called evolution. Its the central principle of all the biological sciences
> and can be very well applied to the social sciences as well as
intellectual
> history.
Sweeping past your sarcasm, I agree that evolution is the process whereby
organic life forms attain a higher degree of complexity, but I don't agree
that "betterness" is a function of complexity. As you've so colorfully
demonstrated above, the evolution of our complex modern culture certainly
hasn't improved it.
Thanks for your lucid responses to my questions. They've really helped in
my understanding of the MoQ.
(Incidentally, the only vestige of the Orpheus thread remaining in my
mailbox is your posting to Sam dated 4/3. But I shall try to resurrect more
of that threat from the archives.)
Cheers and Peace,
Ham
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archives:
Aug '98 - Oct '02 - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Nov '02 Onward - http://www.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/summary.html
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon Apr 18 2005 - 20:27:15 BST