From: hampday@earthlink.net
Date: Sat Apr 23 2005 - 09:30:53 BST
Mark --
You say:
> I've asked several times for
> your answer to Hume's refutation of the Intelligent Design argument.
> You give no response, yet continue to claim that ID is a strong
> argument for the existence of Essence. Is this your idea of a
> philosophical discussion?
I don't recall your asking me to refute Hume's argument even once; but,
then, knowing your position on ID, I might have overlooked the request
believing that it was a rhetorical question.
Hume's so-called "refutation of an intelligent creator" is nothing more than
the empiricist's dismissal of *a posteriori* knowledge. Since nothing like
an "intelligent designer" is implanted in our minds, we cannot infer
intelligent design from our sense experience. Reason has no right to add
anything to this experience, or to alter the information received by
imputing meaning to it. Where, then, does the notion of ID come from, and
how do we recognize it? The analogy he uses is as follows:
"If we see a house,. we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had
an architect or builder because this is precisely that species of effect
which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely
you will not affirm that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house
that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the
analogy is here entire and perfect." [Dialogues, Part II].
By setting up an inappropriate analogy and claiming that the universe does
not resemble a house, he says we can't conclude that there is a universal
architect. Pardon me, but that argument is really dumber that it is weak.
I find Paley's "Watchmaker" argument a far more convincing defense for ID.
"Suppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the
watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think . that, for
anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not
this answer serve for the watch as well as for [a] stone [that happened to
be lying on the ground]?. For this reason, and for no other; viz., that, if
the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, if a
different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in
any order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would
have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the
use that is now served by it." [Paley, 1]. Paley then goes on to
demonstrate that the material universe exhibits the same kind of functional
complexity as a watch:
"There are thus two features of a watch that reliably indicate that it is
the result of an intelligent design. First, it performs some function that
an intelligent agent would regard as valuable; the fact that the watch
performs the function of keeping time is something that has value to an
intelligent agent. Second, the watch could not perform this function if its
parts and mechanisms were differently sized or arranged; the fact that the
ability of a watch to keep time depends on the precise shape, size, and
arrangement of its parts suggests that the watch has these characteristics
because some intelligent agency designed it to these specifications. Taken
together, these two characteristics endow the watch with a functional
complexity that reliably distinguishes objects that have intelligent
designers from objects that do not."
That argument, as you probably know, is still effectively used by the ID
proponents.
> In the absence of time, the causality principle is
> meaningless. Even in the presence of time, any notion of an
> uncreated source, primary cause, unmoved mover is logically
> indefensible, unless you simply assume the truth of what you are
> trying to prove.
Or, unless one assumes that a primary cause is a primary source, as I do.
msh before:
> In what way does your idea of an uncaused cause avoid the
> multitude of unanswered refutations of the Ontological argument for
> the existence of God?
Anselm's ontological argument (slightly abbreviated) is presented like this:
1. God is that which nothing greater is possible, i.e. the greatest possible
being (by definition).
2. It is at least possible for God to exist in reality. .
3. If something exists only in the mind but is possible (in the sense that
was defined in 2), then that something might have been greater than it is.
4. Suppose God exists only in the mind and not in reality.
5. Then there is a possible being that is greater (than the being in 4),
namely God existing in reality.
6. So it is possible for something to have been greater than God (from 5).
7. Since God is that which nothing greater is possible, then it is possible
for something to be greater than that which nothing greater is possible
(from 6).
Since statement 7 can't possibly be true because it is self-contradictory,
God must exist in reality as well as the mind.
A logical syllogism for the ontological argument above shows that:
1. If God exists, then he necessarily exists. (And this premise is true in
all possible worlds.)
2. It is at least possible for God to exist.
Conclusion: If God exists, he exists in reality
Kant came up with the only logically valid objection to this argument,
pointing out that a predicate is a property we attribute to something. He
said:
"Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something
which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the
positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is
merely the copula [i.e. the verb linking the subject and the predicate] of a
judgment. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions,
which have a certain object or content; the word 'is', is no additional
predicate-it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject.
Now if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being
one), and say, God is, or There is a God, I add no new predicate to the
conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject
itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object."
But that's a semantic rebuttal, not a conceptual one. Like a former
president, caught with his pants down, said: "It all depends on what the
meaning of 'is' is." He tried to argue his case with words, but we all know
what the reality was.
I make the claim that Essence [e.g., God] "is" without the contingency of
either "being" or "existing". From a rational perspective, you'll tell me
that makes no sense. But who says that ultimate reality must conform to
man's reason?
Enough of Philosophy 101 for now, Mark. I'm tired. Try again tomorrow.
Cheers,
Ham
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